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SUMMARY
Reflecting the fact that the cooperative sector in the U.K. has
experienced record growth over the past fifteen years, this thesis forms
an investigation of the organisation and behaviour of producer
cooperatives. The theoretical literature surrounding the labour —
managed firm is examined and subjected to testing and empirical
observation. In this way a fuller understanding of the cooperative
sector and of participatory arrangements in general is achieved. The
theory and issues underlying this approach are based on Williamson's
(1980) notion of hierarchy, the neoclassical literature surrounding
perverse supply effects and extensions of that, examining the nature of
the cooperative objective function, growth, managerialism and
degeneration, and the nature of self— exploitation in an economy
dominated by large capital. The empirical contributions are derived
from a data set of 78 producer cooperatives collected by the author.
In the analysis contained in this thesis it has been possible to question
accepted theory, to offer some alternative modelling approaches, largely
based on the use of probit analysis and to seek to describe and
explain more fully certain aspects of the organisation and behaviour of
U.K. cooperatives. In doing so some attempt has been made to
extend the analysis beyond the boundaries of pure economics and to
consider facets of participation provided in other disciplines.
Many different measures have been used in the thesis which indicate
that whilst cooperatives, like many small businesses, will face problems
surviving in the market place, they nevertheless seem largely successful
in pursuing their stated objectives. Many of the 'accepted' negative
aspects of the cooperative form of organisation, such as perverse
supply — side responses, have been shown to be based on restrictive
assumptions about the labour — managed enterprise. Assertions about
the existence and survival of cooperatives based on ideas of
degeneration and self— exploitation have been shown to be
questionable. Perhaps surprising to some, it is shown that
management does play an important role in the organisation and
behaviour of many cooperatives. For example, the existence of some
sort of management structure seems important in those firms with high
growth aspirations.
Much of the discussion in this thesis suggests that worker involvement
can bring about productivity increases. In effect, it is argued that
participation can lead to augmentation of the production function.
Traditional businesses in general might therefore be advised to consider
adopting participation in the workplace. On the other hand
cooperatives should also realise that success in conventional terms can
often enable them to better pursue their political motivations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Producer cooperatives in the United Kingdom have their origins in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In 1893 there were 113
such cooperatives but at the beginning of the nineteenth century their
number steadily declined. It was only during the 1960's that new
cooperatives began to be formed and only after 1975 that there has
been a major expansion in their number.
During the last ten years the U.K. producer cooperative sector has
been experiencing record growth. Whilst still considerably smaller than
some of its European counterparts it is claimed that the U.K. sector
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comprised over 6,000 worker— members in 1984 (Cockerton and
Whyatt, 1984). Cooperatives have been formed in many sectors of
industry where they did not exist previously. These include engineering,
building and construction and technology fields. But the retail and
wholesale sectors are traditionally prominent. The failure rate according
to Cockerton and Whyatt (1984) is probably around 5% of startups,
which is substantially better than figures quoted for all new businesses.
But just how many worker cooperatives there are in the U.K. is open
to considerable debate and the wide range of estimates is somewhat
confusing. Whyatt (1987) states:
'The movement has grown beyond all expectations since
1976. We have witnesses a 26— fold increase which has
brought 1,400 co — ops and 12,000 worker — owners into
being, the greatest increase in Europe." (p. 5)
The Cooperative Development Agency (CDA) (1984) suggests that there
has been and will be phenomenal growth amongst worker cooperatives:
'They have grown so fast during the last few years that
if the growth continues at the same rate, there will be
over 250,000 co — operative businesses by the end of the
2
century. How will the Registrar of Friendly Societies cope
with over 1000 registrations every week... ?"
Hobbs and Jefferis (1988) however suggest that much of the data on
worker cooperatives is misleading as to the true size of the sector.
They argue that the central error is the overzealous inclusion of
organisations which are not strictly "cooperative". Moreover the data
includes cooperatives which are still registered but in reality have
ceased trading and other organisations which do not provide full time
employment even for one member. Hobbs and Jefferis find that the
total population of worker cooperatives may be as small as two — thirds
of that which has been claimed by the CDA. This would give a total
in 1986 of slightly under 900. Hobbs' (1989) subsequent estimates of
the number of cooperatives in existence in 1988 is contradictory,
putting the figure at above 1200 cooperatives, with in excess of 9000
workers.
What is clear however, is that it is no coincidence that the growth in
the cooperative sector (and similarly in the small firm sector) has been
highest during a period of high unemployment. We have seen booms
in the 1890's, 1930's and 1980's. Hobbs (1989) suggests that the
growth rate in 1982 was 35% for example. But the simple
extrapolation of this trend, suggested by the CDA, ignores the social
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and economic framework in which this growth has taken place. The
growth rate for 1988 seems to have been between 10% and 13%.
According to Hobbs and Jefferis (1988) 86% of cooperatives have less
than ten workers (this is confirmed below in table 1.1) and 59% have
less than five workers. Thus there does seem to be a tendency
towards small size compared with all small firms. This may however
reflect the relative youth of the cooperative sector.
When examining the sectoral distribution of cooperatives (table 1.2) we
find that compared with traditional small firms production is relatively
small and the retailing and service sectors larger. There is much
anecdotal evidence to suggest that cooperatives are common is
"artisan" areas of business and the survey used in this thesis tends to
support that view.
Table 1.3 indicates that 35% of all cooperatives can be found in
London and the South — East, although a similar percentage (34%) of
private firms are also found in these areas. Perhaps more interestingly,
64% of cooperatives in London are to be found in only six of the 32
boroughs. This may reflect the differing amount of support given by
some councils and CDA's.
4
Distribution of cooperatives by number of workers
Number of
Workers
Number of
Coops
Percent of
Coops
Percent of
All Firms
1-10 770 86 76
11-24 99 11 14
25-49 18 2 6
50-99 3 3
100+ 4 1
Sources:	 ICOM Database (amended by Hobbs, 1989) and
Department of Employment Gazette (1988) p.39
Table 1.1 
Distribution of Cooperatives and Small Firms by Industrial Sector
Sector Cooperatives Percent of Percent of
Trading l Cooperatives All Small Firms2*
Agriculture 17 2 1
Building 66 8 5
Catering 46 5 3
Professional 56 6 6
Production 243 28 41
Motor 12 1 1
Retail 147 18 13
Services 249 28 23
Transport 19 2 3
Wholesale 25 2 4
1. Where this can be clearly identified
2. Under 25 employees
Sources: ICOM Database, Hobbs (1989), Ganguly (1985).
Table 1.2
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Geographic Distribution of Cooperatives
Region Cooperatives Percent of Percent of
Trading l Cooperatives All Employment
Scotland 74 8 8
North 65 7 5
Yorks & Humb 91 10 10
North West 85 10 8
Wales 62 7 6
West Midlands 62 7 5
East Midlands 81 9 17
East Anglia 23 3 2
South West 35 4 5
London 273 31 27
South East 36 4 7
1. Where this can be clearly Identified
Sources: As table 1.2
Table 1.3
1.2 Rationale for Research
A large number of theoretical studies have refined and extended the
basic model of the labour — managed firm in a market economy first
introduced by Ward (1958). Despite considerable interest in this
institutional form, the issues it raises have rarely been subjected to
empirical scrutiny. A dearth of information remains in spite of the
increasing number of labour — managed and quasi — labour — managed
enterprises operating in Western capitalist economies.
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There seem to be two general explanations for the lack of empirical
work in this area. Firstly, the actual form of enterprises and their
institutional settings differ from the idealised model, distorting empirical
results and impairing their generality. Secondly, there is a lack of data,
particularly at the enterprise level which severely limits the investigations
which can be undertaken. But the existence of a small but growing
cooperative sector in the U.K. allows us to examine some of the issues
raised in the theoretical literature.
In recent years, an increasing number of economists have shown
interest in the internal nature of the firm, in the firm — market
relationship, and in consequent questions. Related to this is the
challenge by radical economists, to mainstream economics, to show
that hierarchical relations of production are principally a tool of capitalist
domination over workers. How production and related activities are
organised, and the relations between the workers and managers and
between workers involved in these activities, is a subject interest which
crosses several disciplinary boundaries. Within the economics discipline
itself these issues are part of a longstanding methodological debate
on realism in economic models. Yet today it is increasingly being
recognised that whether ordinary price theory or the developing
'economics of organisation' provide better characterisations of
microeconomic reality depends upon the questions in which we are
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interested. Central to this debate is the issue of participation and this
thesis attempts to make a contribution to that with an analysis of the
producer cooperative.
The theoretical literature on the labour — managed firm usually
distinguishes it from other firms by assuming that it has a distinct and
particular objective function. The best known example of this being the
"Illyrian" formulation, originally based on the work of Ward (1958),
where the firm seeks to maximise net income per worker. In the past,
to many, this has been an adequate characterisation of the worker—
managed enterprise even though it implied behavioural tendencies which
were perverse (see for example, Vanek, 1970). But there is no real
unanimity as to the appropriate maximands or the behavioural rules
characterizing such enterprises.
However much of the theorising about the cooperative form of
enterprise, whether based on neo — classical optimisation or more
subjective observation, have led many academics to reflect the view
taken by Domar (1966) at an early stage of the debate:
"Judged by strictly economic criteria, the co — op has not
come out well. But even on these grounds, it is quite
possible that a co — op may be more efficient than a
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capitalist or state owned firm in societies where
membership in the co — op, as contrasted with hiring out
for a job, has a strong positive effect on workers'
incentives."
Estrin, Jones and Svejnar (1987) note that at present, there is little
published information on the diverse ways that participatory firms are
actually organised. Moreover, there is little empirical evidence or
modelling of the relationship between worker participation and enterprise
activity. Where appropriate some modelling has been undertaken in
this thesis which contributes in general terms to the performance —
participation nexus.
Again Estrin, Jones and Svejnar (1987) discussing the conclusions of
their work on productivity and worker participation note that these must
be:
"... tempered by the acute need for additional empirical
research in this area. The comparative nature of our
study highlights the diversity of findings across countries
and economic sectors. The fact that the estimated effects
are very significant in Italy and France and relatively
insignificant in the U.K. points to the desirability of
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performing future analyses of the relevant institutional
factors that differ considerably across the individual
settings." (p.57 — 58)
An attempt has therefore been made in this thesis to subject aspects
of the theory referring to the organisation and behaviour of producer
cooperatives, to empirical scrutiny using evidence from the U.K. The
central theoretical stances which have been investigated include issues
of internal organisation, the objective function of the labour — managed
firm, growth, degeneration and self— exploitation.
1.3 Orpanisation and Scope of the Thesis
The thesis examines some important parts of the theoretical literature
surrounding the labour — managed enterprise and subjects them to
testing and empirical observation. In this way a fuller understanding of
the U.K. cooperative sector and of participator arrangements in general
is achieved with pointers for future research being provided. The
theory and issues underlying this approach are based on Williamson's
(1980) notion of hierarchy, the neoclassical literature surrounding
perverse supply effects and extension of that examining the nature of
the cooperative objective function, growth, managerialism and
degeneration and the nature of self — exploitation.
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Unlike many traditional theses the approach taken has not been to
examine all the theory and then subject it to empirical analysis, but
rather to build up a picture of the U.K. cooperative sector by an
examination of key areas of theoretical analysis. A logical structure is
taken along this road, beginning with an examination of the internal
structure of the firm, examining its actual behaviour and ending up with
an examination of issues connected with the external environment.
Most of the empirical work contained in this thesis is derived from a
data set of 78 producer cooperatives in the U.K. Details of survey
design, data collection and a broad overview of the characteristics of
these cooperatives are contained in chapter 2.
Chapter 3, using the approach associated with Williamson (1980),
examines the internal structures of and relative efficiency of labour —
managed and capitalist production. In critically appraising the work of
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Williamson (1975, 1980) and looking
beyond this paradigm both theoretically and empirically, efficiency and
organisational attributes of U.K. producer cooperatives are examined.
The theoretical underpinnings of a neoclassical optimising approach to
the labour— managed firm are examined in chapter 4. These are
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extended to show that the Ward — Vanek Illyrian framework is based on
restrictive assumptions. By examining the objectives and motivations
of the cooperative movement, based on the idealised cooperative
defined by Mellor et. al. (1988), a picture of the diverse nature of the
cooperative objective function is built up.
Chapter 5 attempts to make a contribution to the participation —
performance nexus and to further discuss the supply — side constraints
assumed by Illyrian analysis by examining the performance of
manufacturing cooperatives in the guise of growth aspirations and
actual growth rates. Probit analysis is used to find the characteristics
of the enterprise which make it more probable that it will have high
growth aspirations. Following this there is an extension of the analysis
which examines behavioural patterns associated with political motivation
in the cooperative enterprise. Much of the impetus for this analysis
comes from the criticism levelled at the Western cooperative movement
by Daudi and Sotto (1985).
Chapter 6 examines the reasons why cooperatives may adopt a
managerial structure within their organisation. In particular two
hypotheses are tested. Firstly, that management structure will increase
with the size and complexity of the enterprise and secondly, that
managerialism will increase over time because of a tendency for
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cooperative firms to degenerate towards capitalist forms.
In recognising that the cooperative is often a fringe firm dominated by
larger capitalist enterprises, chapter 7 examines the nature of the self -
exploitation within the cooperative often associated with this scenario.
In fact two scenarios are examined; one where the cooperative has
large capitalist competitors and the other where it is dominated by a
large buyer of its output.
The issues raised in the theoretical literature and in the empirics
discussed in the thesis are re — examined in chapter 8 by reference to
six case studies of cooperatives. The emphasis is on illustrating the
complexities and interrelated nature of much of the preceding
discussion. Finally some conclusions are discussed in chapter 9.
In all the areas just listed, my intent has not been to provide an
exhaustive and all — encompassing review of all the theoretical literature
surrounding the cooperative enterprise. Neither has it been my
intention to squeeze every drop of information out of the data since the
primary objective has been to test and at times challenge common
theories and assumptions about the labour— managed firm. Not
surprisingly it has been impossible to reach definitive answers on the
range of issues tackled. Nevertheless it has been possible to question
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accepted theory, offer some alternative modelling approaches and seek
to describe and explain more fully aspects of the organisation and
behaviour of producer cooperatives. In doing so, some attempt has
been made to extend the analysis beyond the boundaries of pure
economics (whatever they may be) and consider facets of participation
provided by other disciplines.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
2.1 Introduction 
In analyzing aspects of the organisation and behaviour of U.K. producer
cooperatives, the approach taken in chapters 3 to 7 has been to
review and assess the underpinnings of the theoretical literature on the
labour — managed firm (LMF), beginning with workplace specific or
internal aspects of the firm and progressing towards more external
factors. Key issues in the debate surrounding the LMF are examined
and some basic hypotheses based on the discussion are tested. In
some ways the approach may therefore be seen as an attempt to
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verify or refute some common theoretical underpinnings in the literature
surrounding the labour — managed firm in Western economies. Some
conclusions are reached, but this type of investigation should never be
seen as exhaustive, indeed many suggestions for future research are
made throughout the thesis and in the final chapter. The general aim
in using the data has been to examine the key issues in the debate
surrounding the cooperative firm. Statistical analysis is therefore used
to test common hypotheses. It has not been my primary aim to
examine every possible relationship within the data since if these are
not founded in theory they may be spurious. Nevertheless many
interesting, and unexpected, relationships are uncovered.
The boundaries between economics and other disciplines in the social
sciences are rather vague and indeed overlap and it has not been my
aim to concentrate on only mainstream economic analysis. Whilst
neo — classical optimisation models play an important part in the thesis
so do organisational aspects of the firm, radical perspectives on the
firm and on the division of labour, and socio — political analysis.
Superimposed on all of this is an empirical, largely statistically based
analysis of data on 78 producer cooperatives collected by the use of
questionnaires. This is supplemented by six case studies, (chosen
because of their diversity), of cooperatives in chapter 8.
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2.2 Previous empirical investigation
The degree to which any theory can be supported or refuted relies on
the empirical evidence available. Other than anecdotal evidence, in the
case of producer cooperatives, this is in short supply. One of the
problems is that the cooperative sector has always been relatively small
in the U.K. and has also comprised small firms. In an attempt to add
to the empirical evidence available it was the intention of this research
to mount a survey of a representative sample of cooperatives, operating
in the manufacturing sector of the economy. Two previous attempts
at doing this have provided interesting information but naturally sample
sizes were small.
A survey of 57 cooperatives who were members of the Industrial
Common Ownership Movement (ICOM) has been carried out by Chaplin
and Cowe (1977). Their questionnaire was designed to elicit
information about how cooperatives started and how they operated,
together with the kind of problems met both in starting up and in
subsequent operations. A response rate of 57% was achieved without
any follow — up requests. The survey indicated that the problems
involved in setting up a cooperative were no different to those
encountered in establishing a conventional small business. Cooperatives
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which had been established close to the time of the survey tended to
receive a significant amount of help from government finance and loans
from I.C.O.F. and other cooperatives. The average size of membership
investigated was nine members.
One aspect of the study which is particularly relevant to the research
undertaken here concerned the organisation of the cooperative. It
revealed that many cooperatives appeared, at least to the purist, to fail
as cooperatives in one or more of the crucial areas of control, job
allocation and wage payments. Over a quarter of the cooperatives did
not indulge in communal decision — making and in three cases those
responsible for taking the decisions were not elected by the workforce.
One third of the established cooperatives had no restrictions at all on
differentials. Thus commonly elites developed within the workforce
against the ideals of longer term cooperation. Chaplin and Cowe also
note that those cooperatives "representative of alternative movements
seem less concerned about ownership and indeed with financial
success" (p.50).
In a postal survey of economic aspects of worker cooperatives in
Britain, Wilson (1982) analyzed 113 cooperatives. In addition to the
questionnaire responses, data was supplemented by information from
Companies House and the Registry of Friendly Societies.
	 An
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unexpected outcome was that many cooperatives proved to be multi —
functional. For example one cooperative surveyed described its
activities as:
"... a nucleus of people looking for friendly, non — sexist,
socially responsible, flexible work."
and listed their trades along a range from building to dressmaking.
This was typical of cooperatives who had been established as
alternatives to a more traditional firm, seeking to escape more
conventional work relationships, primarily promoting broader causes.
This perhaps suggests a correlation between strength of ideological
input and diversification into a range of activities.
Generally the cooperatives surveyed were seen as having broader
objectives than their capitalist counterparts. Of the firms surveyed,
some were mainly concerned with achieving a desired 'quality of
working life' and many placed much emphasis on political or religious
ideology. Fifty — eight percent of the survey saw stability of employment
and job security as being a prime objective.
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2.3 Data Collection
The two questionnaires used in this research represent an attempt to
collect original data capable of providing empirical evidence able to
support or refute hypotheses based on the general theoretical areas
discussed in the introductory chapter.
The first questionnaire (a copy of which is contained in the appendix
A) was sent to the 216 manufacturing cooperatives listed in the
National Directory of New Cooperatives and Community Businesses
(CDA, 1986). The definition of manufacturing adopted by the CDA
seems to be very broad and the analysis in this thesis prefers to use
the term producer cooperative which would include any enterprise
which makes something tangible. The survey was limited to producer
cooperatives for a number of reasons. These included, wanting data
to reflect the nature of the theoretical literature, the largest part of
which is about participatory production, not wanting to replicate
concurrent work done on wholesaling and retailing by Jefferis (1988),
and not wishing the area of analysis to become too wide and unwieldy
for analytical purposes.
Seventy — eight questionnaires were returned completed and a further
thirty five were returned marked 'gone — away' and eight returned not
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completed. This represents a return rate of 56% and a response rate
of 36%. This return rate includes one follow—up contact with the 216
cooperatives by way of a reminder letter and further copy of the
questionnaire. Of the seventy — eight responses, sixty — six were
responses received before the reminder was sent out and twelve
afterwards. Following Plosser et. al. (1982) this has meant that a test
of survey bias was possible by examining the two sets of responses
as independent samples. It can be shown (see appendix C) that there
is no evidence to suggest that the two samples come from a different
population and therefore no evidence of survey bias.
The high number of 'gone — away' returns is not necessarily indicative
of closures. Contact with local CDA's seems to imply three main
reasons for this relatively high figure:
1. Some cooperatives had entries put into the directory
before they started trading and in the end were actually never
established;
2. Some cooperatives had changed address without having
their mail redirected; and
3.	 Some cooperatives had closed.
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Because of a lack of detailed information held by most local CDA's it
is not possible to estimate the proportions falling within each of these
categories despite telephoning several CDA's for help.
Neither did the Directory only include addresses of "new" cooperatives.
Many were indeed established enterprises which had been operating,
in some instances, for over twenty years. Thus the survey is not
based on only recently established cooperatives.
Wherever feasible respondents were asked to rank their responses in
some order of importance. In some respects the questionnaire may
not have been as comprehensive as desirable, but there is a careful
balance to be kept between accessibility, and therefore response rates,
and the length of the questionnaire. Nevertheless the response rate
seems to be slightly lower than previous surveys perhaps reflecting the
questionnaire's relative detail.
The second questionnaire (see appendix B) was sent one year after
the first to the sixty cooperatives who had responded to the first and
had supplied their addresses. This elicited 46 responses. On this
occasion there was no reminder. The lower response rate may reflect
this, but also reflects the nature of the questionnaire. In retrospect
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there were two problems. One was that the questionnaire did ask for
personal information about the members of the cooperative, but at the
time of compilation it was intended that this information should be used
extensively. The second problem was associated with some aspects
of the questionnaire not being as clear as they could have been.
Although a covering letter was sent to the cooperatives explaining some
points; in retrospect this may not have been enough.
The second questionnaire was sent only to those cooperatives which
had responded on the first occasion since part of the reason for the
questions asked was to compare responses with those of a year earlier
and to compare firms' growth aspirations with their estimated (actual)
growth rates.
2.4 General Information
The size and growth of the cooperative sector was discussed in the
introduction. Its rapid growth in the last fifteen years in particular
though means that the cooperative sector is relatively young. The
sample of cooperatives used in this research tends to mirror that rapid
growth. A distribution showing the establishment dates of the
cooperatives studied in this research is given in figure 2.1.
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The cooperative sector is essentially a subset of the small business
sector. Estrin (1985) notes that the modal size of a U.K. cooperative
is about 4 members and Hobbs (1989) comes up with a mean figure
of 7.9. The sample of cooperatives used in this research has a modal
size of five with a mean of 10.4. However, if the largest cooperative
(producing knitwear on a "cottage industry" basis and established in
1974) with a membership 160 is excluded then this mean falls to 8.4
which is not significantly different to Hobbs' estimate. A distribution of
cooperatives responding to the questionnaire by number of members
is presented in figure 2.2.
It seems useful at this point to present an overview of some of the
key data collected with selected cross — tabulations in order to provide
a "feel" for the data. Since some observations are discrete and in
most cases we have no real estimate of variance strict statistical tests
of significance are not possible and are therefore not presented. For
the purpose of this chapter this poses few problems since the
presentation is for description alone in order to paint a broad picture.
More robust statistical analysis is presented in the following chapters.
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DISTRIBUTION OF ESTABLISHMENT DATES
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DISTRIBUTION OF COOPERATIVES BY SIZE OF MEMBERSHIP
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The regional distribution of cooperatives in the survey based on
addresses supplied (60 enterprises) is as follows:
Table 2.1: Regional Distribution of Cooperatives Surveyed
Location Number of Percentage Hobbs' (1989)
cooperatives of cooperatives estimate (%)
North 18 30 26
Midlands 13 22 17
Wales 2 3 5
Scotland 9 15 7
London 9 15 26
South 9 15 18
N. Ireland 0 0 1
Thus the survey undertaken here looks broadly consistent although
there is a bias away from London and the South towards the North.
One might hypothesise that 'Northerners' are more likely to complete
questionnaires!
Within the producer cooperative framework a broad sectoral
classification is possible. This does not represent any standard
Industrial Classification, but is based on groupings common in the
cooperative sector:
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Figure 2.3
DISTRIBUTION OF COOPERATIVES
BY MAIN PRODUCT
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Key = C.K.F.	 = Clothing, Knitwear and Footwear
FURNIT = Furniture
FOOD/DR = Food and Drink
ART	 = Artistic Material and Graphic Art
ENG	 = Engineering
E.S.S.	 = Electrical, Scientific and Software
N.R.	 = Non-Respondent
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Table 2.2: Sectoral Distribution of Cooperatives Surveyed
CKF PLAST FURNIT FOOD AT ENG ESS OTHER
North 3 0 3 2 1 4 1 1
Midlands 3 2 2 1 1 4 0 1
Wales 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Scotland 2 1 0 1 0 2 1 1
London 3 0 1 2 1 0 2 2
South 3 1 0 2 0 2 1 1
Even those these numbers are too small to lead us to any
conclusions, it might be suggested that table 2.2 reflects a typical
regional split with engineering industry being found mainly in the North
and Midlands and electrical, software and scientific business being
based in the South. The distribution of cooperatives in the largest area
surveyed, clothing, knitwear and footwear, is more evenly spread.
One of the key questions in the first questionnaire surrounds the firms'
reasons for establishing itself as a cooperative and the subsequent
aims of the cooperative. Table 2.3 examines the establishment factors:
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Table 2.3: The Importance of Factors in the Establishment of the Cooperative
Number of cooperatives
	 Numbers
reporting the factor to be:
	 reporting this
to be the
Very	 Not	 most Import—
Important	 Important	 Important	 NR	 ant factor
Religious reason 5 4 66 3 5
Political reasons 16 17 39 6 6
A redundancy situation/
factor closure 19 15 38 6 9
A job creation
programme 18 11 ao 9 9
The provision of a
particular product 31 19 21 7 5
The availability of
grants 16 19 38 5 3
The desire for a
pleasant atmosphere
at work 35 27 12 4 7
Wanting to work for
°nese 38 21 12 7 5
Support of a C.D.A. 9 21 39 9 3
A desire for equality
with fellow workers 28 30 14 6 23
Others 5 0 o 73 1*
NR = No Response * = Objective stated was the provision of shared childcare support
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Simple correlations between the reasons for the establishment of the
cooperative provide some interesting results:
1. Of the 16 cooperatives who listed political reasons as
being very important, half or more also reported the
provision of a particular product, atmosphere at work,
working for oneself and equality with fellow workers as
being very important.
2. Of those recording working for oneself as being very
important, two — thirds thought that atmosphere was very
important and half stated that equality was very important.
3. Two — thirds of those stating atmosphere was very
important also saw working for oneself and the issue of
equality as being very important.
4. Over half of those who thought that the provision of a
particular product was very important also recorded
atmosphere and working for oneself as being very
important.
31
Thus there seems to be a number of cooperatives whose objectives
revolve around matters of politics, equality, working for oneself,
atmosphere and the provision of a particular product. We find that 39
cooperatives (exactly half) saw two or more of these factors as being
very important. In some respect therefore we are able to split the
sample in half according to objective. On the one hand there seem
to be those cooperatives interested foremostly in non — financial
objectives and objectives not aimed primarily at the provision of
employment. These cooperatives seem to be largely politically
motivated. On the other hand there are those who see employment
for members and financial viability as the dominant objectives and might
be seen as less politically motivated. This split between cooperatives
following non — financial objectives and those following broadly financial
objectives is one of the fundamental distinctions used in the thesis.
Question 3 of the questionnaire attempted to reveal something of the
aims of the cooperative at the time of the survey. This was left to the
respondents to word, but nevertheless there are common areas of
response. These are reported in table 2.4. Certainly there appears to
be considerable overlap with the objectives stated above (as one might
expect) and comparison of original objectives with present aims seems
largely consistent. There is however a much larger emphasis put on
employment in the responses; particularly on security of employment.
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This might be a reflection on a decade of high unemployment and job
insecurity.
Table 2.4 
Aims of the Cooperative: 
General area of Response	 Number of Coops
reporting this aim.
The provision of employment/security of employment 	 26
The production and promotion of socially
worthwhile goods	 24
Promoting the cooperative sector	 13
Profitability and good rates of pay	 12
Training and skills development 	 12
Viability of the cooperative/production
to make a living	 10
Equal status for women and minority groups	 9
Growth	 8
High quality workmanship/creativity 	 8
Working with a responsibility towards the community	 8
Provision of good working conditions
	
7
Non- exploitation 	 6
No response	 20
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Thus whilst for many the original intention of the cooperative was not
necessarily to create jobs, certainly the maintenance of those jobs once
created is important. Again featuring as an important objective is the
production of particular (socially useful) products. This was particularly
the case with cooperatives engaged in the production of food and drink
and in clothing, knitwear and footwear.
We can examine links between location and objectives by looking at
some simple cross — tabulations. This is done in table 2.5 but given
the size of the subsets very little difference can be claimed.
Table 2.5: Objectives and Locations of Cooperatives Surveyed
Location/Objectives	 Broadly Financial	 Broadly Non —
Non — political	 financial and Political
North	 8	 10
Midlands
	
5	 8
Wales
	
0	 2
Scotland
	
4	 5
London
	
5	 4
South	 6	 3
Unknown
	
11	 7
Total
	
39	 39
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Another fundamental distinction used in this research surrounds the
growth aspirations of the cooperative. This mirrors a considerable
amount of work on growth characteristics of the labour— managed firm
following the work of Ward (1958), Vanek (1970) and others (for a
review see Ireland and Law, 1982 and Bonin and Putterman, 1987).
As a result of questions 4, 5 and 6 in the survey we may categorise
the growth aspirations of the 78 cooperatives into those expecting high
growth (over 10% per annum) and those expecting low growth (less
than 10%) or no growth. The figure of 10% was chosen simply so
that firms could easily quantify and envisage this sort of growth rate
when completing the questionnaire. The distribution of responses is as
follows:
Table 2.6: Aspirations of Growth Over a 3 year Period 
Turnover
	 Employment Incomes
High Growth 55 39 47
Low Growth/No Growth 23 39 31
Total 78 78 78
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The links between growth aspirations and objectives are examined in
detail in chapter 5.
The use of management in cooperatives may seem surprising to many
since it may be seen as against a general principle of egalitarianism,
but in the survey conducted for this research, 42 cooperatives claimed
to have some kind of management structure, 30 did not and there was
no response from 6 returns. Quite what sort of management structure
existed can be seen from the following table:
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Table 2.7: Decision Making in the Cooperative Enterprise
Cooperatives reported the following strategies
	 number of
for decision making: 	 cooperatives:
On a day to day basis 
A single manager makes the decisions
	 22
A management team makes the decisions
	 20
All members decide democratically 	 29
Other (not specified) 	 1
Non—respondents
	 6
When deciding on longer term policy
A single manager makes the decisions 	 0
A management team makes the decisions 	 9
All members decide democratically	 61
Other (not specified) 	 2
Non — respondents 	 6
Where applicable, were managers democratically elected ?
No	 7
Yes	 27
Not clear / no response	 8
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Looking again at regional distributions gives us the following picture:
Table 2.8: Location and Management Structure: Cooperatives Surveyed
Location/Management Management
Structure
North
	
9
Midlands	 8
Wales	 0
Scotland
	
5
London	 7
South
	
7
No Management
Structure
9
5
2
4
2
2
Unknown	 6	 6
Total
	
42	 30
This may suggest that northern cooperatives are more egalitarian than
their southern counterparts but again we must recognise that the
subsets are very small.
A small amount of data derived from the questionnaires has not been
used in this thesis. There are two main reasons for this. Either during
statistical processing it added nothing to the discussion, or, it was
collected in the anticipation that it might be used but was not
subsequently. The latter explanation reflects the fact that with research
of this kind one often sets off on investigations which turn out to be
'blind alleys'. Research falling into this category includes an attempt
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to model entry and exit by the cooperative firm into markets dominated
by large capitalist firms, modelling the internal structure of the
cooperative using characteristics of members such as age and
examining the various effects of profit — sharing legislation on the
cooperative.
It should be stressed however, that these areas of research have not
been completely abandoned and do represent possible areas for future
research, particularly where additional data can be collected. In the
case of profit— sharing for example, the survey was probably circulated
too soon after the government's profit— related pay legislation was
introduced to bring about usable responses. However, now may be
a time to reopen that line of investigation.
2.5 Statistical Analysis
Much of the statistical analysis in this thesis is based on an
examination of the behaviour of the cooperative where there are two
alternatives. For example, in chapter 5 we examine the characteristics
of firms who have high growth aspirations rather than low growth ones.
Thus we have an analysis of a single dichotomous variable such that
the left hand side of the equation can be represented as a binary digit.
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Thus we are modelling discrete alternatives in limited dependent variable
models.
Statistical analysis of this type of behaviour is complicated by the fact
that such behaviour must be described in probabilistic terms. That is,
models describing choices from a limited number of alternatives attempt
to relate the conditional probability of a particular choice being made
to various explanatory factors that include the attributes of the
alternatives as well as the characteristics of the decision makers. The
explanatory variables can be discrete or continuous.
Since our primary concern is to interpret the dependent variable as the
probability of making a choice, given information about the firm's
attributes, it is reasonable to utilize some notion of probability as the
basis of the transformation. Since we would like the transformation to
be monotonic, the use of the cumulative probability function is most
suitable. The probit model is associated with the cumulative normal
probability function and this model using maximum likelihood estimation
techniques has been used in an attempt to model microeconomic
behaviour.
The probit model assumes that there is an underlying response variable
yi
 defined by the usual regression framework as
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yi =	 +
with E(u i) = O.
The conditional expectation E(yi I xi) is equal to rxi. This has to be
interpreted in this case as the probability that the event will occur given
the xi . The calculated value of y from the regression equation will then
give the estimated probability that the event will occur given the
particular value of x.
An alternative approach in the case of dichotomous variables would be
to use discriminant analysis. If the independent variables are normally
distributed, the discriminant — analysis estimator is the true maximum
likelihood estimator. However, if the independent variables cannot be
guaranteed to be normally distributed the discriminant— analysis
estimator is no longer consistent (see Maddala, 1986). In these
circumstances though the probit maximum likelihood estimator is
consistent and therefore more robust. Press and Wilson (1978)
calculated the probability of correct classification for the two estimators
in a number of empirical samples and find that in general, with limited
information about a population probit maximum likelihood estimation is
to be preferred. Thus in this thesis, because we cannot necessarily
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guarantee normal distributions a probit approach is adopted.
Thus we are assessing the probability that one variable will increase the
likelihood of an event occurring. As is common with limited dependent
variable analysis with small datasets (see Maddala, 1986) it is the sign
of the explanatory variable which we have concentrated on in the
analysis, rather than a more detailed interpretation of its magnitude.
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CHAPTER 3
HIERARCHY AND THE INTERNAL
ORGANISATION OF LABOUR
MANAGED PRODUCTION
3.1 Introduction
We begin the detailed analysis in this thesis with a consideration of the
internal aspects of the labour — managed organisation. Central to the
debate on organisation is a consideration of the structure of the firm
in terms of hierarchy. Whether or not hierarchy is important in the
behaviour of the firm has been the subject of much debate. Moreover,
whether an arrangement where labour hires capital or capital hires
labour is superior in terms of efficiency has been discussed ever since
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Samuelson (1957) observed that in a perfectly competitive market it
doesn't really matter who hires whom.
We know that in the main in Western economies capital hires labour.
Is there a sound efficiency rationale for this condition, or is hiring
explained by considerations of power and control over political
processes? This is the central question posed by economists such as
Williamson (1980). On a critical note, Lindblom (1977) for example,
contends that owners of capital have become the owners of the
enterprise not by logic but by history.
On the issue of the efficiency of hierarchy (which ought to be seen as
a separate issue to that of ownership), Marglin (1974) points to
hierarchy as being the organizational device by which managers and
capitalists exploit workers. But at this stage there seems no reason to
dismiss the possibility of a degree of hierarchy in the labour — managed
firm. If managerial skills, for example, are able to make the firm run
more smoothly without upsetting the democratic process then
management may have something to offer. Adam Smith himself in
recounting pinmaking technology (1904) was imprecise about
organisational and ownership relations that existed amongst workers in
his small factory. But his discrete analysis between each man working
independently and separately, and a Taylorist mode is rigged in favour
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of the latter. Indeed as Marglin (1974) points out the division of labour
typified in Smith's scenario was the result of a search not for a
technologically superior organisation of work, but for an organisation
which guaranteed an essential role in the production process for the
entrepreneur.
Apart from Smith's implicit support for the creation of hierarchy
additional or related advantages are that hierarchy permits the benefits
of innovation to be appropriated more completely and serves to check
deceits (Marglin 1974). This implies a degree of discipline which is
involuntary on the part of the worker. Some consequent disutility of
work may then offset output gains attributable to that discipline.
Although, we should note once again that if a degree of supervision
exists in the labour — managed firm by consent then there may be
considerable benefits to this sort of self — discipline.
Thus hierarchy may lack compelling efficiency rationale in the capitalist
firm but ironically have something to offer the democratic cooperative
form of organisation. The view that hierarchical work modes are
therefore inefficient and that non — hierarchical modes result in greater
work satisfaction (Bowles and Gintis, 1976) may be oversimplistic for
our analysis.
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The familiar neoclassical production function framework leads to the
prevailing tendency in economics to attribute efficiency differences to
differences in technology. This approach neglects an analysis of
alternative modes of production including broadly egalitarian, cooperative
modes. Marglin (1974) argues that many issues can be tested
experimentally. Surprisingly, therefore, Williamson (1980) makes no
attempt to do this when examining alternative modes, preferring an
abstract assessment of the transactional properties of stylised
organisational forms. Nevertheless, Williamson's framework does permit
a priori analysis, thus delimiting some important empirical issues.
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to critically appraise the work
of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Williamson (1975, 1980) in their
establishment of a framework within which to examine the relative
efficiency of the LM — firm, and to use this framework as a basis to
examine the efficiency attributes of U.K. worker cooperatives. Section
3.2 therefore outlines this framework and points out its associated
weaknesses and shortcomings. It will be seen, for example, that some
very restrictive assumptions are made. Section 3.3 looks beyond the
Williamson paradigm towards other issues of interest in the efficiency
debate. Section 3.4 examines previous attempts to assess the relative
efficiency of participation. Section 3.5 uses the framework to examine
the efficiency attributes of the sample of 78 worker cooperatives. This
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includes a re — examination of Williamson's (1980) efficiency rankings
based on a sub — sample of 46 of these firms. Finally, some
concluding remarks are made in Section 3.6.
3.2 Organisational Form and Hierarchy
The possibility that labour — managed (LM) and profit maximising (PM)
production might have differing organisational properties is commonly
examined in the literature in terms of efficiency. There are a variety of
suggestions as to possible sources for this differential which, following
Williamson (1980), can be categorised into four parts.
Firstly, the two organisational forms may have different incentive and
monitoring properties. In other words workers may be motivated and
monitored in different ways. Most of the debate centres around supply
of effort but note must also be taken of other aspects of performance
such as product quality. Secondly, there is a need to examine the role
of what Williamson (1980) calls "assignment" tasks. These include
allocating workers to jobs to which they are most suited. The ability
of labour to assign itself to the most appropriate tasks in the labour —
managed firm being a key issue. Thirdly, as Williamson notes
organisations may differ in terms of "atmosphere". It may be argued,
for example, that profit maximising production alienates workers and that
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the democratic nature of a labour — managed firm may lead to greater
feeling of self — determination. Fourthly, the assertion that, because
transactions are not conducted under conditions of perfect competition
bargaining costs may differ between the two organisational forms needs
to be considered. For example where wage bargaining is concerned,
the profit maximising firm is likely to face significant transactions costs
which do not arise for the labour—managed organisation. These four
attributes are likely to determine the relative efficiency of each
organisational form.,
3.2.1 Incentives and Monitoring
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) analyse incentives and monitoring in terms
of team production where gains are available to factor owners. The
difficulty is in determining each individual worker's contribution to the
total output of the team because that output is not simply the sum of
outputs produced by each of the inputs. If an individual worker can
reduce his/her effort without a proportionate reduction in personal
income, an individual incentive exists for shirking. tn other worcfs, if" Me
production function is not separable there is an incentive for each
member to shirk. Thus a member can gain the full advantages of
1 A fifth attribute which may have an influence Is that of the relative availability
of investment. But Stewart (1986) and Ireland and Law (1982) show how the
traditional problems associated with LM -firm financing can be mitigated. Thus for
now this is ignored.
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shirking but pay only a proportion of the cost; the remainder being
borne by the rest of the workforce. Equally, if the benefits of
increased effort cannot be fully captured by the worker, but are in
effect shared by the whole workforce, then an inadequate incentive
exists to increase effort. Alchian and Demsetz argue that the profit —
maximising firm is the organisational form best able to circumvent this
problem and minimize the degree of shirking for the following reasons.
Firstly, a specialist is assigned the task of monitoring. He/she has an
incentive to monitor because he/she is the residual claimant. Secondly,
the monitor is effective because he/she has the power to discipline
shirkers and ultimately to terminate any contract.
There are a number of criticisms which can be applied to this. Firstly,
there may be a specialist monitor in the PM — firm but just how effective
he/she is is open to question. In particular, Alchian and Demsetz
consider only the incentive to monitor, other factors must also be
considered. In particular, Putterman (1984) points out that the
technology of monitoring is important, as well as the process of
translating observations into pay — out schedules, the effects of
monitoring arrangements upon worker motivation, well — being and
behaviour, and the direct costs of monitoring. At a technological level
for example, whether centralised monitoring or self — monitoring will be
more efficient will depend on the nature of the tasks, the spatial
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dimensions of the workplace and according to Ireland and Law (1988),
the external environment. Some activities will allow individuals to work
and to observe each other's performance simultaneously. In other
words output and monitoring are likely to be joint products.
In the LM — firm each worker can be regarded as a residual claimant
and therefore each has an incentive to monitor other members.
Monitoring by team members will take place up to the point where the
marginal gains from monitoring other members is equal to the marginal
costs. Within the LM — firm it is likely that, because of the close
proximity of workers and similar aims, the marginal cost of monitoring
will be close to zero. Thus the group monitoring itself may have a
superior outcome in any case.
Ireland and Law (1988) examine management design in the LM —firm
in terms of monitoring the effort of the individual worker or member.
They suggest that in the LM — firm a higher cost of monitoring leads to
less effort per worker and that management design is, in general,
endogenous depending on firm type and economic environment. The
implication here is that we should not necessarily expect an egalitarian
type structure in the cooperative enterprise if there is good reason to
adopt some sort of management structure as a result of the
environment in which the firm works. We may therefore expect there
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to be correlation between industry type and management structure.
This is examined in detail in chapter 6.
Secondly, in larger PM — organisations, with a divorce of ownership and
control, the monitor could well not be the residual claimant and thus
has the incentive to shirk him/herself.
Thirdly, Alchian and Demsetz downplay the fact that for many workers,
being monitored itself has psychic costs. The effects on employee
performance and morale, as Williamson (1975) notes, may argue
against excessive monitoring and frequent revisions of reward
schedules. Alchian and Demsetz also claim that no authoritarian
control is involved; the arrangement being simply contractual. This is
clearly not the view of others (e.g. Baran and Sweezy, 1966) claiming
significant problems and psychic costs associated with authoritarianism.
Putterman (1984) subjects Alchian and Demsetz's argument to perhaps
the most important criticism given the empirical work in this thesis. If
in fact there are benefits to having a specialist monitor then there is
nothing to prevent the LMF appointing one. This person is likely to be
at least as effective as a manager doing the same job in the PM —
firm. Indeed in table 2.7 (page 37) we saw that the existence of
managers in cooperatives is not uncommon.
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In order to fulfil his/her functions efficiently, say Alchian and Demsetz,
the monitor must also have the right to hire and fire owners of
cooperating inputs, which may rule out team democracy. But Stewart
(1986) carefully examines the sanctions which are applied to workers
who shirk. In the PM —firm the instrument available to the monitor is
the ability to terminate the contract. This may, however, involve costs
and if the worker is aware of these then he/she knows that it is safe
to engage in some degree of shirking. In the LM — firm, on the other
hand, where workers all directly suffer from shirking by an individual,
an additional and relatively costless sanction, namely peer group
pressure, is available. Chinn (1979), for example, describes how "team
cohesion" serves to stimulate labour supply in Chinese agricultural
collectives. Sen (1966) also points out that in a tightly knit group of
workers, altruism may also play an important part. Again in chapter 2,
table 2.3 (page 30), we saw that a desire for a pleasant atmosphere
at work and a desire for equality with fellow workers were seen as key
reasons for the establishment of a cooperative.
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3.2.2 Williamson's Notion of Hierarchy
Williamson (1975, 1980) argues that standard microeconomic theory fails
to confront the issues of organisation, but, in opposition to the later
work of Ireland and Law (1988), argues that hierarchical modes of
organisation are generally dominant because of their comparative
efficiency.
In contrast to Alchian and Demsetz, Williamson does emphasise that
monitoring of workers and the revision of rewards can create an
atmosphere which has negative effects upon the employment relation.
If there are disputes over monitoring observations and reward
adjustments, these are costly in time and goodwill and the atmosphere
created is one in which employees perform their jobs in a perfunctory
rather than consummate fashion.
Williamson's concern with atmosphere and with non — pecuniary
attributes of working relations, nevertheless leads him to a relatively
sympathetic view of cooperative modes of work organisation. In small
enterprises, such as characterised by the UK cooperative sector, in
which membership is self— selecting and where mutual monitoring can
be effective, a cooperative enterprise might be more efficient than a
hierarchical one. But Williamson argues that democratic decision —
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making becomes inefficient as enterprise size increases. (This issue is
examined in more detail in chapter 5.) As the volume of information
required by decision — makers expands, specialization between
managerial and other roles becomes imperative. Efficiency is thus
served best when central information collection and decision — making
is done by "one or a few individuals who have superior information
processing capacities and exceptional oratorical and decision — making
skills" (Williamson, 1975, p.52).
Williamson evaluates a number of organisational forms. The traditional
worker — manager relationship Williamson discusses as the authority
relation and the worker — worker (or member — member) relationship as
the peer group. The former represents hierarchical capitalist control
and the latter collective democratic control and can thus be seen as
corresponding approximately to PM — organisation and LM — organisation
respectively. Williamson (1976 and 1980) asserts that, while the
democratic peer group possesses superior sociological attributes, it is
inferior to hierarchical alternatives because it fails to assign workers to
their most productive uses. He ignores the fact that some degree of
hierarchy may exist, through the adoption of a management structure,
in the LM — organisation.
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Williamson considers a number of efficiency criteria and awards a binary
score to each. Among the criteria are the following incentive attributes
together with the scores corresponding to the authority relation and
peer group.
Authority Relation	 Peer Group
Work intensity
Care in equipment
utilisation
Local shock responsiveness
(reactions to machine breakdown
or worker illness for example)
	 1	 1
Local innovation (improvements
to process made by individual
workers or groups)
	 0	 1
System responsiveness (the
capacity to implement system
innovations and respond to
system shocks)	 1	 1
Table 3.1 
The suggestion from the table is that the LM —firm has superior
incentive properties. Surprisingly, work intensity is scored as 0 under
the LM — organisation although there exists evidence to the contiesi
(see below).
Because a binary score is used there is no measure of intensity
between the scores. But any extension of the scoring scheme is likely
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to find little acceptance with scores varying with the scorers' value
judgements and perceptions. A detailed rationale for the assignments
is reported by Williamson (1976).
3.2.3 Assignment
A key aspect of the debate revolves around what jobs workers do and
how they are assigned to those various tasks. Williamson cites three
types of assignment which organisations must undertake:
Authority Relation	 Peer Group
Station assignments (efficiency
of assigning workers to tasks)	 1
Leadership	 1
Contracting (the capacity to
contract with specialists able
to serve across the production
processes)	 1	 1
Table 3.2
Thus it is argued that in this respect the authority relation is superior.
But a crucial factor would appear to be Williamson's strict requirement
that in a peer group, leadership or management must be rotated
among all the membership. Putterman (1981) points out that this
would put the peer group at a disadvantage since it prevents
specialisation. However, for our purposes there would seem to be no
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requirement that the leadership role should rotate, preferring to accept
that management may well be a skill developed or even bought — in by
a LM — organisation.
Williamson further argues that the role must rotate to prevent the
manager or managers becoming an elite because they have superior
knowledge and are thus not answerable to peer group pressures.
Supporting this Bradley (1980) in a survey of French and British
cooperatives finds evidence that managers who were supposed to act
strictly within a framework determined by workers, often did not,
pursuing alternative managerial strategies.
But whilst we have to accept that some managerial discretion may be
displayed this does not provide sufficient grounds for discounting the
ultimate power of the workforce. Moreover because of this workforce
power we can assume that any managerial discretion exhibited in the
LM — firm will be less than in a PM — firm where a divorce of ownership
and control is commonplace.
Stewart (1986) makes the further point that whilst recognising the
possibility of gains from specialist decision — making, the potentially
constructive role that workers may play should not be ignored. The
argument is particularly relevant to performance with regard to local
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innovations where open communication channels are important.
Although Bradley (1980) finds that within any firm there appears to be
an inherent propensity for management to withhold information. Thus
any flow of information may not be two — way and additionally there
may be an inherent obstacle to the feasibility of worker control pursued
by strategies focusing on shop floor access to confidential information.
On the issue of assigning workers to tasks Williamson clearly ignores
the possibility that members of the LM — firm are able to assign
themselves to tasks to which they feel most suited. At the least there
is likely to be consultation between managers and other members
before assignment takes place. Moreover "staleness" is more easily
prevented with workers able to suggest their own movement and
rotation from one task to another.
Thus on the assignments where Williamson marks the peer group down
we may, a priori, disagree with the ranking.. Indeed there seems some
reason to suggest superior outcomes for the peer group. Much of the
problem here is associated with Williamson's notion of the peer group.
It seems not to be just a worker — run enterprise in the sense that
ultimate authority resides in the democratic vote of the membership, but
rather, what Putterman (1984) calls a "utopian form of cooperative in
which social, political and economic equality are sought through rotation
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of members between all jobs" (p.178). This restrictive model seems not
to mirror the typical cooperative in the U.K. as depicted in chapter 2.
3.2.4 Atmosphere
The standard economic model assumes that individuals regard
transactions in a neutral manner. But in many situations it is likely to
be the case that the exchange process itself is likely to be an object
of value. Thus individuals are going to value the exchange relation, or
"atmosphere". In this respect Stewart (1986) notes that modes of
organisation are likely to differ non — trivially. Williamson (1975) himself
notes that the peer group may be preferred to hierarchy in this respect
— at least in small organisations. Levin (1982) makes the point that
many studies of productivity fail to take account of "non — market input"
of which atmosphere would be an example.
Baran and Sweezy have long claimed that capitalist organisation leads
to poor atmosphere. For example they note:
"High level committees are entrusted
with the discovery and specification
of goals ... malaise deprives work of
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meaning and purpose; turns leisure
into joyless, debilitating laziness
and destroys the very formation of
bourgeois society, the family". (1986)
The poor atmosphere conditions associated with traditional capitalist
production can easily lead to alienation. Fromm (1965) says that the
individual worker is;
"an economic atom that dances to the
tune of atomistic management".
and that capitalist managers
"Strip the worker of his right to think
and move freely. Life is being denied,
need to control, creativeness, curiosity,
and independent thought are being balked
and the result, the inevitable result is
flight or fight on the part of the worker,
apathy or destructiveness, psychic regression"
(p. 115).
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Williamson (1980) notes the claim that work in profit maximizing firms
might be oppressive. What is surprising is that he sees work
satisfaction as something to be set against organisational efficiency
rather than as an element contributing to it. Thus Williamson himself
fails to fully integrate atmosphere into his analysis of alternative
organisational forms. This seems a major oversight given the emphasis
put on atmosphere at work by many cooperative enterprises (see table
2.3, page 30).
It is to the psychologist whom we might turn, in order to help us
establish atmosphere differences between labour — managed and profit
maximising modes of production. This research suggests, according
to Blumberg (1968), that utility derived from work depends upon the
fulfilment of basic ego needs as well as material rewards. Participation,
power and responsibility on the job, all contribute to the satisfaction of
these ego requirements. Thus atmosphere is clearly an element
contributing to the efficiency of the firm.
3.2.5 Bargaining Costs
Contracts are negotiated with a variety of parties but we are most
interested in the initial contracting associated with the suppliers of
labour. There seem to be several fundamental differences in this area.
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Alchian and Demsetz (1972) regard the relationship between the
employer and employee as being no different to that of grocer and
customer.
'The single customer can assign his grocer to the task of
obtaining whatever the customer can induce the grocer to
provide at a price acceptable to both parties. To speak
of managing, directing or assigning workers to various
tasks is a deceptive way of noting that the employer
continually is involved in renegotiation of contracts on
terms that must be acceptable to both parties. Telling an
employee to type this letter rather than to file that
document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand
of tuna rather than that brand of bread" (p.777)
There appears to be an implicit assumption on the part of Alchian and
Demsetz that any costs associated with employee turnover are
negligible and hence employers can adapt to changes in conditions of
filling jobs on a spot market basis. As Williamson points out (1975)
this is unlikely to be the case if there are idiosyncratic skills associated
with the job, in which case an incumbent worker will have a first mover
advantage. Workers can exploit this advantage when contracts are due
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for renegotiation. The outcome will depend on the strength of the
skills and bargaining power of the worker and the extent of the
information about the supply of alternative labour inputs on the part of
the employer. Either way costs will be incurred. If the employee is
able to price him/herself above what would be a market clearing rate
then there are direct additional labour costs incurred. If on the other
hand a lower wage settlement is reached it might be because
significant costs have been incurred through the absorption of real
resources and delays in efficient adaption through bargaining.
Williamson (1980) claims that the authority relation creates flexibility
though. This is because employees stand ready to accept authority
regarding work assignments for example, provided that the behaviour
called for falls within the "zone of acceptance" of the contract. This
seems to ignore the transactions costs involved in establishing such a
contract which Williamson constantly criticises others for ignoring.
Moreover, if this is an advantage, there seems to be no reason why
members of the LM — organisation should not be willing to accept
assignments from a manager which fall within a pre — negotiated "zone
of acceptance". That zone of acceptance is likely to have been
defined by members democratically anyway.
63
The idea that renegotiation will take place at regular intervals is peculiar
only to the PM — firm. In the LM — firm there is an initial contract
agreeing that any surplus will be distributed, according to some rule,
between the workforce. No explicit bargaining or subsequent
renegotiation takes place outside of the democratic, decision — making
forum. Although common in the cooperative organisation is the use of
a probationary period for new members, where people can enter the
cooperative (or leave subsequently) at very little cost to the enterprise.
The situation becomes even more significant when we consider that
many PM employers will be negotiating not with individuals but with
trade unions. The ability of employees to organise themselves
collectively can result in contract prices being higher than would
otherwise be the case; increasing direct costs still further. Williamson
(1980) himself argues that if a few agents are responsible for all the
contracting this actually increases the degree of hierarchy. Moreover
the actual bargaining process itself may be significantly more expensive
unless the employer is willing to grant 'across — the — board' settlements.
It may be the case of course that the employer will have a degree of
monopsony power accruing from the costs of search on the part of
labour supplies. Cable and Fitzroy (1980) conclude from this however
that the traditional PM — firm will become a bargaining arena, full of
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conflict and mistrust.
3.2.6 Contributions to a Theory of Cooperation?
Williamson's analysis and arguments do clarify intuitive thinking about
efficiency and organisational form even if much of the detail is open to
debate. Much of his discussion about the peer group seems to situate
this organisational form in a large institutional framework. But the real
contribution must be to see that form within the smaller enterprise,
common in the U.K., where Williamson (1980) himself sees certain
advantages.
The problem with Williamson's analysis is that he sees any degree of
hierarchy within an organisation to be a movement away from the
collective, peer group enterprise and the beginning of the capitalist
structure of production. There is a need to consider partially
democratic organisational forms, especially where this is representative
of the democratic cooperative enterprise which employs management
skills to make day — to — day decisions.
That management skills are a necessity in some organisations is hardly
to be disputed. But Williamson's inference that hierarchy is a superior
form in general, to such an extent that workers themselves have an
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incentive to adopt it, seems irrational. If workers are to some extent
tied in to firms and if managers through superior information can obtain
strategic advantages over everyone else, then why should workers want
to relinquish their control over production or, indeed, their ultimate
control over managers themselves?
Williamson's attempt to argue that the capitalist form of organisation of
production is superior to the workers' control form seems deficient.
But as Putterman (1984) points out "his positive contribution to the
understanding of the firm is significant ...[and] among its greatest
virtues is its detection of the utility of cooperative strategies in a world
in which the material and psychological costs of individualism are high"
(p.179). In addition, Williamson's framework with its emphasis upon
human — relations elements and its economics grounded in a world of
bounded rationality and imperfect information seems particularly valid
when examining the cooperative sector.
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3.3 Beyond Williamson ?
Marglin (1974) argues that the non—experimental nature of the social
sciences contributes to the continuing neglect of internal organisation.
Were this not the case, alternative modes of organisation, including
egalitarian work modes, would be designed and tested experimentally.
This section looks at a number of (as yet relatively unresearched)
reasons why we might expect costs in the LM — firm to be lower than
those of the PM — firm. If that is the case then ceteris paribus the
LM — firm will have better efficiency attributes.
3.3.1 The Disutility of Work
Blumberg (1976) argues that there is scarcely a study in the literature
which fails to demonstrate that satisfaction is enhanced or productivity
increased from a genuine increase in workers' decision — making power.
Bowles and Gintis (1976) argue that the participative worker is an
involved worker. Gaffagher and Efnhorn (f976) concfude the(r survey
of the literature with the observation that job enlargement and job
enrichment can be useful tools for management. But they note that a
question mark remains under what conditions participation will be most
effective.
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The history of capitalist hierarchies tends to support the view that
non — hierarchical modes of organisation are in fact more efficient
because of the disutility of work created by the capitalist mode. Stone
(1974), Bowles and Gintis (1976), Braverman (1974) and Marx (1967)
all give examples of this claim. Thus a movement towards a peer
group organisation can result in increased work utility and better
productivity. Much of this debate is related to issues associated with
atmosphere already discussed above.
3.3.2 Remuneration to Workers
There are two reasons why we might expect (at least in the short run)
remuneration paid to the members of the LM — firm to be less than the
remuneration paid to workers in the PM — firm.
Firstly, at times, of unemployment we can expect the number of
workers searching for jobs and starting new enterprises to be high.
These workers will accept wages less than those paid to workers who
are already employed, although greater than social security and
unemployment benefits. Bollard (1983) has shown that there is a rapid
rise in small businesses associated with rising unemployment.
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Research by Welford (1988) shows that a significant number of
cooperatives started from a redundancy situation or as an attempt to
create work and Jefferis (1988) has shown that the growth of the
cooperative sector is highest at times of unemployment.
Secondly, and as Williamson (1980) himself notes, workers who are
attracted to LM — firms will work for a lesser wage because the
oppressiveness of the authority relation is removed and utility form work
increased. Just as workers will accept a trade — off between income
and leisure so we can expect a similar relationship between income
and job satisfaction.
3.3.3 The share of residuals
In the long run where the degree of labour mobility and market
information is significant and where trade unions bargain with respect
to relativities and differentials we may expect wages paid in the PM —
firm to be equal to the average surplus received by the member of the
LM — firm.
If the PM — firm has shareholders then they will expect a level of profit
to provide them with a dividend which must be at least the value that
will keep them investing in the company or provide for capital growth
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equal to the mean level for similar firms. This must enter the cost
function as a normal cost. In other words PM — firM has extra
additional costs being levied on it by virtue of the need to support
capitalist non — wage earners. Initial capital in the LM — firm will often
result from the members and the returns to that are included in their
surplus.
It might be countered that PM — wages will not equal LM — average
surpluses after all, but will be equal to average LM — surpluses minus
the return on initial capital invested. That relies on significant
information being available but we do not dispute the case here.
However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that where owners of
a firm also control it, they will be willing to accept a lower rate of
return on capital than the owners of a firm who do not have control.
Hence we would still argue that the normal profit element of the cost
function for the PM — firm results in higher costs. This analysis is
based on a degree of managerial discretion being exerted in the PM —
firm which they argue might be eliminated by use of incentive schemes
such as profit— sharing.
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3.3.4 The External Environment
The environment in which the LM — firm is likely to operate is unlikely
to be perfectly competitive. The U.K. economy can be characterised
as oligopolistic where large dominant PM — firms have significant market
power. According to Jefferis (1988) LM — firms are commonly part of
a fringe of small firms operating in these markets. Commonly, this
fringe is surviving because of new flexible technology, more specialised
products and markets and changing employment practices. According
to many commentators (e.g. Wood, 1989, Piore and Sabel, 1984) we
are now living in a post — Fordist era of flexible specialisation in
industrial production which is likely to enhance the likelihood of survival
of small firms.
We have presented some evidence to suggest the LM — firms will have
a cost advantage over PM — firms (of a similar size) because of their
flexibility amongst other reasons. But we have not considered the
possibility that PM — firms will on average be larger. The issue here
must therefore centre around the extent of scale economies. The
literature on scale economies comes to no real conclusion about the
extent of these scale economies or the extent to which the benefits of
large scale production are fully mirrored in the cost functions of large
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firms.
	 Interest here surrounds the issue as to whether scale
economies can outweigh other potential cost advantages of LM — firms.
Bannock (1981) argues that technological as well as social change now
strongly favours small firms and that high energy prices favour
decentralised production to avoid rising transport costs. Bannock gives
the example of localised bakeries and breweries re — emerging to serve
small communities, implying diseconomies of large scale production.
Gold (1931) argues that the widespread faith in the economies of scale
argument has not gained much support from theoretical and empirical
literature. Analyses have repeatedly called attention to the fuzziness of
the basic concept of scale and to uncertainties about the sources of
expected benefits, as well as the relatively modest gains apparently
derived from additional increases in scale. Bollard (1983) finds that for
technological and economic reasons economies of scale are no longer
increasing and that small firms' prospects are now more favourable.
Environmental pressures and changing markets are likely to provide
many economies of small scale production. Altshuler et. al. (1984)
show that, although the motor industry has often been used to illustrate
the economies and advantages of large scale production, economies
of scale are receding.
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Thus there is clearly no definitive answer to the question as to whether
small LM — firms will have a cost advantage over larger PM — firms.
Scale economies might exist but they often appear to be overstated in
theory. Empirical investigations using matched data may give us some
answers to the questions posed here and clearly further research is
necessary.
3.4 Empirical Studies
In reality there will be a range of different organisational forms rather
than an LM — firm peer group structure and a PM — firm authoritarian
structure. Thus we are interested in ascertaining whether or not
variations in decision — making, participation and ownership affect the
performance of firms. In examining this area we should recognise the
methodological links between the studies in terms of the participation —
augmented production function.
Defourney, Estrin and Jones (1985) examined a total of 960 firms in
1978 and 1979 in the French economy which has one of the largest
LM sectors in capitalist economies. Participation in the firm was proxied
by the proportion of workers who were members. It was found that
five organisational variables had a significant positive impact on
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performance.
Jones (1982) conducted a similar analysis of British producer
cooperatives over the period 1948 — 68. In all 78 enterprises were
examined. Three alternative proxies for worker participation were
assessed: the proportion of the board of management that were
worker — members, the proportion of workers who were members, and
the proportion of members that were workers. Another two
organisational variables were included; the total share capital owned by
workers and the total profits distributed to workers. In two of the
three industries examined (footwear and printing) Jones makes the
tentative suggestion that worker participation does lead to improved
performance. In the third industry (clothing) the coefficients relating to
participation were insignificant. However, in all three industries
examined positive coefficients relating to incentive effects of surplus
sharing were obtained.
Estrin, Jones and Svejnar (1987) estimate production functions using
data on French, British and Italian producer cooperatives. The authors
find that in France and Italy higher levels of participation are most likely
to enhance performance. Less clear results are available for the U.K.
The authors explain this to some extent by their claim that the external
environment is important and that in Italy and France there is a strong
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cooperative tradition, well organised supporting institutions and an
average general high degree of participation.
Cable and Fitzroy (1980) in a sample of 42 West German enterprises
asked managers in each firm to provide a subjective assessment of the
degree of worker involvement choosing between "no participation",
"observers", "advisors" or "active participants", in various areas of
decision — making. This information was used to construct an index of
participation. Two further variables were examined: workers' capital
stakes and profits distributed to workers. Pooled cross section and
annual data, 1974 — 1976 were used. The OLS estimates suggest
that participation has a positive impact on performance and that capital
ownership by workers improved performance when combined with high
levels of participation. The results also showed that only when
participation was high was there a significant positive coefficient on
profits distributed to workers. This has an interesting implication for
firms currently engaged in profit sharing schemes.
Espinosa and Zimbalist (1978) examined worker participation in Chilean
state — owned enterprises. During the period 1970— 1973, 35 industrial
enterprises were examined in considerable depth. To construct the
participation index enterprises were awarded points according to: the
functioning of the formal structure of participation, the topics or areas
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discussed and the effective influence exercised by workers or their
representatives. A regression of productivity, measured by the average
annual change in output per worker, on participation, employment and
investment yields a significant positive coefficient on participation.
Thus the studies cited would tend to suggest that a participatory
organisational form will lead to better productivity and consequently
lower costs. Moreover it seems from the study by Cable and Fitzroy
(1980) that when direct worker participation and financial participation
are combined the benefits are greatest. This conclusion is also
reached in the study by Jones (1982) and the implication is that as we
move along the spectrum of organisational forms from the traditional
capitalist to the labour — managed the benefits increase. All these
studies fail to take account of what Levin (1982) terms non — market
outputs (e.g. improved atmosphere at work) and we might hypothesise
that this would add to perceived benefits.
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3.5 Empirical Results from the Survey of Producer Cooperatives
The issues associated with efficiency differences between LM — and
PM — production raised above have been investigated by examining the
organisation, attitudes and operational behaviour of our sample of
cooperatives producing in the U.K. Part of the aim of the second
questionnaire was to examine the order of the Williamson rankings, and
implicit assumptions therein, and to investigate claims made about
cooperative production made by Alchian and Demsetz (1982),
Williamson (1975), 1980), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and others.
Central to the Alchian and Demsetz view is the contention that there
is a greater incentive for members to shirk in a LM — organisation
compared with a PM — organisation. But many of the cooperatives
surveyed implied a reverse situation. For example, 37 out of 78
cooperatives definitely thought there were productivity advantages
associated with cooperative organisation. Eight of these stated clearly
that the reason for that was the self — monitoring properties of joint
decision — making leading to no shirking. One cooperative for example
stated:
'We do not have strikes, no shirking and lots
of variety in regard to work."
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On the other hand, of 13 firms who considered there to be definite
productivity disadvantages associated with being a cooperative, three
said that the reason was that work effort was not expected to be so
intense.
One property of self- monitoring, particularly when it is tied into
cooperative ownership, which Alchian and Demsetz do not discuss, is
related to the issue of the use of materials and wastage. There is an
in - built incentive, when workers themselves are residual claimants, for
the amount of waste to be reduced. One co- operative stated clearly:
If you give people an actual part
share of a firm waste in all its
forms almost disappears."
Perhaps the main weakness in the Alchian and Demsetz argument is
the implicit assumption that LM - organisations would lack general
monitoring properties. Cooperatives in the survey, most of which
acknowledge the need for monitoring, fall into two camps here. Firstly,
there are those who see themselves as being self- monitoring, and
secondly, those (42 out of 78) who have somebody or a group of
people acting in a managerial capacity. This tendency seems to
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support the view of Putterman (1984) in arguing that if there are
benefits in appointing a specialist monitor in the PM —firm then the
same is likely to occur in the LM — firm.
Williamson's (1980) contribution to the debate is to examine stylised
forms of PM — and LM — organisation in order to derive efficiency
rankings based on binary scores. Examination of his five incentive
attributes does give some indication that his peer group organisation
has advantages. In the second survey of 46 cooperatives, each was
asked whether they considered these same attributes to be superior,
identical or inferior in a cooperative firm when compared with a
traditional firm. Even allowing for obvious bias by some cooperatives
committed to the movement the results are pretty decisive:
Superior Identical Inferior Don't Know
Work intensity 28 18 0 0
Care in equipment
utilisation 24 16 6 0
Local shock
responsiveness 30 14 1 1
Local innovation 38 4 3 1
System responsiveness 22 18 4 2
Table 3.3
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It should be mentioned that respondents were not questioned about
these terms directly (or those in the table which follows) but about
more understandable descriptions of Williamson's terminology. (This can
be seen from the copy of the questionnaire used and contained in the
appendix.) Williamson's assessment that there will be peer group
advantages with respect to local innovations is most clearly confirmed.
But his assertion that there will be no difference between the two
organisations with respect to poor work intensity is clearly now in
question.
Moreover if we look at the responses of the full sample of 78
cooperatives to the question relating to productivity advantages, only
three (already cited) thought that work effort would be less in the
cooperative enterprise, whereas 36 cooperatives thought that
advantages would come about via increased motivation, flexibility and
commitment.
In the three cases (care in equipment utilisation, local shock
responsiveness and system responsiveness) where Williamson sees
positive attributes for both types of organisation, we find that the
cooperatives themselves consider there to be advantages over and
above their capitalist counterparts. This implies a major weakness for
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Williamson's binary ranking.
On the subject of assignment, Williamson cites three types which
organisations must take: station assignments; leadership and
contracting. He claims that his authority relation is superior based on
a crucial assumption, namely, that in a peer group leadership must be
rotated among all the membership. When questioned, the 46
cooperatives in the survey responded to the assignment categories in
a rather more mixed way:
Superior Identical Inferior Don't Know
Station assignments 18 22 5 1
Leadership 18 14 14 0
Contracting 5 34 3 4
Table 3.4
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Allowing for implicit bias already mentioned, we would have to conclude
that there seems no significant advantage associated with cooperative
production with respect to station assignments. Although Williamson
implies advantages for the authority relation.
Examination of how work is assigned amongst members of the 78
cooperatives in the original survey yields the following results:
Number of cooperatives
Allocation device	 citing this as a method
of job allocation
Work is divided on specific
skill lines	 47
Certain jobs have always been
done by the same people	 15
Work is rotated	 9
There is no specific
division of labour	 21
Allocation is done by
management	 10
Note: The figures do not add up to 78 because some cooperatives
specified more than one allocation device.
Table 3.5
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Commonly in larger more automated cooperatives work was done on
skill lines, whereas with the smallest cooperatives there was usually no
specific division of labour.
Nevertheless, a common theme amongst all cooperatives was the
recognition of the need for flexibility and the advantages associated with
a lack of demarcation. The fact that members were expected to do
any job which needed doing in the organisation was commonly stated.
One cooperative wrote:
"We all have specific jobs to do but at
busy times we all muck in to get things
finished — if the van needs loading
whoever is available does it. We all
work until the work is finished —
together!"
and another:
*There is no longer a them and us
attitude. Everyone works for the same
goal."
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On the other hand a tendency to overwork was cited by one
cooperative:
"There are manifest disadvantages
with regard to efficiency, e.g. the
reluctance to take on new members
until overwork is almost crushing."
This theme will be common to those aware of the literature on
supply - side constraints associated with LM - organisation, where it is
argued that the LM -firm will forgo growth because of an unwillingness
to expand the workforce (see for example Atkinson, 1973 and Bonin,
1983).
The issue of leadership, whilst seemingly balanced, requires rather more
detailed attention. In 42 out of the 78 cooperatives in the original
survey there existed a manager or management team (table 2.7). In
eight of these cases it was not clear whether that management was a
permanent fixture. Telephone calls to these cooperatives revealed that
in two cases only, did management rotate. Thus Williamson's
requirement that leadership is rotated in the peer group relation is
hardly representative of the cooperative sector. There seems to be
rather more acceptance amongst cooperatives who adopt a
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management role, of the specialist attributes discussed by authors such
as Putterman (1981).
Williamson argues that management can become an elite if not rotated.
This ignores the fact that in most cases (27 out of 42) managers were
elected. In only seven cases was it clear that management was not
elected, although in five of these cases policy decisions were not taken
by managers. In only two out of 42 cases do we find that there is
some possibility that management might have become an elite, it being
them who decided on policy matters.
If we re— examine the leadership attribute in terms of cooperatives with
or without a management structure, a rather more interesting picture
emerges:—
Superior Identical Inferior Don't Know
All cooperatives 18 14 14 0
Cooperatives with
managers
16 8 4 0
Cooperatives without
managers
2 6 10 0
Table 3.6
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Clearly, the majority of those cooperatives who did adopt some sort of
management role thought that there were advantages associated with
the LM— organisation. Those without managerial leadership clearly
thought that there existed inferior attributes. There may of course be
some implicit bias here however, since it is likely that where a
managerial structure did exist it was the cooperative manager who
completed the questionnaire. In addition, implicitly, only those believing
in cooperative production were asked for their views of the advantages
of cooperative production. However, we may assume that the
respondents did have experience of other than cooperative forms of
organisation since the average age of most cooperatives was less than
the average time worked of its members.
It may be the case that cooperatives preferring not to adopt any
degree of management leadership may find some advantages of doing
so. But even amongst the cooperatives who do not adopt a
management role there may already be some recognition of the
importance of this task. One such cooperative commented:
"Productivity is largely based on good
management, does our type of organisation
automatically provide this?"
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Thus the assumption, implicitly made by many including Williamson, that
LM- production and the adoption of a managerial structure are
incompatible, seems over- simplistic. There is no real reason to
dismiss some degree of managerialism in the cooperative firm. On the
contrary the number of cooperatives doing just that (bounded by
ultimate democratic control by members) and reporting associated
benefits must at least suggest that a degree of hierarchy may be
beneficial to cooperative development. Once we accept this, much of
the Alchian and Demsetz debate discussed in section 2 is significantly
reduced in importance.
With respect to contracting, clearly no perceivable differences existed
in the eyes of cooperative enterprises when compared to profit-
maximising ones.
Atmosphere at work is commonly cited (e.g. Williamson, 1975) as a
possible source of productivity advantages. It is an area cited by
many cooperatives as being particularly important. Out of 78
cooperatives, 35 saw a good atmosphere as a very important objective
in the establishment of the cooperative and a further 27 saw it as
important. Seven cooperatives clearly specified one of its aims as the
provision of good working conditions.
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Clearly, Williamson's notion that work satisfaction is something to be
set against organisational efficiency rather than as an element
contributing to it is now questionable. In the eyes of many cooperative
firms a good atmosphere not only adds to the basic utility associated
with work but also helps to create an environment contributing
positively to productivity and efficiency. This seems to confirm the
research of authors such as Blumberg (1968).
On the subject of bargaining costs, clearly negotiation of wage rates
and/or bonus payments is normally carried out in a democratic
decision - making meeting. This may cut down the need to negotiate
and renegotiate with individuals which is a cost to be borne by the
PM - organisation. Perhaps at times of heavy demand, when overtime
is required, these bargaining costs become highest for the capitalist
firm. For the labour - managed firm there is evidence to suggest that
these costs can be avoided. Eleven cooperatives who thought there
were productivity advantages associated with LM - production did so
because of their perception that their organisations were flexible with
respect to honours worked. One cooperative, which thought that this
was the only advantage, stated:
The only possible gains are in
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members' willingness to work
whatever hours necessary, often
for no additional reward."
However, the positive attributes associated with 1M - organisation should
not be allowed to hide the negative ones identified by a number of
cooperatives in different ways. Essentially, the linking theme amongst
cooperatives who consider there to be some productivity disadvantages
associated with LM - production revolves around a trade - off between
efficiency and the democratic decision - making process. One
cooperative put this succinctly as:
"Commitment and flexibility has to
be set against operating costs of
workplace democracy."
Implicit in this is the acceptance of potential productivity advantages
being sacrificed in favour of the maintenance of collective decision -
making. Another cooperative stated:
"Collective decision - making is less
efficient .... but on the other hand
cooperative members exploit themselves
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more thus making each worker more
productive."
In particular, it is the slowness of the decision — making process which
many cooperatives saw as a hinderance. But once again the issue of
the degree of management arises. All but one of those cooperatives
complaining about decision — making lags were completely democratic
insofar as even day — to — day decisions were being made by all
members. In one case where the cooperative comprised nine
members (some of which were part— time), it is hardly surprising that
there are considerable costs associated with workplace democracy.
The fact that some cooperatives see themselves as less efficient than
their capitalist counterparts is not necessarily seen as a bad thing per
se. In particular this is often the result of deliberate and rational
trade — offs associated with increased job satisfaction, work effort and
flexible working hours. The latter is seen as very important by many
women members with children.
Typically, cooperatives stated views such as:
"Productivity in the main suffers
slightly in favour of increased
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job satisfaction."
and:
We do not want to feel that we have
to work at full capacity all the time.
We give ourselves more time off which
reduces our productivity."
Moving beyond the framework provided by Alchian and Demsetz and
Williamson, the key areas left to discuss are the disutility associated
with the capitalist mode of production (e.g. Blumberg, 1976 and Bowles
and Girrtis, 1976) and the issue of lower costs associated with lower
remuneration to workers and shares of residuals.
A survey of cooperative firms can only hope to find anecdotal evidence
,
to support or question the first contention. Nevertheless, many
cooperatives did compare themselves to their capitalist counterparts
when discussing issues surrounding productivity and relative efficiency,
citing benefits accruing from lack of demarcation, members receiving
the benefits of their own labour and (again) a better atmosphere at
work.
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Rather more can be said about the second issue. Examining relative
wages, out of 67 cooperatives expressing an opinion, 27 (41%) thought
that wages were lower in the cooperative compared to the non-
cooperative sector, 25 (37%) thought they were about the same and
15 (22%) thought they were higher.
One cooperative stated:
"We are only productive because we
tend to exploit ourselves."
The subject of self- exploitation stems, in theoretical terms, from the
analysis of the cooperative sector provided by Webb and Webb (1914).
Some cooperatives seem to see themselves as being self- exploitative
in terms of hours worked and wages paid. This is not a clear cut
issue though. Whilst some cooperative members see themselves as
earning less than they might do elsewhere for possibly less money,
they often fail to take into account other benefits of working in a self -
managed environment. These include the utility derived from good
atmosphere at work and flexible working, noted particularly by mothers
needing to organise work around childcare. Other non-financial
benefits include: the desire for a high quality of workmanship and
creativity; working with and responsibility towards the community;
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training and skills development; equal status for women and minority
groups and non — exploitation. This issue is further examined in
chapter 7.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Various sources of efficiency differences between profit— maximising and
labour— managed firms have been examined both theoretically and
empirically. Whilst the work of Williamson (1975, 1976, 1980) suggests
that the two organisational forms examined will have different rankings
and that no predictions can be made about efficiency, it is argued here
that this is based on restrictive assumptions. Re — examination of the
situation without these assumptions leads us to believe that LM — firms
may indeed have efficiency advantages.
Nevertheless, the work of Williamson provides us with a basic
framework of analysis upon which it is possible to build a picture of
the cooperative firm in the U.K. Taking his peer group relation and
adapting it to observations from a sample of worker cooperatives, it
has been possible to challenge theoretically and empirically many of the
claims made by Williamson (1980) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
relating to the relative inefficiency of labour— managed production.
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Examination of previous empirical analysis does not resolve the debate
but it adds some weight to the general picture that productivity may be
enhanced by worker participation and ownership, especially when they
are combined.
In the past the benefits associated with self— monitoring and self—
assignment of workers to tasks have been understated. There are
many reasons to believe that workers can and do make constructive
contributions to the efficiency of the firm in these areas. Participation
in the running of the firm allied with ownership of it seems to have
significant advantages.
Nevertheless, there still exist good reasons for the adoption of a
degree of hierarchy when bounded by "zones of acceptance".
Williamson's notion that any degree of hierarchy is a move towards
PM — production and away from LM — production is too simplistic.
Indeed, it can be seen that there are many circumstances where the
cooperative firm can benefit from the adoption of a degree of hierarchy,
by the use of managerial skills. We return to this issue again later in
the thesis. Cooperatives in the survey who did this reported benefits
over and above others who did not. Management, ultimately, still has
to be accountable to the democratic structure of the cooperative
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enterprise, but there seems little doubt that there are efficiency
advantages associated with day —to— day management roles. It may
be in the interests of many cooperatives to develop such a skill.
Overall, we must dispute the claims that the LM — firm is likely to be
less efficient compared with its capitalist counterpart. Indeed, many
reasons have been cited to suggest the opposite. These reasons are
related to the workplace environment, ownership and workplace
relationships and the adoption of a management structure.
Given the surprising importance of management but the still significantly
different internal characteristics of the cooperative enterprise discussed
in this chapter, we might now be interested in investigating what
cooperatives actually plan to do. In other words, what is their planned
behaviour and general objectives. Essentially it is to these issues
which we turn in chapters 4 and 5.
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CHAPTER 4
ALTERNATIVE MAXIMANDS AND
THE COOPERATIVE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
4.1 Introduction
In the analysis of the traditional capitalist firm the dominant assumption
has generally been the maximisation of profits. Of interest in itself is
the challenge to this assumption provided by other objective
formulations such as sales maximisation, growth maximisation and
managerial utility maximisation. A behavioural approach to the capitalist
firm can lead us to view it as a satisficing coalition rather than an
entity which maximises anything. In the case of worker cooperatives
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we have seen that two key characteristics may lead us to challenge the
assumption of profit maximisation even more. Firstly, many
cooperatives in the U.K. have been established for political and
ideological reasons often as a rebuttal to capitalist values and therefore
the exclusive aim of profit maximisation may be seen as undesirable.
Secondly we know that the size of U.K. cooperatives is small and we
are left with the question as to whether small firms, however organised,
do or are able to maximise profits.
The fundamental result that the demand for labour in a labour—
managed firm is inversely related to output price is in part a result of
the objective function chosen for the firm by Ward (1958). But one
might usefully question the Ward Illyrian objective of dividend
maximisation for most cooperative organisations as does Joan Robinson
(1967) when she asks how, when profitability increases due to a
change in a financial parameter, do the members choose whom among
them will be dismissed sO that the remaining members can enjoy a
higher remuneration? Indeed there has been a dearth of empirical
evidence to support ideas of perverse responses. Vartek <296G3
himself argues that it is nonsense to think that a working cooperative
would mutilate itself for the sake of a small additional increase in
income per worker.
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The question then relates to whether we should abandon the dividend -
maximising model altogether. Vanek argues that no labour- managed
firm is a dividend maximiser but that its tendencies are in that direction.
For example, improved profitability could lead to the non- replacement
of retiring workers. Much of the economic literature over the last two
decades builds on the Ward - Vanek tradition. No one is denying
though that simplistic assumptions of profit maximisation or dividend
maximisation can never fully capture the organisation and behaviour of
firms, nevertheless according to writers such as Bonin and Putterman
(1987) these simple models are the starting point for understanding the
complex issues of real- world organisations and they have important
implications for the economics of cooperation and self- management.
It is thus with modifications to these theoretical models, which aim to
build- in 'realistic' assumptions about the labour- managed firm, that
we begin our analysis in section 4.2. In so doing we establish a
theoretical framework from which questions of the data can be asked.
Section 4.3 broadens the debate about objectives and motivations of
the cooperative movement with an examination of a socio - economic
perspective. Although this necessarily encompasses a whole spectrum
of analysis an attempt is made to deduce something about the
objective function of the typical cooperative enterprise. The following
section questions the theory and discussion of the previous two with
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an effort to add some empirical evidence to the analysis. Here an
attempt is made to bring together the two seemingly divergent
approaches of neo — classical analysis and discursive material. Finally,
some concluding remarks are made in section 4.5.
4.2 Theoretical Underpinnings
The traditional Ward — Vanek model of the LM — firm has been criticised
by a number of authors on the basis of its limited objective function.
Various attempts have been made at making this model more realistic.
For example, the objective function may be made more realistic by
including the size of membership as well as the workers' utility function
(see for example, Law 1977, Berman 1977 and Estrin 1979). In
addition it has been argued that membership is not likely to be a short
run variable with changes in output and therefore changes in labour
input being accommodated by a change in the number of hours
worked by the members (Berman, 1977) or by a change in the
intensity of work done by members.
Some authors have also argued that the effort expended by members
is likely to be higher than that expended by workers under capitalism
(Tyson 1979, Ireland 1981). This may be due to reduced alienation
(Reich and Devine, 1981) or a sense of loyalty or perhaps a result of
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the knowledge that the enterprise surplus will return to labour. This
type of consideration implies that LM — firms may be more productive
and have lower per unit costs than comparable PM — firms This was
discussed in chapter 3 and is ignored for the time being.
Assuming that the utility function of the members is to include income
(y) and membership (L) the behaviour of the firm can be expressed as:
max. U = u(y, L)	 (1)
Where U is the utility function of the firm. Differentiating with respect
to L gives us the first order condition for maximisation with respect to
membership.
OU/Oy . Oy/OL + OWN_ = 0	 (2)
Therefore:
Oy/OL = — ($5U/OL)/(OU/Oy) 	 (3)
Equation (3) can be interpreted as saying that the slope of the
income — indifference curve should equal the change in income resulting
from a change in membership. If we assume an egalitarian distribution
of income then (3) can be rewritten as:
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by/OL = (p.5X/OL — y)/L	 (4)
Thus the change in income resulting from a change in membership will
be equal to each members' share of the difference between the value
of the marginal product of membership and the dividend. So long as
workers have some preference regarding changes in membership (i.e.
<> 0) then the utility maximising labour force is attained where
p.OX/51_ <> y	 (5)
and thus the dividend is not at a maximum. In other words there will
be a trade off between dividend and employment. We can illustrate
this by superimposing an indifference map on the dividend curve and
the VMP curve (Figure 4.1)1.
1 The diagrams in this section are adapted from Stephen (1983).
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The traditional Ward — Vanek firm would be in equilibrium at point A with
membership L, whereas the utility maximising firm is in equilibrium at
point B where the dividend curve is tangential to the indifference curve,
with a membership of N. The indifference curves are drawn assuming
that workers have a positive preference for both income and the size
of membership with the consequence that ceteris paribus the LM — firm
will increase in size.
Any change in prices will lead to a response from the firm which in
turn will depend on the shape of the indifference curves, or more
correctly the relative weights on dividend and employment in the utility
function. An increase in output price will shift y upwards. The
response in terms of membership will depend on the nature of the
utility function therefore. Law (1977) shows that given a plausible utility
function the response could reverse the traditional 'perverse' supply
response. On the other hand Estrin (1979) argues that a realistic
preference function for the firm will involve discontinuities around what
are limits to feasible adjustments in membership for internal 'political'
reasons. It is argued that the firm will not increase employment in
response to an increase in output price.
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Attempts to broaden the objective function of the LM — firm indicate that
the perverse supply response can at least be mitigated. Stephen
(1983) rightly argues though, that the validity of all of these conclusions
depends critically on the empirical verifiability of the utility function and
therefore on the type of empirical observation facilitated in this thesis.
Empirics are discussed in more detail below.
A key criticism of the basic model is that membership is likely not to
be a short run variable at all. The traditional model would predict that
workers should leave the LM — firm if the value marginal product of a
member is less that existing income per member. The acceptability of
this assumption has been questioned however (see, for example,
Neuberger and James, 1973). It is perhaps an unacceptable
assumption that workers will be expected to leave an LM — firm for
temporary economic gain. Similarly, if firms will not be prepared to fire
workers in the short run, then they will also be cautious in hiring them
in the first place. This result is clearly apparent from the survey results
presented in chapter 2 with many firms stressing the importance of
equality and good atmosphere in the workplace and caution being
taken over the acceptance of new members (usually after probationary
periods). Indeed we should probably accept the view of Estrin (1981),
who suggests that a likely consequence of self— management would
actually be a reduction in employment flexibility.
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Thus, as Berman (1977) notes, the size of membership in the LM —
firm will be a long — run variable and consequently Estrin (1981)
suggests that "a long — run perspective indicates that supply perversity
might have limited empirical relevance" (p.373). Vanek himself
acknowledges that membership may not be a short term variable
(Vanek 1977). He says that membership reductions are more likely to
take place slowly via natural wastage.
Accepting that the workforce will be fixed in the short run is not to
claim that output or therefore labour input will also be fixed. Labour
input may vary by the temporary employment of non — member
employees as happens in the USA plywood cooperatives (Berman
1982). Ben — Ner (1984) and Miyazaki (1984) have pointed to the
incentive to employ non — member labour, from an external market, as
being a possible reason for the degeneration of the LMF into a
capitalist mode. In the U.K. this sort of process is less likely since
ICOM (Industrial Common Ownership Movement) model rules for the
establishment of a cooperative do not permit non — member labour
• except in a probationary status. However, we return to the whole
debate about degeneration in chapter 7.
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Alternatively labour input can be adjusted by variations in worktime
contributed by members. This is certainly a common attribute in the
cooperatives surveyed, with many stating that long hours were worked
when orders had to be met for example. In chapter 3 (section 3.5) we
noted the cooperative which was reluctant to take on new workers until
"overwork is almost crushing". Let us examine therefore how resource
allocation will occur when workers have the freedom to determine their
hours worked rather than the number of people employed.
Stephen (1983) outlines a model which may be articulated as the
maximisation of the utility of the jth individual, 1.1i , subject to a dividend
constraint, i.e.
max. V = U(yi , hi) + z[yi — (hi/H)(p.f(H,k) — rk)]	 (7)
where yi is the jth worker's dividend
hi is the hours worked by the jth individual
H is total hours worker by all members
p is the price of output
X = f(H,k) is the production function
k is the vector of non — labour inputs
r is the vector of non — labour prices
z is the Lagrange multiplier
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It is assumed that there is no job opportunity which attracts the worker
away from his firm and that each worker assumes that variations in his
labour input do not affect the labour input of others.
The first order conditions for utility maximisation are given as:
M/J /6y = 61JJ
 + z = 0
	 (8)
M/J/6h = 61.1J/Oh — (z/H 2)[H(hp.64/61-1 + pX — rk) — hi(pX — rk)]
=0	 (9)
M/J /Oki = — z(hi /H)[p.6f/Oki — ri] = 0	 (10)
where subscript i denotes the ith non — labour factor.
Equations (8) and (10) yield:
p.6f/Oki = ri	(11)
which, as in the basic model, suggests that each non — labour input
should be used until its value of marginal product equals its price. The
second condition, however, presents problems. Substituting for z and
w= (pX — rk)/H yields:
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— (OUJOh)/(5U 1/15y) = (hi/H)p.Of/.511 + [1 — hi/H]w	 (12)
The right hand side of (12) is the opportunity cost of work to the jth
worker. With only one worker, (h j/H) = 1 and (12) reduces to:
— (OlJj/Oh)/(OUJ/15y) = p.Of/O1-1	 (13)
i.e. the opportunity cost of labour is equal to its marginal value product.
However, where there is more than one worker (i.e. hj < H) the Ith
worker is encouraged to increase his/her hours worked beyond their
optimum level from the point of view of the other members. This can
be seen in figure 4.2.
The number of hours worked by those other than the jth worker is h.
The curve Y shows the net income of the collective as a whole and
the curvewh the income of the jth worker. The dividend per houri
worked is shown by the slope of the ray from the origin to a point on
Y. The income of the Ith worker is given by the height of the whj
curve, e.g. at H 1 it is H iJ. The line joining h to J will have a slope
w since the jth worker works (H 1 — h) hours earning H iJ income and
thus the hourly rate is:
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(H 1 J)/(11 1 — h) = w	 (14)
Thus hJ must be parallel to OF.
The slope of whi is the right hand side of equation (12).
Equation (12) therefore says that the jth worker will work until the slope
ofwh equals the slope of an income — hours indifference curve. Suchi
a position is shown by point B in the diagram.
Berman (1977) notes that the slope of the indifference curve at B is
less than the slope of the indifference curve at G, which is the marginal
product of the last hour worked by the Ith worker. As constructed with
w > p.15f/OH throughout the range of H, ceteris paribus, the other
workers would prefer that the jth worker leaves the firm, since too
many hours will be worked in total.
A solution to this conflict is that of collusion. A reasonable rule which
may arise from collusion is that the Ith worker may change the number
of hours which he/she works when all other members of the collective
change theirs by the same proportion, i.e.
d(hi/H)/dhi = 0	 (15)
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The addition of this constraint to the optimisation problem yields the
following first — order condition for utility maximisation by the jth worker,
with respect to hours worked:
OV/Oh = OUi/Oh — z(hi/H)[p.Of/OH.(H/h)] 	 (16)
This yields:
p.s5f/OFI = — (OU i /Oh)/(OUi /Ely)	 (17)
Berman and Berman (1978) suggest that a condition such as (17) will
guarantee that a price increase will be met by an increase in hours
worked, so long as the substitution effect outweighs the income effect.
With a workforce of just four or five members which is common in the
U.K. this 'collusion solution' is likely. Anecdotally, one certainly gets
the impression that equality in many cooperative enterprises extends to
everyone doing equal amounts of overtime when necessary. Small size
also makes it easier to select like — minded new members with similar
preferences if flexible working becomes necessary.
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So far it has been assumed that each member behaves in a way
which maximises his/her own utility and is totally unaffected by the
impact of his/her behaviour on others. This may not be the case.
Cooperatives are often made up of people where we can assume that
their preferences are like — minded. Indeed we know from chapter 2
that hat is a common reason for the establishment of an enterprise in
cooperative mode. Over time and given the stability which collective
decision — making can create, the utility functions of individual members
are likely to converge still further. Thus with identical utility functions
the worker will no longer seek to maximise his/her own utility but the
welfare of the whole membership or the "community" of which she/he
is part. This may be thought of maximising:
W = U. ± I a..U.	 0 =aii.c 1 and i = j	 (18)
Following Sen (1966), the 'social consciousness' of individual j is
defined as a measure of sympathy for others. This is constrained to
be:
Si = (a)/N	 (19)
It is further assumed that sympathy is symmetric, i.e.
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Sj = S	 for all j	 (20)
Maximisation of W subject to the dividend constraint yields the following
first order condition for the Ith individual's choice of hours:
— (OUj/Oh)/(OUj/by) = p.Of/51-1(h1 /H) + [1 — (hj/H)]w
+ Zaii(OUJOy)/(OUJOy)[p.Of/OH(hi/H)
— w(hi/H)]	 (21)
Stephen (1983) shows that aij = (bUi/Oh)/(OUJOy) is the optimal
degree of concern and is equivalent to the jth individual evaluating the
income and effort positions of all individuals according to his/her own
utility function. Thus the individual's utility function may be expressed
as:
Wj = ZUj (yo h i)	 (22)
If all members have the same utility function and since all individuals
offer the same amount of labour then Stephen (1983) shows that the
optimality condition becomes:
— (OU/Oh)/(OU/Oy) = p.Of/O1-1[S + (1 — S)B/0]
	 (23)
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where B is the ratio of income to total output and 0 is the output
elasticity of labour. Optimality requires that — (.511/5h)/(OU/5y) =
p.Of/Oh which means that either S=1 or that B = 0.
Ireland and Law (1981) have shown that, except where S tends
towards zero, the optimal hours for individual j may fall in response to
an increase in product price even if the worker would have increased
hours were he/she an employee offered a higher wage. Thus altruism
does not necessarily rule out the possibility of a perverse supply
response.
Ireland and Law (1981) show the comparative static responses of the
firm for a specific form of utility function U = w — B(h). The
optimality condition (23) can be rewritten:
B'(h) = Sp(64/051-1) + (1 — S)(B/C2)p(Of/51-1)	 (24)
or	 BS(h) = Sp(Of/61-1) + (1 — S)w	 (25)
Thus when S =1, B'(h) = p.(5f/Oh) and when S = 0, B'(h) = w.
Figure 4.3 assumes that membership is optimal and hours worked in
equilibrium. The total hours worked will be OA.
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When price increases from pc, to pl , the value of marginal product
curve increases to p i XN and the dividend curve shifts to w1. Perfect
sympathy would produce a short run solution of total hours of OB,
whilst minimal sympathy yields OC. This confirms the argument that
concern for others reduces labour input. This is because a greater
number of hours per worker reduces w. In the longer run, B i (h)0 will
shift to B i (h) /
 and total hours is OD. Membership will have fallen but
individual hours must rise since Bi(h) is an increasing function of h and
the marginal disutility of hours is greater at OD than at OA.
Vanek (1970) argues that where production cannot be imputed to each
individual worker then a group behavioural approach is necessary. This
relies on all income being imputable to the group and the democratic
process engendering a group ethic. Thus Stephen (1983) extends the
model by implying a group welfare function of the type:
U = U(y,L,H)	 (26)
where y = (pX — rk)/n
H is the number of hours worked by the whole labour force
L is the number of workers.
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The optimisation problem becomes:
	
max. V = U(y,L,H) + z[y — (pX — rk)/L]
	 (27)
The first order conditions are then given by:
6V/6y = 6U/6y + z = 0	 (28)
Therefore
	 5U/6y = — z	 (29)
6V/5H = OU/OH — (zp.)6X/6H))/L = 0 (30)
Therefore	 — (5U/61-)/5U/5y) = p.(5X/5h)/L 	 (31)
5V/61. = 6U/61_ — z[Lp(5X/5L) — (pX — rk)]/L 2 =0
(32)
Therefore
	 — (6U/5L)(5U/5y) = p(6X/5L)/L — y/L	 (33)
	
5V/Ok = — z(p(6X/5k) — r)/L = 0	 (34)
Therefore	 p(5X/5k) = r	 (35)
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Equation (31) says that the slope of the cooperative's work— income
indifference curve is equal to the income per worker curve and
suggests that so long as the substitution effect outweighs the income
effect an increase in p results in more hours being worked.
In the longer run the membership of the collective may also be varied.
If the 'group' shows no preference as to size then (33) reduces to:
p(OX.OL) = y	 (36)
i.e. the optimal condition in the basic model. The optimality condition
for the non — labour factor (equation 35) is as before.
This model does beg a number of questions. For example, how is the
group utility function derived and how are the H hours distributed
amongst the L members? These questions will be interlinked to the
extent that the shape of the utility function will be related to the
factors determining the way in which the total hours are distributed, i.e.
upon behavioural relationships. In order to answer these sorts of
questions however, the internal organisation must be considered.
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Clearly though the perverse short run supply response does depend on
very simplistic assumptions being made. The basic Ward — Vanek
model can be adapted in a number of ways in order to eliminate this
response and this reflects much of the existing literature in this area.
Thus theoretical models of cooperative and participatory behaviour may
or may not confirm the perverse supply relationship. We have shown
how a basic formulation can be extended with further "realistic"
assumptions but we still need to consider the extent to which these are
appropriate as descriptions of the real world. It is not possible to
comment empirically on the precise form of objective functions but it is
possible to examine the sorts of motivations and behavioural patterns
which will influence them. Thus we may infer something about the
general nature of the objective function by observation. This is the aim
of the remainder of this chapter.
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4.3 Objectives and motivations of the cooperative movement
We now turn our attention away from the neo — Classical framework to
review literature related to our line of study from a socio — economic
perspective. Previous literature adopting a socio — economic perspective
examined the cooperative as an alternative social grouping where
atmosphere, attitudes and relationships within the organisation are
central. Discussion surrounding issues such as factors affecting the
success of worker cooperatives (Cornforth, 1983), conditions for
financial viability (Jefferis and Thomas, 1985) and performance (Jefferis
and Thomas, 1987) has resulted in a greater empirical insight than had
been previously provided.
A useful framework to begin with is provided by Mellor, Hannah and
Stirling (1988), who make a brave attempt at defining the ideal
cooperative. If dreams were to come true, they say (p. 173), the ideal
worker cooperative would have the following characteristics:
1. Provide employment according to the desires of its members.
2. Employ no more people than can effectively participate in
decision — making on an equal basis.
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3.	 Provide socially useful products in a way that is not damaging
to the environment.
4. Organise work in a way that is personally satisfying and
rewarding.
5. Increase the political consciousness of cooperative members.
6. Operate in a way that is economically exploitative of neither its
members or customers.
7. Adopt non — discriminatory employment practices and work
practices.
8. Be part of a co — ordinated but decentralised communal economy
or a movement working towards that end.
According to the authors these positive features largely reflect the
sources of tension which have characterised cooperative development.
They implicitly encompass a view of people as inherently uncompetitive
and non — aggressive. If these aims are an accurate reflection of the
desires of the cooperative movement in the U.K., then we should be
able to deduce something about the objective function of the individual
firm. To that end we need to examine some aspects of their list in
greater detail.
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4.3.1 Socially useful production
An important aspect discussed within the cooperative movement is that
of socially useful production. As early as 1844 the Rochdale Pioneers
had made the production of pure and unadulterated food a fundamental
principle. This has found considerable resurgence in the recent
movement towards wholefood production. According to Collective
Design Projects (1985) socially useful production simply reflects the idea
"that we should collectively produce those things that we
need, rather than things that are frivolous, dangerous or
even deadly." (p. 14)
The implication is that the emphasis lies less in exchange value and
in what Mellor et al. (1988) call use value — in other words,
production primarily for use rather than primarily for profit. But the key
issue revolves around the question as to whether we can expect
cooperatives to see socially useful production in a significantly different
way to their capitalist counterparts. Can we expect there to be
anything in the particular organisation or structure of the cooperative
which leads it to partake in socially useful production? Freer (1983)
notes that some
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"... may hope for too much from workers' cooperatives as
the making of profit is necessary for their survival. Yet
they are probably realistic in believing the production of
socially useful goods and services and the careful use of
resources is more likely to be taken as a major aim
among the highly committed members of a cooperative
than in a conventional firm."
Taylor (1986) stresses the motivation of members of the cooperative
when he notes:
"If the enterprise has been planned and developed by the
workers themselves, they will have brought their everyday
experience of the needs of society to this process. We
believe that worker initiation of socially controlled
enterprises is therefore a good way of re — directing the
purpose of economic activity so that it meets social needs.
Socially useful production is best determined by the
members of society concerned, rather than bureaucrades
working for them." (p. 15)
Bodington et. al. (1986) prefer to stress new types of consumerism as
the driving force for change to socially worthwhile goods. 	 The
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implication being that, as Matthaei (1984) rightly points out, capitalists
will find markets where it is profitable to produce some socially
worthwhile goods. The response of commercial firms to the demand
for additive free food and healthfoods and a sudden interest in "Green"
marketing bears witness to this.
But socially useful production does not just focus on the product. It
raises issues relating to methods of production and ecological
considerations. Those who advocate socially useful production see a
strong relationship between the product and the means by which it is
produced. Collective Design Projects (1985) state:
"The debate about Socially Useful Production can
encompass different stages of the production process:
forms of ownership and control; work practices, labour
processes, job satisfaction, challenge, involvement; useful
products." (p. 14)
According to Mellor et. al. (1988) under these circumstances we might
expect a cooperative to be the means by which the creation of socially
useful production takes place. Production occurs in a democratic
collective manner, although this is only to be achieved if work takes
place in an economic and cultural environment which supports such
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values.
From table 2.4 (page 33) we can see that the production of particular
(socially useful) products is important. This is particularly the case with
cooperatives engaged in the production of food and drink and in
clothing, knitwear and footwear. A case study of a cooperative with
the key objective of socially useful production is provided in chapter 8.
In all twenty — four cooperatives in the survey indicated that one of their
main aims was to produce socially useful goods. Allied to this was (in
about half the survey) a political consciousness. That political
consciousness was not necessarily aimed primarily at the cooperative
movement but did at least recognise issues such as worker democracy,
self— determination and the notion of atmosphere at work being a
function of the organisational form of that work. Thus when, as is
common, an organisation is established as a rebuttal to capitalist
values, producing a good which members consider to be socially
important in a way which is not ecologically destructive, is it any
wonder that modelling is difficult?
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4.3.2 Political consciousness
Irrespective of the political ideologies of members of the cooperative the
fact remains that in the U.K. cooperatives are commercial enterprises
operating in the capitalist market. The question which therefore follows
is does the cooperative tend to exhibit particular political motivations in
its behaviour? And if it does exhibit such motivations will they always
be the same?
Clearly, the answer to this second question is no. For example let us
look at two opposite but likely scenarios. Firstly, the cooperative may
have motivations which point it in the direction of worker capitalism.
With a direct stake within a job — owning democracy within the capitalist
system, members will have an incentive to ensure its perpetuity.
Rather than fostering opposition to capitalism therefore, the cooperative
succeeds in broadening capitalism's popular appeal. Alternatively, the
cooperative may be borne out of a demand for more self —
determination. Greenberg (1983) refers to a theory of escalation here.
The experience of democracy in the workplace, being an essential
educative tool in the growth of social consciousness, in time translates
into the enhancement of more cooperative and egalitarian values and
behaviour in a capitalist society.
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Greenberg (1981) in studying workers in the American plywood
cooperatives and their non — cooperative competitors found that workers
in the latter displayed higher levels of confidence in the potential of the
working class than did members in cooperatives. He concluded that
the cooperative may not therefore be an appropriate educative setting
for nurturing a large political movement for change. But one must
take into consideration the fact that American plywood cooperatives are
not directly comparable to U.K. worker cooperatives. The plywood
cooperatives have a clear distinction between members and non —
members for example, and do not operate in a political environment
where there is an adversarial political labour movement.2
Gender politics have also played a role in sectors of the cooperative
movement. Assumptions have been made about the positive
relationship between feminism and non — hierarchical, non — competitive
organisations (see Bookchin 1982 for example). Cooperative work
practices and support systems associated with self— management have
much to offer women. To many, feminist principles are parallel to
cooperative ones. Capra (1983) for example notes that there is
2 Further empirical work on American plywood cooperatives has been
undertaken by Berman and Berman (1989). They highlight differences between these
cooperatives and comparable conventional firms which indicate, amongst other things,
that the two productive modes have significantly different production functions.
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"... a significant shift in values from the admiration of large
scale enterprises and institutions to the notion of small is
beautiful, from material consumption to voluntary simplicity
... changed by the rise of feminist awareness originating
in the women's movement" (p. 30)
A significant number of cooperatives saw equal status for men and
minority groups within the cooperative as important. On top of this
many cooperatives were established by women either on feminist
principles (e.g. the need to have work determined people other than
men), or on principles of particular need (e.g. the provision of flexible
working arrangements and shared childcare for women with children).
In the latter category women often seemed prepared to accept low
wages relative to those in capitalist organisations as a form of trade —
off for their preferred work arrangements.
Another set of principles supporting the cooperative organisation are
put forward by radical Green thinkers. There is an almost
unquestioned assumption that cooperatives will be the most appropriate
form of economic structure for an ecological society. Capra (1983) for
example writes:
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"Detailed study of the ecosystems over the past decades
has shown quite clearly that most relationships between
living organisms are essentially cooperative ones,
characterised by coexistence and interdependence and
symbiotic in various degrees." (p. 302)
Henderson (1978) sees the formation of cooperatives as important
indicators of the emergence of a 'counter— economy', pointing the way
to an ecological future. Her main emphasis is in thinking globally but
acting locally and therefore in demanding more worker — participation
and self— management.
Porritt (1984) is even more specific:
'There is one particular form of small business that is
especially important in the eyes of the ecologists, and that
is the cooperative. A cooperative is much more likely to
be sensitive to the needs of the community in which its
members live. The profit motive is linked to a broader
collective concern: concern on the one hand that the
working members are adequately cared for, and on the
other that the cooperative is playing a constructive part in
the wider community." (pp. 140 — 141).
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4.3.3 Participation in decision — making
According to Fox (1974) a degree of self—determination in the
workplace has significant psychological and other advantages for the
worker. Thus self— determination is the way in which people can
"... meet their challenges and overcome obstacles, develop
their aptitudes and abilities, and enjoy the satisfaction of
achievement ... Perhaps the central notion here can be
expressed in the language of decision — making, choice and
responsibility ... This is the process of self — determination
... A workplace which offers no — or only the most trivial
— opportunities for choice, decisions and the acceptance
of responsibility is therefore one which offers few
opportunities for [psychological] growth." (pp. 4 — 5).
Thus the ability to exercise discretion and participation in decision —
making at work not only enhances job satisfaction, but contributes
towards the individual's feelings of personal and political efficacy. Many
of these issues were discussed in chapter 3.
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By virtue of their collective ownership and control through democratic
structures, worker cooperatives would seem ideally suited to offering
opportunities to participate in decision — making and the exercise of a
relatively high degree of autonomy. We may hypothesise that workers
in cooperatives should exhibit lower levels of alienation than their
counterparts in private firms.
The whole area of employment practices and work practices is also an
important area reflecting the behavioural nature of the organisation.
We have already noted that many cooperatives are keen to adopt more
equitable work practices, particularly with respect to women and
minority groups. Recruitment practices have also been discussed. In
terms of work practices, democratic decision — making seems important.
The allocation of work amongst members of the cooperative was seen
in table 3.5 (page 82). This indicates a wide range of allocation
devices and mirrors the many different work practices adopted.
Whereas we may model the capitalist firm in terms of work aimed at
the maximisation of profit, the members of cooperative organisation may
see work itself as utility — generating in itseit.
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4.3.4 Self — development, skills development and training
One of the basic assumptions made as far back as the beginning of
the century (Webb and Webb, 1914) is that the working class has the
ability to run industry and that people can cooperate at work rather
than compete. In addition the people who make up the firm are
presumed to carry an ideological commitment not only to cooperation
but also to socialism. According to Mellor et al. (1988) this hardly
represents the real world where job creation is a major priority for
many cooperatives, leaving little time to consider the politics of that
process.
Nevertheless there is still a common assumption, discussed in part
above, that cooperative working can lead to personal development.
The democratic work environment may be one in which personal
development is easier than in a capitalist hierarchical structure, where
a range of constraints are imposed on work. Particularly important here
seems to be the issue of training and skills development. It is clear
from the survey that many cooperatives see skills development, training
and developing high levels of workmanship as important ends in
themselves.
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4.3.5 Exploitation
Worker cooperatives under capitalism have been criticised for self —
exploitation. In particular companies in a position of market
dependency facing considerable competition for orders are often forced
to cut costs. For most cooperatives the most flexible way to do this
is to cut labour costs. Thus wages, holiday pay and the length of the
working week are all susceptible to erosion. In a cooperative where
a major motive is the creation and maintenance of jobs it will be very
difficult for members to resist cuts in wages if it results in additional
orders and associated security. But in many other cooperatives the
issue is rather more complex. Mellor et al. question whether if workers
takes a pay cut in order to pay for crèche facilities that really
constitutes a pay cut. What about if a cooperative was established by
previously higher paid workers who do so to achieve flexible working
hours? Clearly, this is not self— exploitation since it reflects a trade
off in the individual's utility function between income and other
attributes. If a rational positive decision is taken to establish a crèche
facility, for example, this must at the very least imply no change in
utility. In addition if one adds — in utility derived from job satisfaction
and other positive attributes associated with cooperative rather than
capitalist production, the self — exploitation argument becomes even
weaker.
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Stressing the fact that cooperatives are generally just small businesses
Webb and Webb (1914) point to other forms of exploitation which is
likely in this sector as well:
"... the smallness of their enterprise usually exempts them
[members] from any effective legal protection in the form
of the Factory Acts. Oppressed by the wholesale and
retail traders on either side of them, they become in turn
potent instruments of oppression of those whom they
employ whether these be members of their own families
or the most helpless individuals of the wage — earning
class." (p.3)
Clearly, external market conditions will have an impact on the behaviour
of the cooperative including the extent of its self— determination. Thus
self — determination will often require a degree of specialisation and
market segmentation. If this is not possible then the main question
becomes, is there a point at which capitalist constraints impinge so
strongly on the cooperative that it becomes meaningless to see itself
as an independent and autonomous unit? We return to the issue of
self— exploitation in chapter 7.
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4.3.6 Employment practices and work practices
It cannot be assumed that ownership of a job necessarily equates with
complete control over that job. Nevertheless much of the
contemporary support for the cooperative enterprise revolves around the
belief that they can provide a high quality, more satisfying work
environment. Implicit within this is the assumption that cooperative
members are free to make decisions and exercise a high degree of
control over their working lives. As pointed out previously though, this
will depend to a large extent on the relative non — dependency on
customers or suppliers.
The scope of decision — making may also be limited by increasing
mechanisation as new technology takes on (or is able to at least) jobs
traditionally done by members. Some cooperatives may actually
choose not to adopt new technology, but if their competitors do then
assuming this to be cost reducing, the only way the cooperative can
continue to function is by cutting wages. Nevertheless when profit is
not the main motive, a cooperative may decide to purchase machinery
which is less efficient than others available, but potentially less
hazardous to health and safety.
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Job rotation is a strategy widely used in the cooperative sector. It
allows members a degree of variety in their work and presents an
opportunity to acquire a rage of skills. While there are benefits for the
individual, Mellor et al. (1988) argue that the cooperative as a
democratic institution will benefit:
"The workforce will develop knowledge and confidence in
the operation of the business as a whole, not just one
area. This acts as a safeguard against the development
of unofficial hierarchies of power based on knowledge and
access to information. At the same time, it encourages
greater participation in decision — making because
cooperators feel more confident of the relevance of their
contribution ... " (p. 125)
There are obvious limitations to the practice though. If particular
specialist skills are required then job rotation may be impossible.
Paton (1978) further notes that job rotation can present problems of
efficiency:
"By rotating people quickly through routine tasks, one
removes a major incentive for people to develop short
cuts, dexterity and carefully arranged methods whereby
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those lumbered with such jobs permanently are able to
keep one jump ahead ... it may be that such an
organisation constitutes the worst possible arrangements
as far as the introduction of changes are concerned: no —
one has specific responsibility, but everyone is affected ..."
(p. 47)
If a cooperative is in a position to expand then it must make some
choices with regard to recruitment policy. This will depend largely on
the objectives of the incumbent workers. The membership itself is
likely to have an impact on the work environment and therefore the
utility of members. Thus the decision to expand is a decision which
will be taken with considerable care. Worries about 'breaking up a
happy atmosphere' may actually result in the cooperative not expanding
employment.
137
4.4 Issues of Theory and Practice
The neoclassical framework outlined in section 4.2 and the discussion
of idealised cooperative principles in section 4.3 raise a number of
issues which need to be developed and examined. In particular we
need to consider the extent to which models of the cooperative
organisation like those discussed in section 4.2 are based on verifiable
foundations.
One of the most basic assumptions in the models presented is that
decisions take place on the basis of manipulating a utility function
containing members' residual income and the size of the membership
of the cooperative. But the research reported here tends to indicate
that membership of the cooperative is more an historical accident than
a rational maximising process. Certainly, most cooperatives expressing
a view saw the maintenance of the membership of the cooperative (i.e.
employment) as being very important. Again we would support Estrin's
(1981) assertion that membership is not a short— run flexible variable.
Not only are some members unlikely to leave the cooperative to
accommodate higher incomes for those who remain, but they are not
going to be dismissed on those grounds by fellow members who have
only an equivalent say in the democratic process. Moreover, evidence
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suggests that the recruitment of new members is also considered very
carefully for a number of reasons including not wanting to damage
existing relationships and the atmosphere of the workplace. Commonly,
members of the cooperative will work overtime for long periods rather
than recruit extra staff. Where recruitment does take place it is
commonly on a probationary period basis.
As was seen in section 4.2, much of the literature surrounding the
maximand of the labour managed firm assumes that each member
behaves in the way that maximises his/her own utility and may be
unaffected by the impact of the behaviour of others. This was argued
to be a naive assumption when examining any organisational form but
in the case of the cooperative, particularly inappropriate. In the case
of the income — sharing cooperative one member may be affected by
the behaviour of another since one member's effort will in part
determine another's income. At issue therefore is the consideration of
whether cooperatives demonstrate a degree of altruism as suggested
by Stephen (1983), i.e. attach some weight to the impact of their
behaviour on others' welfare. A definite answer to this question is
impossible on the basis of this questionnaire, but nevertheless amongst
the objectives cited by cooperatives one can find mention of
worksharing, equal status, democracy, harmony and caring for others.
One cooperative listed its objectives as:
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"The provision of goods and services required by our
customers, to look after our members in every respect, to
fly the common ownership flag and to be a caring, sharing
community."
The nature of the cooperative and its size relative to many capitalist
firms does lend weight to an analysis where we assume that because
of like — minded preferences the utility functions of members converge.
Although building in a degree of altruism into the neoclassical model
does not always rule out a perverse supply response, it does tend to
lessen the likelihood of that occurring. . Cooperatives are often
established by groups of friends or previous workplace colleagues.
Often this is done in response to closure where the workers
experiences will be similar. 	 Often the political motivations of the
establishing members	 will be very similar and therefore their
motivations and behaviour largely convergent.
Indications from the survey suggest that motivations are not only largely
consistent within the firm but also between many cooperatives.
Moreover we can see that aims are rarely identified with the
maximisation of financial variables. Only twelve cooperatives in the
sample actually mentioned good rates of pay and profitability as being
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an aim. More often the aim was in some other direction with a
proviso that the cooperative had to be viable in order to maintain jobs.
What seems very important therefore is that we should be able to
consider the motivations of the cooperative which implies understanding
something of the behavioural patterns which exist within the
organisation. At issue is the question as to whether these behavioural
patterns, which can change between situations as well as over time,
are capable of being modelled in a conventional neo — classical way.
These issues are more associated with the discussion of section 4.3.
But in many cases motivations may be even wider than just the firm
level. Eight cooperatives from the sample indicated that they saw
working with and responsibility towards the community as being an
important aim. Thus in order fully to model this sort of cooperative
some sort of account needs to be taken of the utility to be derived
from community projects by both the cooperative members and indeed
the community itself. This would seem to be a formidable task and for
now it is put aside.
Since we are therefore hypothesising that in the main the objectives
and motivations of the firm depend on the members therein we need
to be able to examine some of the characteristics of the members.
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The second questionnaire asked respondents about the age structure
of the cooperative. Of the 40 cooperatives which provided enough
information to be useful we find that the average age of a cooperative
member is 34.7 years with a standard deviation of 7 years. This is
clearly younger than the average age of the working population. We
might hypothesise that age might be a significant factor in the political
motivations displayed by the cooperative. Therefore splitting our
sample into two parts according to political motivations as described in
chapter 2 we find the following:
Type of coop.
	 no. of firms average age standard deviation
(years)	 (years)
politically
motivated	 18	 31.7	 6.2
non — politically
motivated
	
22	 35.9	 7.5
Table 4.4
Given the sample size, the statistical significance of any difference is in
doubt. But what is perhaps more interesting is the size of the
standard deviation indicating that there is often not a wide spread of
age ranges in the typical cooperative. This is perhaps less surprising
when we consider that many cooperatives are formed by friends or
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previous work colleagues.
Another possibility is that there will be regional differences in the
behaviour and motivations of cooperatives. For example we might
hypothesise that cooperatives in relatively depressed areas will be
interested more in the maintenance of jobs than other motivations.
Using the same split between politically motivated firms we find:
Type of coop.	 Number of firms in:
North Midlands Wales Scotland London South
politically
motivated	 9
	
4	 2	 7	 5	 2
non — politically
motivated	 9
	
9	 0	 2	 4	 7
Table 4.5
Again, split like this, the sample does become small and we must be
careful about statistical significance. But overall there is no real
difference, with the North — an area where we might have
hypothesised differences — being split equally.
	 If we examine
cooperatives who mentioned somewhere in their response to either
questionnaire the importance of employment the regional split is as
follows:
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North Midlands Wales Scotland London South
10	 3	 3	 6	 9	 5
Table 4.6
Again no discernable differences are clear and the relatively high
numbers for the North and London just mirror the fact that more
responses to the questionnaire came from these areas anyway.
Thus a broad analysis (by age and region) of the characteristics of
cooperative members does not add much more information to the
analysis. Nevertheless we must accept, almost de facto. the argument
that the characteristics of the cooperative are dependent largely on
internal members and relations. As Wiles (1977) points out the firm
has no objectives of its own, only the individuals within it.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
Not all cooperatives are 'ideal' cooperatives. Nor would many want to
accept the categorisation made by Mellor et. al. What is very clear is
the diversity in aims and objectives of cooperatives and although we
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have split the sample in two according to the degree of political
motivation this definition in itself is very loose and hides a multitude of
differences. This diversity itself implies a range of a different objective
functions for the cooperative sector. Implicitly we have accepted the
need for a degree of behavioural type modelling based on the
behaviour and motivations of members. Whilst we may hypothesise
that cooperative members may have more similar utility functions than
workers in the traditional capitalist firm by virtue of the very fact that
they have come together in a cooperative enterprise this does not
mean that there is no need to see the enterprise as a satisficing
coalition. In these circumstances we need to consider very carefully
whether neo — classical modelling based on the maximisation of
anything, even subject to 'realistic' constraints is suitable.
Cooperatives tend not to follow set behavioural patterns which make
them capable of modelling. Their relative size and democratic process
makes them more flexible often than the capitalist firm. For example
in times of poor demand for their product, members of the cooperative
are far more likely to accept a pay cut, or to work overtime without
payment than a worker in a traditional firm.
Moreover, any modelling of the cooperative enterprise must take
account of the utility functions of its members. When, as is often the
145
case, those utility functions contain implicit trade — offs between income
and more socially oriented objectives, such as good relations with the
community or ecological considerations or adherence to a particular
political movement or gender politics, then this becomes almost
impossible. Nevertheless a key area of consideration is that of growth
within the cooperative firm. Some theoretical models of growth within
the labour — managed enterprise do provide us with testable conclusions
and it to this which we turn our attention in the next chapter.
However, Vanek (1970) reminds us that firms do not have to explicitly
income — maximise. He claims that much of their behaviour does follow
the sort of predictions which this model makes. Centrally, to my mind,
is the idea that the cooperative will be willing to trade — off employment
for income. From the second questionnaire we do have some
evidence relating to this from 40 cooperatives. Cooperatives were
asked what their actual growth rates in terms of turnover, employment
and income had been. We are interested in any cooperatives who in
that period had had a growth in incomes but a decline in employment.
Six cooperatives actually fall into this category. In none of these cases
were members forced to leave, rather they left either for retirement or
for another job (in one case to establish another complementary
cooperative in the area). Nevertheless we may ask why their position
was not replaced. Although the range of possible answers, including
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not wanting to damage a good atmosphere for example, will not prove
a case either way. On the other hand out of 24 cooperatives who
had actually increased employment, 19 did so whilst increasing income
as well and five did so whilst income stayed the same. Overall then
maybe a little evidence for Vanek's claim?
A more productive line to take may parallel traditional profit — maximising
modelling where it is assumed that a proportion of profits is consumed
by management within the firm (see Cowling, 1982 for example). We
might assume that cooperatives do income maximise but that some of
that income is consumed internally by following other objectives. It
might be the case that the members of the cooperative catering for
vegetarian tastes, for example, could have a higher income if it served
a wider market and produced non — vegetarian food as well.
Even if we cannot fully reject a neoclassical analysis of the cooperative
firm we must ask about its usefulness in describing and predicting the
behaviour of the U.K. cooperative sector. Evidence cited here tends
to suggest that only in a few cases has this happened and that the
sheer diversity of the cooperative sector makes any other result almost
impossible.
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CHAPTER 5
GROWTH ASPIRATIONS AND GROWTH RATES
OF THE COOPERATIVE FIRM
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine performance in the guise of
growth aspirations of manufacturing cooperatives in the U.K. The
theoretical literature on cooperative firms has in the past comelltrated
on distinguishing them from their capitalist counterparts by means of
differing objective functions. In the main this has involved neo-
classical analysis of aspects such as membership adjustment (Ireland
and Law, 1982), finance (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1970) and efficiency
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(Ichiishi, 1977). The seminal work of Vanek (1970) and Ward (1958)
and consequent supply — side tendencies which this approach implies
has been the subject of much debate (see for example Ireland and
Law, 1982 and Bonin and Putterman, 1987). This chapter sets out to
examine the basic objectives of our group of cooperatives and link
these to issues surrounding growth and performance.
After an examination of the broad principles surrounding the
performance — participation nexus and the objectives of the cooperative
the chapter examines the growth aspirations of the cooperative firms in
the survey. Aspirations are important because they reflect the planned
behaviour of the enterprise, their actual behaviour being clouded by a
range of exogenous events. Probit analysis is used to find the
characteristics of the enterprise which make it more probable that it will
have high growth aspirations. Following this there is an extension of
the analysis into examining behavioural patterns of the enterprises in
terms of their political motivations. Much of the impetus for this
analysis comes from the work of Daudi and Sotto (1985) who have
been critical of the political motivations of Western cooperatives. In the
later sections of the chapter actual growth rates of a subset of
cooperatives are examined and compared with aspirations. Before some
final remarks, we examine the determinants of management structure
and perceived productivity advantages (which we shall see become
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important determinants of growth) in terms of the other exogenous
variables.
5.2 The Participation — Performance Nexus
The chapter attempts to make a contribution to the participation —
performance nexus to which much attention has been paid in recent
years, and to further examine the supply — side constraints assumed of
the labour— managed firm by Illyrian analysis. The work by Estrin,
Jones and Svejnar (1987) for example, finds that in general, for
western economies, the overall effect of participatory schemes in
producer cooperatives is positive, although growth is not examined
specifically.
Whilst the analysis here concentrates specifically on one aspect of
performance, namely growth, it is indicative of the attempt to examine
the theoretical claims made of the labour — managed firm. From a
purely neo— classical stance the issue of growth within the cooperative
firm based on a restrictive analysis by Ward (1958) and others is the
one which may have damaged the cooperative movement amongst
academics. Research is still needed to discover the reality behind the
theory.
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As Estrin, Jones and Svejnar (1987) point out there has been very little
formal modelling of key relationships associated with worker
participation. Central here is the question as to whether cooperatives
will plan to grow as fast as their capitalist counterparts or whether there
may be reasons to believe that productivity effects will have a negative
or positive influence on growth aspirations.
On the positive side participation is likely to generate superior labour
morale, greater team spirit and consequently an increased incentive
towards effort. It may also improve a firm's organizational efficiency,
flexibility and willingness to innovate. Moreover, as Jones and Svejnar
(1985) argue participation may also result in lower absenteeism, better
workmanship, superior information flows and superior monitoring of
effort and quality. This may all manifest itself as optimism with regard
to growth.
On the negative side, the strongest case is made by Jensen and
Meckling (1979) who see participation as always having negative effects
on productivity. The focus tends to be associated with trade — offs
between efficiency and joint — decision making because of problems of
group preference formation. Even if this can be overcome, it is
suggested that decision — making will be slow and cumbersome.
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The assumed lack of managerial leadership and the nature of that
management within a cooperative enterprise has also been cited by
some (for example even as early as 1920 by Webb and Webb) as a
reason for inefficiency in the participative firm. Although, the assumed
restrictive nature of management, (e.g. the requirement that
management in a cooperative should rotate which is stressed by
Williamson, 1980) may not always resemble that which occurs in the
real world.
In the analysis of the traditional capitalist firm the dominant assumption
has been the maximisation of profits. We have already argued that in
the case of worker cooperatives two common characteristics may lead
us to challenge the assumption of profit maximisation even more;
political and ideological reasons and the small size of firms.
The survey undertaken attempted to elucidate the objectives of the
cooperative. Respondents were asked how important a number of
factors were in the establishment of the cooperative. Table 2.3 (page
30) summarised the responses showing up a clear importance of the
atmosphere at work, wanting to work for oneself, the provision of a
particular product and a desire for equality with fellow workers.
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5.3 Growth and the Cooperative firm
It is often claimed that the labour — managed firm will tend to grow at
a slower rate than its capitalist counterpart. The work of authors such
as Ward (1958), Atkinson (1973) and Bonin (1983) represents a
theoretical demonstration that the labour — managed firm chooses a
lower rate of growth than the profit — maximising firm in certain restrictive
circumstances. Casually, one may expect that growth which results in
an expansion of the labour force and consequent diluting of the
authority of original members, may be resisted. At the least the
expansion of the workforce needs to result in a proportional expansion
of the surplus if members are not to be made worse off by following
a growth strategy.
Atkinson's (1973) starting point in analyzing growth is to recognise that
in the labour—managed firm, like in any firm, there is likely to be some
separation of ownership and control. In a large LMF it is easy to
imagine that the direction of policy would be in the hands of a
manager, who although elected and accountable, would enjoy a degree
of discretion. It is therefore interesting to compare growth in a
capitalist firm with growth in an LMF where managerialism exists in
both.
153
This can be done with the aid of a simple model derived from Solow
(1971) and Atkinson (1973). The basic assumptions of the model are
as follows:
1. There is no substitutability in production between labour and
capital.
2. There is labour — augmenting technical progress at a rate r such
that
Lt = aKte r-t
	 (5.1)
where Lt
 is labour employed and Kt is capital stock at time t.
3. There are economies of scale and output, Yt , is given by:
Yt = loKt1-1	 (5.2)
4. The firm is facing a downward sloping demand curve for its
output. This shifts outward over time at a rate G o. However,
if the firm spends money on sales promotion it can expand its
sales, at any given price, at a faster rate than G.
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5. It is assumed that the firm makes a once and for all decision
about its price which is constant over time and about its rate of
growth which is a constant proportional rate.
6. Output grows at a rate G so that capital stock grows at a rate
GAi which must be less than G. Thus
Kt = Koe(G/i.ot 	 (5.3)
7. The net revenue of the firm is given by
RoeGt — F(Ko)T(G)eGt	(5.4)
where the function F represents gross revenue and the function
T(G) = 1— s(G) where s(G) is the expansion cost as a
proportion of sales revenue. We assume the T(G) has the
shape depicted in figure 5.1
8. It is assumed that the gross revenue per unit of capital at time
zero (F(K0)/K0) has the slope given in figure 5.2. For this to
hold we require that the elasticity of demand be a declining
function of Ko. Atkinson (1973) shows that this is a reasonable
assumption.
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Figure 5.2
Go	 Gmax
FN/K0
Ko*
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9.	 We assume that the firm aims to maximise the present value of
dividends at a discount rate a.
10. We assume that all capital is financed by borrowing at an interest
rate i. There are no intermediate inputs or outputs and no hired
workers. We ignore depreciation. Thus the net income of the
LMF is given by
RoeGt — i loxiC	 (5.5)
where pK is the price of capital goods.
If the firm is egalitarian then the dividend rate is equal for all workers:
dt = (Roe [p+n - GipitvaKo _ opertva	 (5.6)
Thus the present value of dividends over an infinite time horizon is
given by
Do — [R0/aK0][1/(0 — G(1-1/p))] — ip K/a0	 (5.7)
where 0=a— r
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The LMF will choose Ko and G to maximise Do. Consider first the
scale of operations (Ks). The maximisation of D o
 requires that gross
revenue per unit of capital be maximised, i.e. point K
	 figure 5.2.
It can be seen that at point K 	 elasticity of demand is equal to
(p/p— 1)s.
Consider now the determination of the growth rate. Assuming that
second — order conditions will be satisfied we derive first order
conditions by differentiating with respect to G:
— •51:10/OG = [R0(1 — 1/14]/[S)— G(1 — 1/p)]
	
(5.8)
which can be written
— T'(G)/T(G) = 1/(a — G)
	
(5.9)
where a =0/(1 — 1/p)
In other words the LMF equates the marginal cost of an extra unit of
growth, in terms of revenue foregone, with the present value of the
gain arising from economies of scale. If there were no economies of
scale (i1=1), the LMF would chose Go. Thus it is only economies of
scale in the basic model which make the firm interested in growth. It
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is both independent of the rate of interest and the choice of Ko. The
growth rate chosen is however a decreasing function of C), which can
be seen as the "effective" discount rate. The higher C), the lower the
growth rate chosen and in the extreme case where workers are only
concerned about current dividend d o, the growth rate chosen would be
Go.
It seems reasonable to compare this outcome with that of the capitalist
firm. Assuming that the capitalist firm (CF) has the same production
function and prices as the LMF and that the wage rate (w t) is equal
to the LMF's dividend rate (at least initially), we can set out the basic
model.
We assume that the CF finances its capital formation out of retained
earnings. The dividends paid to shareholders at time t are equal to
the net revenue minus wages minus retained earnings:
RoeGt — awtKte -rt
 — PA(G/1-1)
	 (5.10)
Assume that the wage rate rises at a rate r such that wt = woert.
The stock market value of the firm is assumed to be equal to the
present value (at the market rate of interest j) of the dividend payments
to shareholders:
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Vo = Ro/(j — G) — (K0/6 — G/p))[awo
 + (G/p)pk]	 (5.11)
where we assume j to be greater than Gmax and hence greater than
Grnax/p.
The CF is assumed to maximise the difference between its stock
market value and the value of capital employed:
Zo = Vo
 — pKK0 = Ro/(j — G) — (Ko/a — G/1.1))[awo + 4)0
(5.12)
The scale of the firm is determined simply by
OR0/OK0
 = (awe + jpK)[(j— G)/(j— Gip)]
= R0/K0 — (Z0/K0)(j — G)	 (5.13)
Thus the CF can achieve a strictly positive value of Zo if market
conditions are right, implying that its scale will be larger and therefore
its price lower than with the LMF. This result corresponds with that of
Vanek (1970).
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In choosing its rate of growth (assuming second order conditions are
satisfied) the CF sets
— OF10/OG = Ro/a — G) — [Ko (j — G)/pa — G/1.0 2][awo + jpK]
= Zo + [jK0(1— 1/p)/(j— G/1.0 2][awo + jpK] (5.14)
Where Zo is strictly positive, the growth rate is greater than G o even if
there are no economies of scale. Thus there appears to be a
significant difference between the two types of firm. If we combine
5.13 and 5.14, the first order condition for G is:
—r(G)/T(G) = 1/(j— G) — 141(K061:10/R0OK0)(1/0— G/p))
= 1/(j— G) — (1— 1/T)/(j— Gip)	 (5.15)
where T is the elasticity of demand.
However, the basis for comparison between the LMF and CF is less
straightforward than in the static models considered by Ward and
Domar. Essentially the model consists of two new elements:
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a) the comparison of a time path of payments to labour rather than
just the current remuneration; and
b) the specification of the rates of time discount applied by
shareholders and workers.
The assumption made here is that the present value of wages paid by
the capitalist firm is equal to the present value of dividends:
(Do = w0/(o — I.)) and that the rate of discount used by the CF is
equal to the rate of interest paid by the LM firm a=0.
From equation 5.7 these assumptions imply that:
H = awo + ipk = R(KLm , G Lm)/KLm — a/(a — G um) (5.16)
The value of G Lm and H are declining functions of a. The value of H
in turn influences Gu through its effect on Ku and hence in (5.15).
It can be shown that Gu is a declining function of H and hence a
situation such as that shown in figure 5.3.
There is therefore a value a * such that for a less than a* the first order
conditions indicate a faster rate of growth for the LM firm, and for a
greater than a* the CF grows faster.
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Figure 5.3
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Atkinson (1973) goes on to show that the results can be more
accurately summarised as follows:
a) if the workers' effective discount rate is greater than or equal to
that of the shareholders, then the capitalist firm grows faster; and
b) if the workers' effective discount rate is less than j, then either
the capitalist firm grows faster or the capitalist firm cannot break
even.
More recent theories of the firm have, of course, emphasised the
separation of ownership and control. Thus it would be more useful to
compare the LM firm not with the capitalist firm but with the
managerially controlled firm which may be more typical of modern
advanced economies.
The model of the managerial CF firm presented here is based on the
work of Marris (1964). Managers aim to maximise the rate of growth
subject to a potential takeover constraint. This constraint can be
formulated in terms of the valuation ratio where Vo must be greater or
equal to mR<K0, where m is a constant and less than or equal to 1.
This can be written as:
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Z0 = — (1 — m)pkKo
	(5.19) or;
R0/K0
 = — G)[mP K + (awo + G/I-)PK)/(i —G/1)]
	
(5.20)
For any Ko
 we can find the greatest G that satisfies (5.20). Thus the
managerial firm will choose Ko to maximise R0/K, i.e. the same scale
of output as the LMF.
In order to compare growth rates of the MCF and the LMF, assume
that the present value of the payments per worker are equal and that
j=i. Consider first the case where m=1. Let Z the value of the
CF with K=K0 , then for H such that Zo * is positive, the growth rate for
the MCF is greater than that of the CF. Hence we can deduce that
GmcF will be greater than G L roF where H is such that the CF can break
even. However, if m is less than unity it is possible for the reverse to
be true.
In the model of the LMF we have assumed the maximisation of income
per worker. In practice however, the direct control of the LMF may be
in the hands of appointed managers creating a managerial LMF
(MLMF). The managers although accountable to the membership may
be able to pursue some of their own goals.
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There will of course be constraints on the managerial discretion. It
seems reasonable to suppose that workers are concerned with the level
of dividend and that any dividend below a certain level will result in the
dismissal of managers. The objectives of managers are difficult to
specify but we might assume that like their counterparts they will be
interested in the rate of growth of the enterprise.
On these assumptions the aim of the MLMF can be seen as
maximising G subject to
ado
 = R0/K0 — OK
	 (5.21)
The firm chooses K0 such that R0/K0 is maximised. The growth rate
however is increased to the point where (5.21) holds with equality and
if d' is less than the current dividend paid to the LMF, the MLMF
grows faster. To this extent, allowance of managerial discretion
narrows the gap between the capitalist and labour— managed enterprise.
The separation of ownership from control thus tends to intrease Drowth
in both the LMF and CF. Whether a MLMF will grow as fast as or
faster than the MCF will depend on the degree of managerial discretion.
Two qualifications must nevertheless be considered. Firstly, the goals
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of managers in the MLMF may be rather different to those assumed
and secondly, no account is taken of the distributional changes that
would accompany the introduction of labour management in this
analysis.
Whilst it was never the intention of this thesis to provide a direct
comparison of a sample of labour— managed and capitalist firms (and
we are able therefore to say few things about comparisons between CF
and LMF production) we do know which cooperatives in the sample
appoint managers and we can test Atkinson's view that managerial
discretion in the LMF will increase growth rates.
5.4 Survey Results
The results of the survey certainly do not reflect a view that
cooperatives will not want to grow. No respondents expected a decline
in terms of the definitions of growth used: turnover; employment; and
incomes of members. The distribution between those anticipating no
growth, a growth rate oi less than 10% per annum and a growth 't'&E
of more than 10%, over the next 12 months and three years, is shown
in figure 5.4. In every case over each time period the majority of
respondents expected growth by more than 10%.
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Figure 5.4	 ANTICIPATED GROWTH RATES
04A
	
04B
	
05A
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NO CHANGE Ez]	 I \ N LESS THAN 10%	 tz223 MORE THAN 10%
Questions from the questionnaire: 
Q4	 To what extent do you expect you cooperative to grow in terms of turnover in the next:
A. 12 months
B. 3 years
Q5	 To what extent do you expect employment in the cooperative to expand in the next:
A. 12 months
B. 3 years
Q6	 To what extent do you expect incomes of the members of the cooperative to expand in the next:
A. 12 months
B. 3 years
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A relatively large proportion of respondents did expect employment not
to change even though some of them expected turnover to increase by
more than 10% even in the short term. This may lend support to the
view that some cooperatives do not wish to expand employment. In
the past the reason for this has been seen in terms of selfishness (i.e.
not wanting to dilute the shared surplus) but other rational reasons
might include not wanting to risk losing a good atmosphere or the
relationships between members (see for example Miyazaki, 1984). On
the other hand with cooperative enterprises being on average so small,
an increase in membership even by one person is a large, discrete
change. Hence it is perhaps not surprising that some cooperatives
expect a significant change in turnover without increasing membership.
We have categorised the growth aspirations of the 78 cooperatives in
the survey into those expecting high growth (over 10% per annum)
over a 3 year time period and those expecting low growth (less than
10%) or no growth. The distribution of cooperatives is then as follows:
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ASPIRATIONS OF GROWTH OVER A 3 YEAR PERIOD
TURNOVER EMPLOYMENT INCOMES
HIGH GROWTH 55 39 47
LOW GROWTH/
NO GROWTH 23 39 31
Table 5.2
Allocating a 1 to a cooperative with high growth aspirations and a 0
otherwise it is possible to examine the determinants relating to the
probability of being optimistic about growth or otherwise. This is a
simple application of Probit analysis.
A priori we may hypothesise that growth aspirations may be linked to
the objectives and reasons for existence of the cooperative (table 2.3).
If we allocate a 1 to objectives which were very important and a 0 to
those which were not important we have an index of the degree of
importance of each objective.
It has already been suggested that those cooperatives who believe
there to be productivity advantages associated with the cooperative form
of organisation may consequently be more optimistic about growth.
Thus by allocating a 1 to those cooperatives who believe there to be
productivity advantages and a 0 otherwise we have another index of
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the degree of importance of each objective. Similarly we can index
information about the members' capital stake in the cooperative and the
degree of managerialism in the following ways:
Members' financial stake in 	 Value
in company	 imputed
100%
	
1
Between 50% and 99%
	
0.67
Between 1% and 49%
	
0.33
Nil	 0
Table 5.3
Degree of managerialism
All members decide
democratically on all decisions
Manager(s) responsible for day — to — day
decision making
Manager(s) responsible for day — to — day
decision making and policy decision
Table 5.4
Value
imputed
0
0.5
1
5.5 Probit Analysis
Since we might expect there to be different reasons for growth
aspirations in terms of turnover, employment and members' incomes we
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will deal with each one in turn. Variable names are given in brackets.
Firstly though we should be clear about divisions between exogenous
and endogenous variables. In the first instance we are assuming that
our measures of growth aspirations can be determined by the
exogenous variables which will include all variables relating to the
objectives of the cooperative, the management structure, attitudes
towards the productivity of cooperative structure, capital stake and the
size of the cooperative. Issues associated with this categorisation are
reexamined in section 5.11.
5.5.1 Turnover  (TO)
As far as the objectives of the firm are concerned we may hypothesise
that those cooperatives who see the provision of a particular product
as important (PPRO) will wish to maximise the sales of that product
and may therefore seek a high turnover. Similarly if an important
objective is seen as working for oneself (YOU) then we may expect the
same effect. An interesting hypothesis to test is whether members in
a cooperative where they have a high capital stake (K) will look
towards a high growth strategy. As we have seen Atkinson (1973)
suggests that an important determinant to the extent of turnover is the
degree of managerialism (MAN).
172
We may also expect that those who believe there to be productivity
advantages (PROD) will expect higher turnover. The size of the
cooperative (SIZE) may also be important. Thus if we estimate this
hypothesised relationship using Probit we get the following results:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:	 TO
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD
ERROR
CONSTANT 0.0434 0.4232
PPRO —0.9749 0.4215
YOU 0.2703 0.4465
K 0.7134 0.3501
MAN 0.8065 0.5261
PROD 1.0313 0.3623
SIZE 0.0011 0.0047
LOG LIKELIHOOD	 — 36.4268
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD	 0.6269
CASES CORRECT	 61
Table 5.5
Given this specification the only coefficients significantly different from
zero are PPRO, K and PROD. Leaving out the least significant of the
variables (CONSTANT, YOU and SIZE) an alternative specification yields:
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TO
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD
ERROR
PPRO	 — 0.7730	 0.3020
K	 0.5107	 0.2003
MAN	 0.4873	 0.2217
PROD	 0.6623	 0.2814
LOG LIKELIHOOD	 — 40.0262
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD	 0.6054
CASES CORRECT	 62
Table 5.6
All coefficients are significant at the 95% level. Thus if a cooperative
has a high degree of managerialism (which accords with Atkinson,
1973), a strong capital stake on the part of members and believes
there to be productivity advantages associated with cooperative
organisation it is more likely to be optimistic in its growth aspirations
regarding turnover. The provision of a particular product however, has
a negative impact upon growth aspirations, which is opposite to that
hypothesised. A possible explanation for this is that there may be a
trade — off between the production of a particular good and high growth
aspirations. For example in the survey, one cooperative producing
cruelty — free cosmetics, clearly thought that they could expand into
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more traditionally produced goods but had decided not to in order to
maintain vegan principles. This sort of trade — off seems to represent
a rational decision on the part of some cooperatives to maintain an
important principle of socially — useful production for example. Indeed
it is for these sorts of reasons that many enterprises established
themselves as cooperatives rather than traditional small firms in the first
instance.
5.5.2 Employment (EMP)
Looking at the objectives of the firm first, our basic hypothesis must be
that firms who value a good atmosphere (ATM) and equality (EQU)
amongst the workforce will not be keen to increase the size of the
workforce. Thus we would expect negative coefficients on these
variables. But on the other hand managers may be keen on this since
it increases their own prestige and thus we include the MAN variable
again. We may also expect that where there is a high capital stake
in the company workers will not want employment increasing policies
for fear of it diluting membership surplus. Including our productivity
variable and the size of the cooperative (for the reasons outlined
above) our estimation is as follows:
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EMP
OBSERVATIONS:	 78
VARIABLE
	 COEFFICIENT STANDARD
ERROR
CONSTANT — 0.2680 0.4608
ATM 0.3676 0.6181
EQU 0.5531 0.5971
MAN 1.1988 0.5442
K 0.6897 0.5093
PROD 0.8842 0.3232
SIZE — 0.0290 0.0201
LOG LIKELIHOOD —42.1251
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD 0.5827
CASES CORRECT 60
Table 5.7
The objective variables surrounding atmosphere and equality in the
workplace (ATM and EQU) are insignificant and also have the wrong
expected sign and are therefore excluded. Our capital stake variable,
K, and the constant are also insignificant. SIZE is insignificant but its
negative sign, implying some degree of perversity is what might be
expected from an Illyrian model and therefore it is left in the model.
Thus a respecification of the model yields:
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EMP
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD
ERROR
MAN	 0.8848	 0.4042
PROD	 0.6550	 0.2687
SIZE	
—0.0400	 0.0188
LOG LIKELIHOOD
	 — 46.8393
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD
	 0.5485
CASES CORRECT	 53
Table 5.8
All the coefficients are significant but the overall model is less
satisfactory. The implication being that information has been lost in
reducing its scope. Nevertheless interesting is the continued
importance of managerialism and of productivity beliefs. The negative
(now significant) sign on SIZE indicates that as the membership gets
to larger levels the tendency to increase membership further is reduced.
This may imply some sort of ceiling on the number of members of the
typical cooperative enterprise, perhaps because of an unwillingness to
dilute members' influence as discussed in chapter 3. Alternatively, it
may be that there is some sort of efficient scale for cooperatives and
the small cooperatives are growing to that equilibrium position.
177
Thus the Illyrian analysis arguing that the growth rate amongst
cooperatives is likely to be low in terms of employment is given limited
support but there seems little evidence that workers will actively seek
to restrict employment for reasons of self — interest.
5.5.3 Incomes of Workers (INC)
To the cooperative member, the opportunity to reap the full rewards of
the enterprise surplus rather than see it syphoned off by the owners
of capital must be important. Thus we may expect those who see
working for oneself (YOU) as an important objective of the cooperative
to strive for higher incomes. Those with high capital stakes may also
expect proportionately higher returns and managers may strive for
higher incomes for members as a way of maintaining their position.
Thus we include MAN and K variables again. Including productivity and
employment variables for the same reasons as stated above our model
becomes:
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INC
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE
	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD
ERROR
CONSTANT	 —1.0163	 0.4003
YOU	 1.0156
	 0.4077
K	 1.2422	 0.5348
MAN	 —0.2455
	 0.4792
PROD	 0.6678
	 0.3251
SIZE	 —0.0039	 0.0036
LOG LIKELIHOOD	 —40.2115
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD
	 0.5971
CASES CORRECT	 57
Table 5.9
MAN and SIZE are insignificant. Interestingly whilst highly important
before MAN even has the wrong sign. Perhaps managers whilst
interested in a growth in turnover and employment which increases their
prestige directly are less likely to be interested in the incomes of the
whole membership. Re — estimation of the model yields:
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INC
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD
ERROR
CONSTANT	 — 0.9429	 0.3492
YOU	 0.9009	 0.3914
K	 1.2889
	 0.5339
PROD	 0.6250	 0.3108
LOG LIKELIHOOD
	 — 40.9345
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD	 0.5917
CASES CORRECT
	 56
Table 5.9
The constant remains highly significant and negative indicating that
expectations of significant increases in incomes in the cooperative
sector are generally low. This is often confirmed by anecdotal
evidence. YOU, K and PROD all have positive significant impacts on
the probability of a cooperative growing fast in terms of income. This
tends to support the view that members will expect a reasonable return
on capital particularly if they perceive there to be productivity
advantages of cooperative organisation. One might also hypothesise
that the direction of causation is the other way as well; specifically, that
K may be high because of the income growth anticipated. In addition
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much of the impetus of working for oneself may be directed toward
higher incomes. Although we must remember that in many
cooperatives that income base is likely to be low in the first place.
5.6 Discussion
The hypotheses on which the models are based are clearly highly
subjective. Others may agree or disagree with much of the a priori
reasoning. But what is significant is that much of this reasoning with
regard to the objectives of the firm has proved to be very weak.
Indeed only in one case, that of wanting to work for oneself when
examining income aspirations, do we find that an objective of the
cooperative is important. On fundamental issues such an equality in
the cooperative no significant evidence of this influencing growth
aspirations is found. Elsewhere (Welford 1988, Daudi and Sotto 1985)
it is suggested that much of the reason for this is to do with a large
section of the cooperative movement not adhering to traditional
"cooperative" principles.
What seems very important, and somewhat surprising to the purist, is
the importance of managerialism in the growth aspirations. With regard
to turnover and employment a high degree of managerialism tends to
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lead to a higher probability that the cooperative will have high growth
aspirations. This seems to support the Atkinson model outlined above,
although whether the reason for this is managerial discretion or
something else is not clear. It may be, for example, that managers
want to be seen to be successful, especially in an environment where
they can be replaced and are answerable to the workforce, and they
therefore adopt growth strategies. What is clear is that strong and
effective management is possible in a cooperative environment. Those
cooperatives which did display significant managerial tendencies,
moreover, did not see a need to rotate that management which many
(e.g. Williamson, 1980) see as a weakness.
Some may look at these results and see only small differences between
them and what we may expect from a sample of small capitalist firms.
This in itself is a reflection on large parts of the U.K. cooperative
sector. The positive relationship between wanting to work for oneself,
the capital stake of members and aspirations towards higher incomes
may be seen as a capitalist result by many.
As ever there is a need for further research. But what is increasingly
apparent is that the U.K. cooperative sector is a very disperse one.
Neither traditional Illyrian theories nor sociological descriptions are able
to describe the behaviour of this fast growing movement. There is a
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need to examine the constituent parts of the cooperative sector in order
to gain a fuller understanding of it.
But on the subject of growth, it cannot be assumed that the
cooperative firm will have a slower growth rate than its capitalist
counterpart. This research seems to show that cooperatives do want
to grow and are not bound by the various conventions and behaviour
which have traditionally been put forward as reasons for a slower
growth rate. But clearly many cooperatives are willing to sacrifice some
degree of growth in favour of the maintenance of other principles,
particularly where the cooperative has been established to produce a
particular product or range of products. For example there may be
reason to believe that the provision of a particular product in some
circumstances may be more important than seeking a growth in
turnover.
Generally, the particular type of cooperative which is likely to have the
largest probability of high growth aspirations will be one which has
some managerial leadership (particularly where turnover and employment
is concerned), where members have a large capital stake, where the
members want to work for themselves and where it is believed that
cooperative organisation has productivity advantages.
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The probability of a cooperative with a large number of members
growing as fast as a smaller one in terms of employment is probably
less. This possible 'employment ceiling' effect implies that we may not
cast Illyrian models of the labour — managed firm completely to the wind.
5.7 Objectives and political motivation
In this section the above analysis is extended by examining the same
cooperatives in terms of their political motivation. Some of the impetus
for this analysis comes from the work of Daudi and Sotto (1985) who
have been critical of the political motivations of Western cooperatives.
Indeed in an attempt to argue that cooperatives are degenerating into
capitalist firms, they accuse the cooperative movement of "going
towards the very regions that it used to condemn, or, rather were
condemned by its ancestor" (p.38). But this section also seeks to
establish whether or not there exists distinct groupings amongst U.K.
manufacturing cooperatives based broadly on a political/non — political
division.
By examining both a subset of cooperatives with clearly defined political
motivations and another with other non — political motivations it should
be possible to evaluate both the strength of the political movement
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towards cooperation and self— management, and the assumed
weakness of those with non — political motivations. Correlations between
the reasons for the establishment of the cooperative are given on page
31.
There seems to be a number of cooperatives whose objectives revolve
around matters of:
politics,
equality,
working for oneself,
atmosphere, and
the provision of a particular product.
Based on the stated objectives of the cooperative we found that 39
cooperatives (exactly half of the sample) saw two or more of these
factors as being very important. We are therefore able to split the
sample into two halves according to these objectives. On the one
hand there seems to be those cooperatives interested foremostly in
non — financial objectives and objectives not aimed primarily at the
provision of employment (the production of a particular product for
example). On the other hand there are those who see employment
for members, financial viability or profitability as the dominant objectives;
objectives which some may consider as not uncommon amongst small
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traditional capitalist firms. This commercial orientation does not exclude
political motivation of course: cooperatives which are commercially
successful can often pursue political motivations in an effective way.
But those cooperatives categorised into this second group did not state
that a number of political objectives were important. Henceforth we will
refer to the first subset of cooperatives as having political motivations
and the second as having non — political motivations.
5.8 Probit Analysis
Once again, since we might expect there to be different reasons for
growth aspirations in terms of turnover, employment and members'
incomes we will deal with each one in turn. Variable names are given
in brackets.
5.8.1 Turnover (TO)
As far as the objectives of the firm are concerned we hypothesised
above that those cooperatives who see the provision of a particular
product as important (PPRO) will wish to maximise the sales of that
product and may therefore seek a high turnover. Similarly if an
important objective is seen as working for oneself (YOU) then we may
expect the same effect. Following Atkinson (1973) we include the
186
degree of managerialism (MAN). In addition we expected that those
who believe there to be productivity advantages (PROD) will expect
higher turnover and that the size of the cooperative (SIZE) in terms of
employment may also be important. Thus if we estimate this
hypothesised relationship using Probit, but this time distinguishing
between our two subsets, we get the following results:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TO
DATA SET
	
NON - POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS	 POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS
OBSERVATIONS
	
39	 39
STANDARD	 STANDARD
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT	 ERROR SIGNIFICANT COEFFICIENT	 ERROR SIGNIFICANT
CONST	 -0.0357 0.5653 N 0.5475 1.0180 N
PPRO	 - 1.2048 0.6887 N - 0.8660 0.6357 N
YOU	 0.3450 0.6848 N - 1.9460 0.8753 N
K	 0.7709 0.3522 Y 0.8619 0.3866 Y
MAN	 0.7430 0.4820 N 0.8909 0.4899 N
PROD	 0.9408 0.5438 N 1.0467 0.5052 Y
SIZE	 0.0024 0.0351 N -0.0196 0.0360 N
LOG
LIKELIHOOD - 16.5825 - 18.7938
AVERAGE
LIKELIHOOD 0.6536 0.6176
CASES CORRECT	 30	 30
TABLE 5.11 
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Given this specification the only coefficients which were significantly
different from zero in the full data set were PPRO, K and PROD.
Amongst the cooperatives with non — political motivations the only
significant variable is K; with K and PROD being significant for the
political motivations data set. Leaving out the least significant of the
variables in the full data set (MAN is still included because its
significance is marginal) an alternative specification yields:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TO
DATA SET
	
NON - POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS	 POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS
OBSERVATIONS
	
39	 39
STANDARD
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR	 SIGNIFICANT
STANDARD
COEFFICIENT	 ERROR	 SIGNIFICANT
K	 0.9192 0.3922 Y 0.8019 0.3725	 Y
MAN	 0.6969 0.2959 Y 0.8411 0.4925	 N
PROD
	 0.8101 0.4606 N 0.9691 0.4003	 Y
PPRO	 - 0.7102 0.5634 N - 0.7688 0.5342	 N
LOG
LIKELIHOOD - 18.8754 -20.6552
AVERAGE
LIKELIHOOD 0.6163 0.5888
CASES CORRECT	 32	 29
TABLE 5.12
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All coefficients in the full data set were significant at the 95% level.
Thus, in general, if a cooperative has a high degree of managerialism,
a strong capital stake on the part of members and believes there to
be productivity advantages associated with cooperative organisation it
is more likely to be optimistic in its growth aspirations regarding
turnover.
Amongst cooperatives with non — political motivations PROD and PPRO
are not significant. Thus there would seem to be less optimism about
the role of productivity advantages in this subset. In addition the
production of a particular product is less important. This is perhaps
not surprising since this variable was one chosen to distinguish
politically motivated firms (although another issue is discussed below).
Amongst the cooperatives defined as having political motivations it is
the degree of managerialism which seems relatively unimportant. This
we might have anticipated given that a likely characteristic of a
cooperative with political motivations (by definition) is a degree of
equality.
PPRO is also insignificant for both data sets. This is probably best
explained in terms of the data. 	 With the fuller data set of 78
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observations the variance of PPRO and therefore the amount of
information provided is greater. When we reduce the observations by
fifty percent clearly there is less information on which the probit model
can parameterise. This is something which implies that we must be
quite careful about interpreting the results of each subset. At best an
indication of relative importances are given. What is pleasing though
is that the signs on the coefficients are consistent. What is clearly
confirmed in table 5.12 though is the importance of the capital stake
variable, the existence of a managerial structure for cooperatives with
non — political motivations and the belief that there are productivity
benefits in the cooperative form of organisation for those with political
motivations.
5.8.2 Employment (EMP)
Looking at the objectives of the firm, our basic hypothesis was that
firms who value a good atmosphere (ATM) and equality (EQU) amongst
the workforce will not be keen to increase the size of the workforce.
But on the other hand managers may be keen on this since it
increases their own prestige. We also expected that where there is a
high capital stake in the company workers will not want employment
increasing policies for fear of it diluting membership surplus.
Alternatively some cooperatives may wish to expand membership
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because of their commitment to equality. For example, women only or
ethnic minority cooperatives may see this as a way of consolidating
their objectives. Including our productivity variable and the size of the
cooperative our estimation of the two subsets is as follows:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EMP
DATA SET
	
NON - POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS	 POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS
OBSERVATIONS
	
39	 39
STANDARD	 STANDARD
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 	 ERROR	 SIGNIFICANT COEFFICIENT	 ERROR	 SIGNIFICANT
CONST	 - 1.4813 0.8162 N 0.6810 1.2386	 N
ATM	 0.7405 0.9388 N -2.0490 1.5588	 N
EQU	 0.6873 0.9715 N 0.9806 0.9706	 N
MAN	 1.1746 0.5715 Y 0.9035 0.4301	 Y
K	 1.4368 0.9367 N 0.2664 0.6853	 N
PROD	 0.7049 0.4835 N 1.0652 0.4883	 Y
SIZE	 -0.0808 0.0492 N -0.0037 0.0168	 N
LOG
LIKELIHOOD - 18.1374 -20.2626
AVERAGE
LIKELIHOOD 0.6281 0.5948
CASES
CORRECT	 31
27
TABLE 5.13
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In the full model (table 5.7 above) the variables ATM and EQU were
insignificant and had the wrong expected sign. K and the constant
also insignificant. SIZE was insignificant but its negative sign was
expected from an Illyrian specification and left in the model. The
coefficients on MAN and PROD were significant for the full data set and
the subset corresponding to cooperatives with political motivations but
PROD is once again insignificant amongst the subset with non — political
motivations.
In terms of the two subsets, data restrictions clearly lead to rather less
significant results. Amongst cooperatives with non — political motivations
only the variable relating to management structure is significant.
Amongst those with political motivations MAN remains significant in
terms of employment growth, even though it dropped out when the
dependent variable was turnover growth. In addition the productivity
variable is significant.
A respecification of the model based on the results of the full data set
yields the following results:
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EMP
DATA SET
	
NON - POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS	 POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS
OBSERVATIONS
	
39	 39
STANDARD
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT	 ERROR	 SIGNIFICANT
STANDARD
COEFFICIENT	 ERROR	 SIGNIFICANT
MAN	 1.2808 0.5839 Y 0.9165 0.4220	 Y
PROD	 0.4634 0.4247 N 0.8021 0.3727	 Y
SIZE	 -0.0898 0.0496 Y -0.0164 0.0226	 N
LOG
LIKELIHOOD -22.1181 -21.6036
AVERAGE
LIKELIHOOD 0.5671 0.5747
CASES CORRECT	 26	 27
TABLE 5.14
All the coefficients were significant for the full data set. Interesting was
the continued importance of managerialism and of productivity beliefs.
The negative, significant sign on SIZE indicated that as the membership
gets to larger levels the tendency to increase membership is further
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reduced implying a tendency for cooperatives to limit their size.
PROD is confirmed as being insignificant however in the non — political
motivations data set, but the other variables remain significant and the
sign on SIZE remains negative. For cooperatives with political
motivations the tendency for cooperatives to limit their size seems to
disappear since the SIZE variable is now insignificant. Although when
dealing with such small firms it might be the case that this tendency
has simply not yet emerged. The coefficients on MAN and PROD for
cooperatives with political motivations are significant.
It should be noted however, that in the case of both PROD and SIZE
whilst one coefficient is significantly different to zero and the other not,
in neither case are these coefficients significantly different from each
other.
Thus the Illyrian analysis arguing that the growth rate amongst
cooperatives is likely to be low in terms of employment is still given
some limited support, since as firm size increases there is less of a
tendency for employment to increase, but still there seems little
evidence that workers will actively seek to restrict employment for
reasons of self— interest, particularly if they have strong political
motivations. The continued support of a management structure in
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terms of employment growth in both subsets seems to be a particularly
interesting characteristic.
5.8.3 Incomes of Workers (INC)
To the cooperative member the opportunity to reap the full rewards of
the enterprise surplus rather than see it syphoned off by the owners
of capital was hypothesised as important. Thus we expected those
who see working for oneself as an important objective of the
cooperative to strive for higher income. Those with high capital stakes
may also expect proportionately higher returns and managers may strive
for higher incomes for members as a way of maintaining their position.
Once again including productivity and size of workforce variables our
estimation for the two subsets is as follows:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INC
DATA SET
	
NON- POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS 	 POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS
OBSERVATIONS
	
39	 39
STANDARD
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT	 ERROR	 SIGNIFICANT
STANDARD
COEFFICIENT
	 ERROR	 SIGNIFICANT
CONST	 - 1.4923 0.5887 Y 0.5058 0.8964	 N
YOU	 1.2092 0.6381 N -0.8285 0.8604	 N
K	 2.1701 0.9385 Y 0.6040 0.6088	 N
MAN	 -0.4951 0.8280 N -0.2213 0.4929
	
N
PROD	 0.8857 0.4830 N 0.4894 0.4719	 N
SIZE	 0.0075 0.0063 N -0.0170 0.0173	 N
LOG
LIKELIHOOD - 18.5736 - 18.5665
AVERAGE
LIKELIHOOD 0.6211 0.6212
CASES CORRECT	 29	 27
TABLE 5.15
MAN and SIZE were insignificant in the full data set and YOU, K,
PROD and the constant were significant. In the subset pertaining to
cooperatives with non — political objectives the importance of working for
oneself is diminished as is (once again) the perception that productivity
advantages are important. In the other subset however all variables
turn out to be insignificant, implying that there seems to be no
systematic relationship between the hypothesised variables for
cooperatives with political motivations.
Re — estimation of the model in line with the results of the full data set
yields:
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INC
DATA SET
	
NON - POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS	 POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS
OBSERVATIONS
	
39	 39
STANDARD	 STANDARD
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 	 ERROR	 SIGNIFICANT COEFFICIENT	 ERROR	 SIGNIFICANT
CONST	 - 1.3631 0.4926 Y - 0.5576 0.6931	 N
YOU	 0.9877 0.6063 N 0.4011 0.4078	 N
K	 2.0718 0.8983 Y 0.6921 0.6845	 N
PROD	 0.7663 0.4639 N 0.5457 0.4655	 N
LOG
LIKELIHOOD - 20.0713 - 19.5834
AVERAGE
LIKELIHOOD 0.5977 0.6052
CASES CORRECT	 25	 29
, TABLE 5.16
In the full data set the constant remained highly significant and negative
indicating that expectations of significant increases in incomes in the
cooperative sector are generally low. This continues to be the case in
the non — political motivations subset. But working for oneself and
productivity perceptions become insignificant.
For the politically motivated subset of cooperatives all coefficients are
insignificant. This must be in part due to our data restrictions.
However, the degree of significance may be further underestimated
since the YOU variable is one which is defined as being related to
political motivations and implicitly appears on both sides of the equation
for the political motivations subset, thus leading to some multicollinearity
and thus unreliable standard errors. In fact, this tendency will occur
anywhere where an objective of the cooperative has been used as an
explanatory variable.
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5.8.4 Model Estimation Using Dummy Variables
The data restrictions discussed above means that information may
therefore be missing in the type of specification used. In addition to
this using a 'split sample' estimation process implies a reduction in the
size of each data set leading to a reduction in the variance and
therefore the explanatory power of the model. In order to build up a
more comprehensive picture, supplementary information can be built up
if the full model is re — estimated using a dummy variable (DUM) in
place of the 'objectives' variables on the right — hand — side of the
equation rather than splitting the dataset into two discrete parts.
However, use of a simple dummy variable method does constrain the
coefficients to be the same for the two types of cooperative and
therefore interaction terms are used in a reestimation of the models in
section 5.8.5.
In addition to this examination of the significance and size of the
dummy variable itself can provide information about whether
cooperatives with political motivations, for examp(e, have different
behavioural tendencies overall, to those without political motivations.
Allocating unity to cooperatives with political motivations and a zero
otherwise estimation of the six basic models above yields the following
results:
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES: TO
OBSERVATIONS:	 78
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR SIGNIFICANT
CONSTANT - 1.2000 0.3573 N
K 0.8582 0.3311 Y
MAN 0.6535 0.4110 N
PROD 0.9259 0.3420 Y
SIZE 0.0065 0.0376 N
DUM -0.1785 0.3527 N
LOG LIKELIHOOD: -39.2230
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD: 0.6048
CASES CORRECT: 58
TABLE 5.17
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: TO
OBSERVATIONS:	 78
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR SIGNIFICANT
K 0.7460 0.3487 Y
MAN 0.8178 0.3381 Y
PROD 0.8516 0.3154 Y
DUM -0.2612 0.4182 N
LOG LIKELIHOOD: -39.3859
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD: 0.6035
CASES CORRECT: 61
TABLE 5.18
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The use of the dummy variable does not greatly affect the turnover
model and the dummy itself is insignificant indicating little behavioural
difference between the subsets. The continued importance of MAN, K
and PROD is confirmed. However, its negative sign, implying that
politically motivated cooperatives may have a lower probability of being
a high turnover growth enterprise, may add some weight at least to a
belief that there is a trade off between political objectives and other
business objectives. This was clearly stated by some respondents in
the original questionnaire.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: EMP
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR SIGNIFICANT
CONSTANT	 - 0.8876	 0.4090	 N
MAN	 1.2582	 0.5626	 Y
K	 0.7291	 0.5668	 N
PROD	 0.8677	 0.3224	 Y
SIZE	 -0.0300	 0.0112	 Y
DUM	 0.7792	 0.3467	 Y
LOG LIKELIHOOD:	
- 42.0929
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD:	 0.5830
CASES CORRECT: 	 56
TABLE 5.19
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: EMP
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR SIGNIFICANT
MAN	 0.7959	 0.3085	 Y
PROD	 0.5651	 0.2859	 Y
SIZE	 -0.0462	 0.0208	 Y
DUM	 0.5307	 0.2618	 Y
LOG LIKELIHOOD:	 - 46.0301
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD: 	 0.5543
CASES CORRECT	 51
TABLE 5.20
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MAN, PROD and SIZE are confirmed as being significant. With regard
to employment the dummy variable yields a more interesting result. In
the full model and in the reduced specification the dummy is positive
and strongly significant and does add to the explanatory power of the
model. This result suggests that cooperatives who are politically
motivated are likely to be far more optimistic about employment growth
than their 'non — political' counterparts. The improved specification still
yields a negative sign on the SIZE variable however, suggesting a
possible limit to this growth aspiration.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: INC
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR SIGNIFICANT
CONSTANT	
-0.7368
	 0.3646	 Y
K	 1.3679	 0.5322	 Y
MAN	 0.0322	 0.4935	 N
PROD	 0.6800	 0.3201	 Y
SIZE	 0.0019
	 0.0032	 N
DUM	 0.6500	 0.3815	 N
LOG LIKELIHOOD:	
-42.0218
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD:
	 0.5835
CASES CORRECT:
	 57
TABLE 5.21 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: INC
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR SIGNIFICANT
CONSTANT	 -0.6953	 0.3062	 Y
K	 1.3628	 0.5300	 Y
PROD	 0.6547	 0.3161	 Y
DUM	 0.6395
	 0.3805	 N
LOG LIKELIHOOD:	 -42.2180
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD:
	 0.5820
CASES CORRECT:
	 56
TABLE 5.22
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The income model recovers much of its explanatory power with the
dummy variable specification, although the dummy itself is insignificant.
The insignificance of DUM suggests that there is no significant
difference between the subsets on matters of income. This also
confirms the view that the simple models represented here are not fully
capable of explaining the income aspirations of politically motivated
cooperatives.
Use of the dummy variable approach has provided us with some
supplementary information, particularly with regard to employment
growth. However, constraining the explanatory coefficients to be the
same in this approach has meant that it is not possible, in terms of
turnover and income aspirations, to determine whether the behaviour of
the politically motivated cooperatives is "on the whole" different from that
of its non — political counterpart. In effect this approach views political
motivations as having a fixed effect rather than influencing the
coefficients on the other explanatory variables.
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5.8.5 Interaction Dummies
We should also recognise that, in addition to a possible difference in
the intercept parameter, some of the slope parameters may change as
well. We may therefore reestimate our models including interaction
dummies, again using a 1 to indicate a cooperative with political
motivations. The models estimated in tables 5.18, 5.20 and 5.22 are
reestimated below.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: TO
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR SIGNIFICANT
K	 0.5310	 0.2011	 Y
DUM K
 
- 0.0098	 0.0107	 N
MAN	 0.7788	 0.3182	 0	 Y
DUM mAN
 0.0027	 0.0053	 N
PROD	 0.6529	 0.2314	 Y
DUMPROD 0.0092	 0.0141	 N
DUM	 —0.1912	 0.3413	 N
LOG LIKELIHOOD:	 —39.5781
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD:
	 0.6003
CASES CORRECT: 	 60
TABLE 5.23
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None of the dummies are significant in the turnover model indicating
no difference between the two subsets. This confirms the more simple
result in table 5.18 and of the split sample in table 5.14 where none
of the coefficients between the two samples were significantly different
from each other. Looking now at employment:
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: EMP
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR SIGNIFICANT
MAN	 0.9898
	
0.4140	 Y
DU MmAN - 0.1040
	
0.0326	 Y
PROD	 0.6357	 0.2497	 Y
DUMpRoD 0.0212
	
0.0094	 Y
SIZE	 — 0.0329
	
0.0121	 Y
DU Msizs — 0.0329
	
0.0121	 Y
DUM	 0.4537
	
0.1984	 Y
LOG LIKELIHOOD:	 — 45.3371
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD: 	 0.5243
CASES CORRECT
	
50
TABLE 5.24
For firms with political objectives the existence of management is still
important, although the slope dummy is negative mitigating this
somewhat as firm size increases. The tendency to limit the size of the
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cooperative in terms of employment seems less in the politically
motivated cooperative (again there is a negative sign on the dummy)
whilst the belief in productivity advantages associated with cooperative
production continues to be important.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: INC
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR SIGNIFICANT
CNST —0.9821	 0.3401	 Y
K	 1.3081	 0.5101	 Y
DU M K — 0.0260	 0.0091	 Y
PROD	 0.6201	 0.2961	 Y
DU MpRoD 0.0039	 0.2961	 N
DUM	 0.5501	 0.4120	 N
LOG LIKELIHOOD:	 — 42.0201
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD:
	 0.5820
CASES CORRECT:	 54
TABLE 5.25
Looking at income growth aspirations the shift dummy remains
insignificant. Nevertheless the interaction term on K is significant and
negative. This implies that the politically motivated enterprise is less
inclined to see a high capital stake on the part of members as
important in its growth aspirations as its non — political counterpart.
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5.9 Discussion
It must be stressed again that the models presented above are
subjective and the a priori reasoning is open to some debate. In
addition, splitting our sample in two has lead to information being lost
and because of restricted variances more variables have become
insignificant. Much of this lost information has been regained though
with a dummy variable specification. Nevertheless some common
conceptions about cooperative firms, particularly with regard to their
objectives and political motivations, have been tested.
We have suggested in previous chapters that a common criticism of the
cooperative movement is that it does not adhere to traditional
"cooperative" political principles (e.g. egalitarianism, democracy, income
sharing and social responsibility). Thus, by examining the growth
aspirations of a clearly defined subset of politically motivated
cooperatives, to some extent we have been able to examine the
significance of this claim to the movement as a whole.
Overall one characteristic which seems important in the generation of
growth aspirations is the importance of a managerial structure. This
seems to lend weight to the Atkinson model.
	 With regard to
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employment, a management structure tends to lead to a higher
probability of growth aspirations in both subsets of cooperative
examined. But with regard to turnover, managerialism seems less
important to cooperatives with political motivations.
The issue of whether productivity advantages associated with
cooperative production lead to higher growth aspirations is perhaps the
area of clearest difference between the two subsets. In growth
aspirations relating to turnover, employment and income the perception
of productivity enhancement is not important for cooperatives with
non — political motivations, yet in relation to turnover and employment
it is important to those with political motivations.
It is often claimed that the labour — managed firm will be restrictive in
terms of employment growth (see for example, Atkinson, 1973 and
Bonin, 1983). Results reported here do not confirm that. Although
there is some evidence of a limit to employment growth for
cooperatives with non — political objectives, this is much weaker for
those with political objectives. One assumes that this latter group who
overall seem less deterministic with regard to incomes may well be
more committed to planned employment growth. Alternatively there
may simply be more optimism about employment growth in politically—
motivated cooperatives. This does conflict with the view that workers
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will not want employment increasing policies for fear of them diluting
membership surplus unless, as has been implied, politically — motivated
cooperatives are less interested in income growth.
The research reported here does not add weight to the Daudi and
Sotto predictions of degeneration of the cooperative sector. For non —
politically motivated cooperatives we may point to only small differences
between their objectives and behaviour when compared to traditional
capitalist firms. Although one must recognise that this has not been
directly tested here and does suggest an area for future research. For
cooperatives with political motivations we find much more commitment
not only to a political movement but also to the use of cooperative
organisation to promote productivity, internal growth aspirations and less
of a reliance on managerial leadership.
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5.10 Actual Growth Rates
In the second survey of cooperatives, respondents were asked about
their actual growth rates over the previous twelve months, using exactly
the same criteria by which they had been asked about anticipated
growth rates. Out of 44 responses in total we have full data which
can be compared with original responses in 40 cases. In the first
instance though it is useful to examine straightforward responses.
GROWTH RATES OVER A 'TWELVE MONTH PERIOD:
Turnover Decline No growth Increase Increase
(< 10%) ( > 10%)
Anticipated 0 1 3 16
Actual 0 1 7 12
Employment Decline No growth Increase Increase
( < 10%) ( > 10%)
Anticipated 0 3 10 7
Actual 3 5 6 6
Income Decline No growth Increase Increase
(< 10%) ( > 10%)
Anticipated 0 3 10 7
Actual 0 7 7 6
TABLE 5.23
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There is clearly some over — anticipation of growth over the twelve
month period, but this does hide some under — anticipation in a few
cases which can be seen from the following table:
ACTUAL GROWTH RATES COMPARED WITH
ANTICIPATED GROWTH RATES
Under	 Accurate	 Over
anticipation	 anticipation	 anticipation
Turnover 2 13 5
Employment 3 9 8
Income 4 9 7
TABLE 5.24
Whilst rather more enterprises are over— anticipating their growth rates
than under— anticipating them, there is a large number of cooperatives
whose expectations (and perhaps plans) are largely accurate. Not
surprisingly the largest overestimation comes with regard to
employment. But unlike the other two cases it is here that a more
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formal decision has to be made about growth. Turnover and incomes
grow if business is good, but employment only grows when members
of the cooperative decide to let a new person into the organisation.
We have already discussed a multitude of reasons why it may not be
in the interest of the cooperative to expand its membership. Thus we
may have some limited evidence to suggest that whilst cooperatives
may want to expand their membership, the actual process of finding
somebody suitable, of taking a risk introducing a new member and a
multitude of other factors may prevent this from happening. On the
other hand we must not ignore the three cooperatives who increased
employment although they had not planned to do so.
We are now able to check our basic probit models examining growth
aspirations, against actual growth rates in order to see if the
determinants of expectations are equivalent to the determinants of actual
growth rates. Tables 5.26, 5.27 and 5.28 reestimate the models based
on actual growth rates for turnover, employment and incomes
respectively.
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TO
OBSERVATIONS: 40
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD
ERROR
PPRO	 -0.3330	 0.3097
K	 0.3217	 0.3213
MAN	 0.3722	 0.1279
PROD	 0.6226	 0.2814
LOG LIKELIHOOD	 -27.2162
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD	 0.5604
CASES CORRECT	 30
TABLE 5.26
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EMP
OBSERVATIONS: 40
VARIABLE
	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD
ERROR
MAN	 0.4038	 0.4112
PROD	 0.5022	 0.4268
SIZE	 -0.1047	 0.1855
LOG LIKELIHOOD	 - 23.9773
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD	 0.5075
CASES CORRECT	 27
TABLE 5.27
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INC
OBSERVATIONS: 40
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD
ERROR
CONSTANT	 — 0.5549	 0.4421
YOU	 0.1991	 0.3319
K	 0.5895	 0.4619
PROD	 0.6250	 0.3178
LOG LIKELIHOOD	 — 24.4045
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD	 0.5172
CASES CORRECT	 26
TABLE 5.28
The only coefficients which remain significant are the MAN (the
existence of a managerial structure) and PROD (the belief that there are
productivity advantages associated with the cooperative organisation)
variables with respect to turnover growth. This confirms the idea that
the existence of a management structure is conducive to growth for a
range of reasons outlined elsewhere and that turnover growth is in part
due to optimism about the cooperative having productivity advantages.
This may provide some confirmation that cooperatives do indeed have
productivity advantages; the positive coefficient indicated that where
these are perceived (assuming the perceptions are correct) growth is
indeed higher than otherwise.
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None of the coefficients with respect to employment growth or income
growth are significant. Thus it might be suggested that actual growth
rates are rather more random than growth aspirations. This might be
expected since cooperatives are working in environments which are
uncertain and aspirations may not be fulfilled because of a number of
exogenous reasons. With full information and certainty we might
hypothesise that actual growth rates may more fully mirror aspirations.
But we have already indicated, when looking at political sub — divisions,
that the strength of any relationship in the area of income was quite
weak. But overall we must also remember that the number of
observations has fallen from 78 to 40 and that detectable variance
within the data, which the probit analysis can pick up, is obviously less.
Our lack of significance may be as much due to the lack of data
therefore.
5.11 Issues of exoneneity
We have assumed that all the variables on the right hand side of our
estimated equations are exogenous. It should be clear that variables
relating to the objectives of the cooperative, such as wanting to work
for oneself or the importance of a particular product, will be related to
each other. Indeed we have used these relationships in order to
partition the dataset into politically motivated cooperatives and others.
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But in general these variables have not been as important as one
might have initially expected. Indeed where any variable relating to the
objectives of the cooperative is important and significant in an estimated
equation, it never appears with another such variable. Hence in this
case there is no problem of multicollinearity.
However, as noted in section 5.9 two variables which do seem to be
important indicators of growth aspirations (and indeed actual growth
patterns as observed in section 5.10) are the existence of a managerial
structure (MAN) and the belief that there are productivity advantages
associated with cooperative production (PROD).
In a dataset of this kind explanatory variables are almost bound to be
related and interlinked because they are based on a common set of
values and attitudes. In effect we face problems similar to those
encountered by researchers using time — series data, in that
observations will almost certainly reflect a degree of multicollinearity.
The effect of this is well documented, but briefly it is to increase the
size of variances for estimators and therefore to drop variables from the
analysis which may be important. The more severe the multicollinearity
problem, the larger will be these variances. However, as Judge et al.
(1988) point out multicollinearity will not be a major problem as long as
it is not too severe and as long as one does not place too much
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emphasis on the exact magnitude of the estimated coefficients. As
stressed in chapter 2 the stance taken throughout the thesis is to
place emphasis on positive or negative significant relationships rather
than trying to explain the magnitude of coefficients or turning them into
exact probabilities.
It remains however, to discover the nature of any multicollinearity and
indeed, perhaps more interestingly, to discover and relationship between
management structure, productivity beliefs and other assumed
exogenous variables.
5.11.1 Management Structure
We have seen that management structure is important in the growth of
the cooperative firm. We may now be interested in the characteristics
of cooperatives which choose to adopt a management structure. The
definition of management structure is given in table 2.4 above. We
have three possible states (managers making policy decisions,
managers making only day — to — day decisions and no management)
and therefore a multinomial probit has to be employed. Regressing
MAN against the other significant exogenous variables used in the
estimation above yields the following results:
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
OBSERVATIONS:
VARIABLE
CONSTANT
PPRO
YOU
K
PROD
SIZE
LOG LIKELIHOOD
CASES CORRECT
Table 5.29
78
MAN
COEFFICIENT
0.0030
0.2477
0.0355
0.3455
0.4801
0.6222
—31.4523
41
STANDARD
ERROR
0.0146
0.5689
0.1137
0.3571
0.2565
0.2491
The only variable which is significant at a 95% level is SIZE. In other
words a managerial structure is more likely in a larger cooperative (this
theme is further developed and confirmed with more descriptive
statistics in chapter 6). However, the significance of PROD is marginal.
A re — estimation of the model gives:
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filled out the original questionnaire and they were perhaps "bullish"
about productivity in their enterprise.
5.11.2 Productivity Advantages Associated with Cooperative Production
Similarly PROD itself may not be a completely exogenous variable. If
we examine the determinants of a belief in productivity advantages by
use of an equivalent "dual" estimation to that in table 5.29 we find:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
OBSERVATIONS:
VARIABLE
CONSTANT
PPRO
YOU
K
MAN
SIZE
LOG LIKELIHOOD
CASES CORRECT
Table 5.31
78
PROD
COEFFICIENT
0.0135
0.2767
0.1635
0.2315
0.1482
0.2416
—34.9831
42
STANDARD
ERROR
0.0200
0.2557
0.1773
0.2971
0.0565
0.4441
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MAN
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD
ERROR
PROD	 0.5841	 0.2664
SIZE	 0.6982	 0.2641
LOG LIKELIHOOD	 — 30.2423
CASES CORRECT	 40
Table 5.30
SIZE remains significant and PROD (the belief that there are productivity
advantages associated with cooperative production) is now significant.
This is typical of a multicollinearity situation: estimators are quite
sensitive to the addition or deletion of insignificant variables.
In itself though, the positive relationship between the degree of
management and the belief that there are productivity advantages
associated with cooperative production is interesting. One might
assume (from earlier chapters for example) that it was egalitarianism
and cooperation which caused there to be productivity advantages, but
this result emphasises the role of management. Clearly, this chapter
has revealed an importance of management which has hitherto only
been suggested. But a very important consideration is that where
management in a cooperative existed, it was probably the manager who
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The only significant variable is MAN which we might have expected
from the estimated equations above. In other words MAN and PROD
are interlinked. Reducing the estimation to this significant variable alone
gives us:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PROD
OBSERVATIONS: 78
VARIABLE
	
COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD
ERROR
MAN
	
0.2212	 0.0954
LOG LIKELIHOOD	 — 29.7731
CASES CORRECT	 39
Table 5.32
Clearly there is a relationship between PROD and MAN and we have
also seen that MAN and SIZE are linked (confirmed in chapter 6). It
seems that as the size of the cooperative increases so does the
likelihood of the existence of a management structure and this in turn
increases "bullishness" about productivity advantages. But there is
therefore some evidence of multicollinearity between these variables.
However there is little sign of a very close relationship between them
and the capital stake structure of the cooperative or the variables
relating to the objectives of the enterprise.
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The conclusion has to be that whilst we can detect the existence of
multicollinearity we should not be too troubled by its existence. It does
seem limited in scope and scale and its consequences outlined above
would not seem to have too much effect on the general results. At
worst we may be excluding variables which are important. But our key
relationships, such as the relative importance of management, seem to
still be relevant. Since the issue of management itself is further
developed in chapter 6 we will not dwell on it here.
5.12 Concluding Remarks
This chapter started out by examining the growth aspirations of
cooperatives as a contribution to the literature surrounding the
participation — performance nexus. It went on the examine the
associated behaviour differences between "politically motivated" and
"non — politically motivated" cooperatives. Thirdly actual growth rates of
a subset of cooperatives were examined and compared with growth
aspirations.
We have seen that any suggestion that cooperatives may not want to
grow is refuted by the evidence on growth aspirations. As ever there
is a clear need for further research but Illyrian theories are unable to
227
fully describe the behaviour of this sector. This research indicates that
cooperatives do want to grow and do not seem to be bound by the
various conventions and patterns which have traditionally been put
forward as reasons for slow growth. But some cooperatives are willing
to sacrifice some degree of growth in favour of the maintenance of
other principles, particularly where the cooperative has been established
to produce and promote a particular product or range of products.
With respect to political motivations there are clearly some behavioural
differences between those with or without the political motivations
defined by reference to the cooperatives' stated objectives. For
cooperatives with political motivations we find a commitment not only
to the common ownership movement but also to the use of cooperative
organisation to promote productivity and less of a reliance on
managerial leadership. But even in the case of non — politically
motivated cooperatives there is little to support the view of Daudi and
Sotto (1985) in their pessimistic view of the cooperative sector.
Actual growth rates indicate a healthy cooperative sector, with the
majority of cooperatives growing over the twelve month period under
analysis. The systematic link between growth and some of the
behavioural variables which existed in the case of growth aspirations
disappears to some extent in all but the case of turnover. But data
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problems and exogenous factors clearly have an important influence
here.
In many respects though it is the analysis of growth aspirations rather
than actual growth rates which tells us more about the individual
motivations and behavioural characteristics of the cooperative enterprise.
In particular a few particular characteristics seem important. Surprising
perhaps to many is the clear importance of the existence of a
managerial structure in the growing cooperative firm which in turn
grows in likelihood with the size of the firm.
In general we find that the particular type of cooperative which will have
the highest probability of high growth is one where there is some
managerial leadership, where members have a substantial capital stake,
where members see an importance in working for themselves and
where members believe that there are productivity advantages in the
cooperative form of organisation.
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CHAPTER 6
THE DETERMINANTS OF MANAGEMENT
STRUCTURE AND DEGENERATION
IN THE COOPERATIVE FIRM
6.1	 Introduction
We have already seen that management may play an important role in
the growth plans of the cooperative firm. But where management can
be categorized as distinct from the remaining membership account must
be taken of the role of that sub — group or person and interplay
between the various individuals and groups making up the membership.
A management group or manager will be the result of its appointment
(either a result of the historical development of the firm or an
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appointment of a specialist manager) or as a result of management
rotating. The characteristics of both scenarios are examined in section
6.2. But we should also recognise that if managers comes to have
a dominant influence over other members the direction of the
cooperative may change. Common in the literature on the labour—
managed firm' is the idea that a cooperative firm once it has a
management structure will also suffer from a degree of managerialism
will tend to degenerate into a traditional capitalist firm 2. In other words
over time managers will come to dominate a cooperative pushing it
towards a traditional capitalist structure. The general issue of
degeneration is examined in section 6.3. An empirical analysis relating
to the determinants of the adoption of a management structure is
discussed in section 6.4. Rather a useful tool of analysis in this area
has been to examine some cooperatives in depth and some findings
are presented as case studies in chapter 8.
1 For a fuller review of the literature and some interesting case studies on the
subject of degeneration see Cornforth (1988).
2 There need not necessarily be strong management for the labour- managed
firm to degenerate. Other reasons are possible, see for example Cornforth (1988),
Ben - Ner (1984), Miyazaki (1984) and Furubotn (1976).
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6.2 Management and Managerial Discretion
6.2.1 The appointment of a specialist manager
The consequences of having specialised management in the capitalist
firm are well documented with much of the debate surrounding degrees
of managerial discretion (see for example Baumol 1959, Marris 1964
and Williamson 1964). Developments from and empirical tests of these
models have provided us with more of an insight into the workings of
the capitalist firm (see for example Fama 1980 and Smirlock and
Marshall 1983). In the literature on the labour managed firm a number
of authors have found evidence of managerialism. Poole (1978),
Granick (1975) and Obradovic (1978) in studies of the Yugoslav firm all
find that workers have relatively little influence on decisions compared
with managers. However that does not necessarily imply that
management is pursuing different objectives to workers but in French
and Canadian Cooperatives of the early 1970's Bradley (980) finds that
managers did not tend to work within the framework determined by
members.
On the theoretical side Atkinson (1973), Law (1977) and Stewart (1987)
have analyzed the possible consequences of managerial discretion for
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the cooperative firm. Atkinson's growth model has been discussed
previously. The approach taken by both Law and Stewart emphasises
short run behaviour and specifically adjustments in employment.
Stewart in particular finds that managerial discretion can have major
implications for short — run behaviour and that discretion is one reason
why the traditional relationship between price and employment in the
Illyrian firm may be reversed.
An issue important in the analysis of the cooperative sector is the way
in which management is selected. Specifically whether management
has been elected by the whole membership or workforce or whether
management has in some way appointed itself, either as a result of
historical development or by assuming a certain role. Purists would
certainly question the whole ethos of an organisation calling itself a
cooperative in the latter case. Allied to this issue is the question as
to whether management can be voted down.
6.2.2 Why appoint a specialist manager ?
A large number of cooperative firms seem to appoint specialist
managers. In the survey undertaken here 42 cooperatives out of 78
employed some sort of managerial structure. This therefore seems to
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be an important characteristic of some cooperatives which needs to be
examined. We have already seen that cooperatives' growth aspirations
can be influenced by the existence of management. But we need to
consider the motivations for appointing management in the first place.
These seem to fall into four broad areas based on essentially
organisational aspects.
Firstly, as Williamson (1980) emphasises there are efficiency grounds.
We have seen that he claims there are superior outcomes in terms of
hierarchy resulting from assignment and contracting tasks. Knight
(1921) sees this efficiency in terms of uncertainty where individuals with
superior managerial ability are appointed to perform a specialised task.
In the capitalist firm economists such as Braverman (1974) and Marglin
(1974) have emphasised the role of management less in terms of
efficiency and more in terms of the separation of decision making from
workers in order to ensure full benefits to the owners.
Secondly management is often taken to be a particular skill which only
some people possess. Whilst these skills might be acquired through
education it is arguably only a minority of the population who have
such organisational skills. These skills we are often told are important
to the smooth running of the firm. Thus as long as there appears to
be efficiency criteria associated with the perception of a particular
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managerial skill we may expect some cooperatives to appoint (or
perhaps train) a specialist manager, rather than adopt collective
decision — making or rotation. We have seen that there is certainly
evidence of this sort of behaviour in the survey of cooperatives used
in this thesis.
Thirdly, the argument advanced by Bradley (1980) is that managers are
needed to contain and encapsulate information, in other words to
prevent information leaking out to competitors. To make information
available to workers, it is argued, would run the risk of leakage and
may therefore threaten the existence of the firm. However, as Ireland
and Law point out (1982), there is no guarantee that restricting
information to management will keep it secure since there is nothing to
stop managers leaving to work for competing firms.
The fourth argument, linked closely to the scale of production,
surrounds the need for coordination. Both the production process and
customers need to be organised and this task may be most efficiently
done by a single person or group who are able to step back from the
internal workings and organisation of the firm. As with the other three
arguments the need for a management structure seems to grow with
the size of the cooperative.
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6.2.3 Rotating the Management Role
An alternative to the appointment of a manager is to rotate that role
amongst the membership (or those willing to take on the role) such
that a person or team serves for a fixed length of time. Williamson
(1980) in his analysis of the relative efficiency of the peer group
structure actually requires that management must rotate, arguing that
this must occur in order to prevent the manager or managers
becoming an elite because they have superior knowledge and are thus
not answerable to peer group pressures.
The advantages of such an arrangement include the ability to share
responsibility whilst retaining the ability to act quickly on day to day
matters and also giving all members an opportunity to develop
management skills. It also means that the cooperative does not hit a
crisis if a single permanent manager decides to leave. But the
disadvantages to having rotation of management include an inability to
perhaps develop management skills to the full, lack of continuity and
having to go through some sort of adjustment process each time there
is rotation.
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6.2.4	 Managerial Utility and Management Discretion
It is probably too simplistic to assume as Stewart (1987) does that
managers in LM — firms and in capitalist firms will have similar
motivations. (Although he notes that there is no evidence to the
contrary.) Those motivations according to Williamson (1963, 1964)
being salary, status, prestige, professional excellence and security.
Where a difference does exists it is likely to be in terms of income or -
more psychological rewards in terms of status and prestige. Even in
the most egalitarian cooperative, where income differentials are zero,
these other rewards are still likely to exist. In Williamson's model the
power, status and prestige of the manager is enhanced by an
expansion of staff, in addition as Law (1977) points out an increase in
staff is a further contributor to utility if it in turn determines managerial
salary. Atkinson (1973) suggests that the main constraint faced by the
manager of the cooperative firm would be a minimum level of income
expected by the workforce.
The extent to which managers are able to increase their utility at the
expense of other members is largely based on the members' ability to
monitor the manager in the light of full information. If the manager is
able to pursue his/her own objectives in an unmonitored way or if
he/she is able to withhold information at, for example, full meeting of
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the cooperative then managerialism may occur. With perfect monitoring
and open access to information managers will be unable to use any
discretionary power to their own advantage. But this is likely to be
very costly. Specifically, monitoring costs will depend on structural
factors (the relationship between managers and workers, the educational
level and skills of the workforce and the frequency of members'
meetings, for example) and the technology involved (the more complex
the technology, the more difficult it may be for workers to decide
whether managers are acting optimally).
6.3 The Degeneration Thesis
Historically, there has been a great deal of pessimism about the
possibility of sustaining genuinely democratic forms of organisation. As
far back as 1949, Michels argued that all democratic forms will
eventually become dominated by elites and that the democratic form of
ownership was therefore unsustainable. Weber (1968) argued that the
most efficient form of organisation was a bureaucratic one rather than
a democratic one. Historically work on the longer term survival of the
democratic cooperative firm has been particularly pessimistic with
authors such as Webb (1914), Shirom (1972), Mandel (1975) and
Meister (1984) arguing that in order to survive worker cooperatives will
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have to adopt the same organisational form and priorities as capitalist
businesses in order to survive. This has become known as the
degeneration thesis.
Disagreement remains over the underlying determinants and ultimate
consequences of the degeneration process with analysts citing the
structure of ownership and capital formation (Vanek, 1971), the use of
hired labour (Miyazaki, 1984 and Ben — Ner, 1984) and the role of
management (Cornforth, 1988) as being responsible. But in all these
cases the empirical base underlying such modelling is very thin (see
however, work on life — cycles in French cooperatives by Estrin and
Jones, 1986).
6.3.1 Theories of Degeneration
According to Abrahamsson (1977), Marx saw the spread of bureaucracy
as an inevitable outcome of capitalism. Writers in the Marxist tradition
have thus identified the causes of degeneration in terms of the external
forces of capitalism. Workers cooperatives whilst feasible in the short
run were doomed eventually to reflect the capitalist system. Mandel
(1975) argues for example;
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"Not only is self— management limited to the level of the
factory, workshop or assembly line, an illusion from an
economic point of view, in that the workers cannot
implement decisions against the operations of market laws,
but, worse still, the decisions taken by workers became
more and more restricted to decisions about profits...
There have been many examples of workers' cooperatives
that went wrong; there have been some that succeeded —
in capitalist term that is ! All they have succeeded in,
however, has been to transform themselves into profitable
capitalist enterprises, operating in the same way as other
capitalist firms."
The main thrust of this type of approach is that cooperative type
organisations cannot hope to change the wider forces at work in the
capitalist system, but rather will be susceptible to these forces. In
particular the need to survive will mean surviving in a competitive
environment with the need to be profitable in the same way as
capitalist organisations.
Ben — Ner (1984) and Miyazaki (1984) argue that the labour— managed
enterprise is unstable and will, over time, degenerate into a non —
cooperative form if it does not fail as an economic entity. Crucial in
their approach is the existence of external labour markets which provide
an incentive for cooperatives to employ non — member labour. After a
point it is predicted that a membership elite will develop who will pay
themselves higher wages than the non — member labour. As has
already been noted though, in the U.K. the employment of non —
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member labour is disallowed by most model rules. In the survey
undertaken for this thesis non — members were occasionally found to be
on probation awaiting full membership but there was no evidence to
suggest that others were employed in any other capacity.
In addition, empirical work based on French cooperatives (Estrin and
Jones, 1986) where different model rules are common find that there
is no evidence of the proportion of the cooperative workforce who are
members falling over time. Indeed in older firms this proportion
actually tends to rise.
Other theorising in this area stresses the role of property rights. The
work of Furubotn (1976) argues that the cooperative form of
organisation is grossly inefficient. Because of the excessive risk
aversion, minimal work effort and short— sighted decision — making it is
argued that the firm will eventually liquidate. But in a number of
European countries the number of cooperative surviving long periods
of time is large and Perotin (1986) finds that cooperatives are most at
risk from liquidation early in their lives. Moreover, these sorts of
predictions do not sit easily alongside the tendencies for cooperatives
to grow as observed in chapter 5.
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Vanek (1970) argues that cooperative firms will be forced to liquidate
because the capital market discriminates against firms which are self —
managed, reinforcing a tendency for firms to self—finance leading them
to be smaller in size and have a smaller capital — labour ration than
their conventional counterparts. Over time underinvestment takes place
and there is an incentive to employ non — member labour. Again
though, the evidence supporting this sort of scenario is lacking.
Moreover, from the survey we can see from the following table that
there is no obvious difficulty in obtaining finance in the usual ways:
Sources of Capital not	 Number of cooperatives reporting
provided by members	 this as a source
Grants	 20
Unsecured loans	 28
Secured loans	 42
Other cooperatives 	 3
Industrial Common Ownership Fund	 2
Table 6.1 
Almost two — thirds of cooperatives managed to get secured loans but
a number also managed to get unsecured loans. Perhaps surprising
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is the relatively large number receiving grants. These came mainly
from local authority initiatives, the Prince's Trust (in the case of
organisations with members under 25 years of age) and charities.
For the purpose of this analysis, we are left with a slightly different
argument (although not wholly separate) concerning the role of
management in the cooperative firm. Meister (1974, 1984) as a result
of his empirical observations of various democratic organisations,
argues that degeneration takes place in four stages where central to
this process is the role of management. In the first instance the
organisation is characterised by high idealism and commitment which
enables the firm to operate and sustain itself in the early period. But
following this 'honeymoon' period there are likely to be some internal
conflicts between those wishing to maintain the initial ideals of the
organisation and those more interested in increased economic activity.
The need for efficiency will eventually lead to the cooperative appointing
administrators or coordinators who in time become managers. The
second phase is a period of transition, where if the cooperative
survives, it slowly adopts more and more conventional capitalist
principles in order to consolidate its success. Again there may be a
period of internal conflict between managers and democratic idealists.
In the third phase cooperatives lose their radical ideals and an
acceptance of the rules of the market takes place. Democracy thus
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becomes restricted to a management elite who are able increasingly to
follow their own objectives. Thus as the business continues to
develop and production is rationalised the gap between management
and workers grows. During the final phase workers lose all effective
power and control is assumed by managers because of their ability to
control information and the development of a superior management
expertise.
Both Meister (1974, 1984) and Kirkham (1973) suggest that cooperative
development is subject to Michels' (1949) "iron law of oligarchy".
Michels suggests that both organisational and psychological factors will
lead to the emergence of a dominant elite. At a psychological level it
is argued that members see the need for a leader. But that once this
leader is in position he/she sees the position as his/her own and
acquires skills or withholds information which makes that position a
permanent centralising position. The formation of management elites
is also necessitated by organisational factors making direct democracy
inefficient: large size making communications and the flow of full
information difficult; the difficulty of resolving disputed collectively; the
degree of technical specialisation which occurs as the cooperative
develops which results in experts with consequent power; the
difficulties of decision — making in a collective organisation, particularly
where those decisions have to be made quickly; and the need for
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stable leadership to maintain continuity in the organisation.
Abrahamsson (1977) takes issue with Michels on a number of points
however. Firstly, Michels' analysis assumes that direct democracy is
the standard against which other forms of organisation are judged. As
a result any form of representative democracy is seen as a movement
away from an ideal situation towards an oligarchic one. But Michels
himself cites many good reasons why a representative democracy can
be more efficient in a successful firm. So long as the representatives
of workers remain responsible to the workforce periodically and for
policy decisions there should not be a problem. Secondly, It is
implicitly argued by Michels that one a member becomes a
representative or manager he/she will cease to have the same interests
as those he/she represents. But in the cooperative sector it would
seem more reasonable to expect this not to happen. Cooperatives are
on the whole small organisations with particularly strong principles
where managers, it is argued are more likely to act in the interests of
the whole membership. Thirdly, Michels largely ignores technological,
economic and political processes which will also influence the
organisation and behaviour of the cooperative firm.
Batstone (1983) has argued that both the work of Michels and Meister
is rather pessimistic. He has produced evidence to suggest there
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might be processes of regeneration which lead to a resurgence of
representative democracy and prevent a process by which management
turn the organisation into a capitalist clone.
Management in "simple collectives" and implications for the degeneration
thesis has been examined in some detail by Cornforth (1988). He
regards the simple collective as an ideal cooperative where the
authority for making decisions is in principle the collective of all
members. The only structure the organisation has is the meeting of
all members where information about the business is shared and where
issues and disagreements are discussed. This type of structure seems
common amongst small collectives — having memberships of under
ten. Cornforth's work has been to appraise the organisation and
behaviour of a sample of these firms.
Cornforth indeed finds that there is a tendency over time for people to
occupy specialist roles on a more or less permanent basis; there
being both internal and external pressures underlying the trend:
"First, as the business becomes more complex, the
specialist knowledge required becomes greater and this
takes longer to acquire. Second, cooperators may feel,
after the first flush of enthusiasm for working in an anti —
bureaucratic way, a need for greater continuity and
specialisation in order to increase efficiency. Third,
financial pressures tend to reduce the time available for
training and the willingness to take risks with inexperienced
people." (p.5)
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As Michels has suggested these changes would appear to provide an
increased role for managers and specialists. But Cornforth observes
a number of factors which prevent this from happening. Firstly, in
small cooperatives specialist jobs are commonly shared or widely
dispersed rather than concentrated in the hands of one or two. This
means that significant levels of job rotation are still possible. Secondly,
members of cooperatives are often aware of the potential problems
which could occur as a result of domination by experts and take action
to deal with it. For example, management's role is commonly seen as
one of presenting various alternative scenarios rather than the one
favoured by management. Thus coupled with the fact that cooperatives
are small and informal means that members feel able to influence and
control policies within the firm. On this last issue Cornforth may still
underestimate the power of management. Even if all possible scenarios
are presented (and who knows if they are?) management can still
(even unconsciously) present them in a way which accords with
personal preferences.
In addition there are reasons why simple collective structures can give
rise to problems. Problems associated with the transactions costs of
information dispersal and, as Michels (1984) notes, the inability to make
quick decisions are common responses in cooperatives' responses to
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the research undertaken here. Although it might be argued that better
decisions are made when all members are involved, the probability of
missing worthwhile opportunities increases with time. Freeman (1974)
has pointed to problems associated with "structurelessness". Even
though some may resist structuralising the workplace, she argues that
structure is impossible to avoid. If a formal hierarchy does not emerge
then an informal one tends to result instead. Since the informal elite
is not explicitly recognised neither is its power and neither does it have
to be accountable. Thus a formal arrangement must be preferred.
Landry et. al. summarise the problem as follows:
"The position is that informal elites are not accountable to
anyone. Because power has no explicit basis there are
no straightforward mechanisms for removing their influence.
Unless you are part of the influential group it is hard to
know who has real power in an organisation run by an
informal elite: who you should lobby for what purpose;
what are the criteria on which decisions are based; which
of the organisations goals should take priority."
In looking at more complex collective structures Cornforth (1988)
recognises that less simple structures are required in the organisation.
That structure usually being organised around the main areas of
responsibility and paths of accountability. But still it is likely that
informal structures will exist. But a complex structure is rejected by
many cooperatives because of its association with conventional
structures found in capitalist counterparts.
	 Where more complex
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structures do exist in the cooperative sector they are More often
defined by the democratic decisions of members. Moreover, those
holding responsible positions are commonly elected and have to be
periodically re — elected. Limits are placed on authority to allow for
democratic control at other levels of the organisation.
Woolham's (1987) case study of Wholegrain examines a complex
structure in terms of degeneration and regeneration. Its diverse
business operations coupled with the fact that it is based on two
geographically different sites with five departments (shop, warehouse,
packing room, bakery and office) means that the development of areas
of responsibility is inevitable. The cooperative holds regular democratic
departmental meetings and there is an elected management committee
with representatives from each department. This deals with financial
and other affairs which affects the cooperative as a whole. General
meetings of the whole cooperative are held monthly to discuss and
vote upon recommendations of the management committee.
In the shop constant staffing changes meant that in the end one
person was left with all the administrative tasks and was eventually
appointed manager. In the warehouse an informal 'managerial' role
was adopted by one of the workers who was the oldest and had the
most experience. He became largely responsible for recruitment in the
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warehouse. Both of these situations led to conflict with accusations
both of bad management and of a lack of cooperation. In addition to
,
this one of the founder members and a member of the management
committee was given special responsibility for new business
development. Whilst he was very competent he slowly took over more
and more areas of decision — making and became less and less
responsible to the membership as a whole.
Nevertheless, it is argued that these processes of degeneration are
often balanced by processes of regeneration. In the shop for example,
a new manger was appointed who was much keener on cooperative
decision — making and delegated many of her 'specialist' tasks while
increasing the amount of basic shop work she did.
This scenario indicates that in a growing and particularly in a
diversifying cooperative, structure and forms of management need to be
regularly reviewed from the point of efficiency and democracy. The
best structure for a growing cooperative will depend on a range of
factors including size and the degree of diversity.
Increased specialisation in the cooperative leads to competence gaps
between people and it is this area that responsibility is often assumed
and informal structures emerge. The response to this for a democratic
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organisation must be to encourage skill development equally in the
workforce via job — sharing, job — rotation and training. Moreover, the
dependence on a few experts can seriously threaten a cooperative if
those experts leave. The problem with the latter is that if expensive,
training more than one person can be a drain on resources. Job —
sharing and rotation can also reduce competence, continuity and thus
efficiency. Thus a fine balancing act is needed.
6.4 Characteristics of cooperatives with a Management Structure
The idealist's egalitarian cooperative will be democratically run with
decision — making being done by all the members. But in reality we
observe that in many cases day to day running and decision — making
may be the responsibility of a members taking the managerial role or
of a management group.
Table 2.7 summarised the extent of decision making done by a
manager or management team in the sample of cooperatives surveyed
for this thesis. As far as day to day decisions are concerned it is
common for these to be taken by managers but in all but nine cases
policy decisions were taken by all the members. Seven cooperatives
did not elect their managers and in two of these cases the managers
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decided on policy matters. It is therefore important to analyze the
characteristics of cooperatives who adopt some sort of management
structure and to examine whether there are systematic reasons for
expecting a cooperative to adopt a degree of leadership.
From the discussion above we may expect there to be organisational
reasons why a cooperative may adopt a management structure as the
cooperative grows. Thus as the size of the cooperative increases in
terms of membership we may expect there to be an increased
frequency of a manager or management team taking decisions. In
addition to this the degeneration thesis leads us to hypothesise that
over time there will be a dilution of the cooperative's original objectives.
In turn we may expect the firm to adopt more capitalist principles,
including the adoption of a management structure, over time. Thus our
basic hypothesis must be that the age of the cooperative may also be
an important determinant in any management structure. However, size
and age may be correlated themselves, with an increased likelihood of
a managerial structure in a large and older cooperative.
Vienney (1980) has suggested that participation is more possible and
more effective when the ratio of skills to capital needed in the
production of a product is in favour of skills and where skilled labour
is needed in the production process. Thus where capital intensive
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production takes place, without skilled labour, we may expect there to
be a managerially based rather than participatory based framework
within the cooperative. In other words there may be constraints of
scale which are not conducive to cooperative organisation in some
sectors. In categorising the cooperatives in the sample into eight
sectors, based on the main product produced: clothing, knitwear and
footwear; furniture; food and drink; artistic material and graphic art;
engineering; electrical, scientific and software; and others, we can test
whether there are sectoral differences in the decision to adopt a
management structure. In addition to Vienney's arguments we may
also consider uncertainty. If because of the need to make faster
decisions or have more specialist knowledge in uncertain sectors, some
members are able to convince other members of the need for a
management structure, we may also have the basis for sectoral
differences.
Thus our basic hypothesis is that the existence of a management
structure within the cooperative will be related to size (as measured by
the number of members), age and sector. Out of the sample of 78
cooperatives we have the full information about 66 of them. Examining
simple statistics relating to age and size of the cooperative in an
attempt to support our hypothesis (table 6.2) leads us to suggests that
the numbers reported are not significantly different for age and
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membership within the sub — groups.
All cooperatives (66): 
Average age (years): 6.76
Average membership: 9.49
Cooperatives adopting a managerial structure (38): 
Average age (years): 7.76
Average membership: 	 11.34
Cooperatives not adopting a managerial structure (28): 
Average age (years): 5.45
Average membership: 	 7.07
Table 6.2
These differences cannot lend much support to our basic hypothesis
above. But out of the 38 cooperatives we may distinguish between
those with a managerial structure handling only day to day decision
making (30 cooperatives) where longer term policy decisions are taken
by all the membership and those where managers and not the whole
membership take the longer term decisions (8 cooperatives). Perhaps
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surprisingly the average age of this sub — group is less (although not
significantly so) even than that of the non — managerial group at 5.12
years, but the average number of members at 13.6 is significantly
higher than for all cooperatives. This may lend a little weight to the
idea that organisational aspects rather than ones linked to degeneration
are rather more important in the decision to adopt a management
structure.
Turning now to estimating the fuller model where the existence of a
management structure depends on age, membership and sector, we
have a situation which is best examined in terms of the characteristics
which increase or decrease the probability of either adopting or not
adopting a management structure within the cooperative. This is simply
estimated using the probit model where on the left hand side of the
equation we have a 1 representing the existence of a managerial
structure (variable name MANAG) and a 0 otherwise. On the right
hand side we have continuous variables to represent age and size
and seven dummy variables for the eight sectors (categorised by main
product) specified.
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Variable names: 
AGE	 age of the cooperative (years)
SIZE	 size of the coop in terms of the number of members
FURNIT	 furniture
FOOD	 food and drink
ART	 artistic material and graphic art
ENG	 engineering
ESS	 electrical, scientific and software
PLAST	 plastics
OTHER	 others
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Table 6.3 Results of full model estimation:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MANAG
OBSERVATIONS 66
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR
CONSTANT — 0.3211 0.4472
AGE 0.0632 0.0371
SIZE 0.0325 0.0141
FURNIT —0.1584 0.5012
FOOD 0.2161 0.5271
ART —0.1150 0.4516
ENG 0.0945 0.3457
ESS 0.1211 0.3710
PLAST 0.0785 0.3513
OTHER —0.2145 0.5329
CASES CORRECT = 53
LOG LIKELIHOOD —42.3618
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD 0.6263
Only the SIZE variable is significant with the most insignificant variables
being ones relating to sector. Attempts to reduce the number of
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dummy variables, by amalgamating the sectoral groupings still result in
insignificant coefficients. Thus although based on small samples we
have to reject the Vienney type hypothesis. If we reestimate our model
excluding our sectoral dummies we find:
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MANAG
OBSERVATIONS 66
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD ERROR 
CONSTANT	 — 0.3267	 0.3949
AGE	 0.0555	 0.0341
SIZE	 0.0355	 0.0154
CASES CORRECT = 56
LOG LIKELIHOOD — 42.7032
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD 0.6236
Table 6.4 
Again the only variable which is significant is that of SIZE. The
constant is the most insignificant variable and excluding it from our
estimation gives:
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MANAG
OBSERVATIONS 66
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD ERROR
AGE	 0.0274	 0.0234
SIZE	 0.0305	 0.0127
CASES CORRECT = 48
LOG LIKELIHOOD — 43.3578
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD 0.6186
Table 6.5
Still, our AGE coefficient fails to be significant whilst the SIZE coefficient
remains so. However the number of cases correct falls to 48 such that
the overall model specification is poorer.
Life — cycle patterns of LM — firm behaviour (Miyazaki, 1984, Estrin and
Jones, 1986) suggest that AGE might enter the formulation as a
quadratic. But we can see from table 6.6 that this also fails to be
significant.
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MANAG
OBSERVATIONS 66
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD ERROR
AGE	 0.0111	 0.0140
AG E2	0.0029	 0.0127
SIZE	 0.0249	 0.0120
CASES CORRECT = 50
LOG LIKELIHOOD —42.9411
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD 0.6201
Table 6.6
Examining only the relationship between the existence of managerialism
and the size of the firms confirms the significance of SIZE.
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MANAG
OBSERVATIONS 66
VARIABLE	 COEFFICIENT	 STANDARD ERROR
SIZE
	
0.0391	 0.0132
CASES CORRECT = 48
LOG LIKELIHOOD — 44.0213
AVERAGE LIKELIHOOD 0.6132
Table 6.7
One problem with the estimation above is that we might expect the
age and size of cooperatives to be correlated with the size of the
cooperative growing over time, thus introducing multicollinearity into the
model. The consequence of this being that standard errors are no
longer accurate. In order to be sure that the AGE is insignificant we
must therefore test for any multicollinearity. Examining the relationship
between AGE and SIZE using O.L.S. gives us the following results:
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIZE
OBSERVATIONS 66
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 64
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR T — VALUE
CONSTANT 7.2831 2.4144 3.0165
AGE 0.3429 0.2872 1.1936
R — SQUARED = 0.0217
Table 6.8
The AGE coefficient is insignificant. Thus we cannot assume that
cooperatives increase their membership over time necessarily and we
can reject any assumption of multicollinearity.
The consequence is that the only variable which has a direct and
significant impact on the probability that a cooperative will adopt a
management structure is the size of the cooperative. This tends to
support an argument that the most important reason why a cooperative
will adopt a managerial structure is associated with its size and
therefore organisational attributes. 	 The insignificance of the age
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coefficient does lend support to a view that the cooperative will
degenerate over time by moving into a management structure which
eventually becomes managerialist and capitalist.
6.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
A degree of management can be important to the cooperative firm, if
it is able to be monitored by members of that firm. This chapter has
looked briefly at two reasons for the existence of a managerial
structure. Firstly, we hypothesised that management was important
when the size of the cooperative increased because of organisational
and information related reasons. Secondly, the literature on
degeneration may lead us to believe that managerial structure would
become more formal over time as the cooperative moved further away
from its original ideals.
The first proposition is clearly supported from the evidence presented,
although it is not entirely clear whether it is the large cooperative which
adopts a managerial structure or whether the adoption of a
management structure leads to managers pursuing their own objectives,
one of which may be to increase the membership of the cooperative.
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The second proposition is more questionable. Although there is some
evidence to support the view that on average cooperatives with a
management structure are older than those without a management
structure, when examining age of the cooperative in the context of the
probability of a cooperative adopting a management structure there
seems to be no systematic link. This in turn must lead us to question
the degeneration thesis. Although we must remember that the bulk of
the cooperative sector in the U.K. (and in this survey) are young firms
and one might hypothesise that it is too early to be sure of this
finding.
Essentially the degeneration thesis is based on a view of a Utopian
cooperative, with any movement away from that seen as being
degenerative. This seems to be a particularly dogmatic view. Certainly
there seems little evidence to suggest that over time the cooperative
will necessarily tend to take on a capitalist structure. The evidence
may on the other hand support the more pragmatic story of
degeneration and regeneration (we return to this issue in chapter 8).
That is not to say that no cooperative will ever degenerate or that
many cooperatives with a management structure may not suffer from
a degree of managerialism. It does suggest that simple theories of
degeneration are not capable of explaining much of what we observe
in a dynamic cooperative sector.
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CHAPTER 7
THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND
THE NOTION OF SELF EXPLOITATION
7.1 Introduction
Any analysis of the U.K. cooperative sector would be lacking without
a consideration of the external environment in which most cooperatives
find themselves, namely one dominated by large capital. The actual
position facing many U.K. worker cooperatives is one where they are
dominated by large firms. This can manifest itself in competition in the
market place or the dominance of outlets by a monopsonistic buyer.
In the survey of 78 cooperatives used in the thesis we can clearly
distinguish 42% of these enterprises as operating in markets where a
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dominant capitalist competitor exists and 27% operating in a market
where a dominant buyer exists.
The recent growth of small firms and particularly of cooperatives has
been seen as a good thing. Commentators following the arguments
of Bolton (1971) and Birch (1979) have pointed to the positive
characteristics of small scale enterprise which include harmonious
working environments, reduced absenteeism, the provision of
competition for large firms, a source of innovation and the creation of
new jobs. In addition, the last ten years has seen environmental
concerns about large — scale production and a trend away from Fordist
production techniques. According to commentators such as Piore and
Sabel (1984), Wood (1989) and Imrie (1986) new technologies,
changing work practices and more flexible markets and production
techniques have led to an increased potential for specialised units.
But Jefferis (1988) suggests that this may not be all good, suggesting
that in practice, workers in many small firms experience lower wages,
worse working conditions, less trade union representation, and less
protection from arbitrary management decisions, than workers in similar
jobs in large firms and that it is no coincidence that low paying
industries are normally dominated by small firms.
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In addition in response to demand uncertainty, many aspects of large
firms' operation have been fragmented and taken over by small firms.
Thus the responsibility for dealing with fluctuations in demand and
output has often been pushed on to small firms and away from their
dominant counterparts. Often being underfinanced, small firms can only
survive by intensifying the exploitation of labour through paying lower
wages.
This chapter recognising that many cooperatives, because of their small
size, will be operating in markets characterised by traditional capitalist
firms seeks to explore the idea that this dominance will force
cooperatives into a position of self — exploitation in order to survive. We
start out therefore in section 7.2 by looking at the operation of small
cooperatives as fringe firms in the market place. Section 7.3 goes on
to explore the notion of self — exploitation, examining specifically the
argument that it is dominance by capitalist firms which forces
cooperatives into this role. Having built up some clear hypotheses,
section 7.4 examines some empirical evidence. Finally some concluding
remarks are made.
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7.2 The Nature of the Fringe Cooperative Enterprise
The debate about the political and economic significance of worker
cooperatives in a capitalist economy is ongoing'. Treated sceptically
by many but seen as the road to self — managed socialism by others,
they are nevertheless a growing part of the mixed (albeit capitalist
dominated) economy. Their role, largely as small businesses, in the
economy must nevertheless be seen in the context of larger
conventional firms.
Gunn (1988) notes that:
"In the most general sense self— managed firms can only
compete effectively with conventional firms in a market
economy to the extent that the monetary value of their
greater efficiency and lack of profit compensate for the
ability of capitalists' managers in comparable conventional
firms to keep wages below what members of the self—
managed firms are willing to accept." (p. 10)
Implicity what this means is that either these self— managed firms must
have an absolute cost advantage for some reason, or they will be
under continual pressure to reduce the total compensation package and
other costs such as the provision of adequate levels of health and
safety provision.
1 For an excellent overview of this debate see the book by Mellor et. al.
(1988).
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Technologies associated with production, information and
communications have provided many opportunities for reorganising
production. With additional opportunities for franchising and sub —
contracting, these developments have made smaller — scale, batch
production possible. The benefits associated with large scale
economies are being replaced by economies of scope as large batch
based capital equipment is replaced by more flexible multi — product
machinery. We know from the survey that very few cooperatives are
operating in markets presently associated with high technology (artisan
type cooperatives still dominate) but there may be much potential
growth in this area in the future.
In the past, large mass production techniques have relied on mass
demand for the product being produced. This meant that production
was highly sensitive to changes in aggregate demand and in particular
to recession. Now, smaller quantities of much more specialised
products can be produced profitably because the technology is
available to do it and because markets are growing internationally such
that even the most specialised products are likely to have sufficiently
stable markets in terms of demand. Clearly a post — 1992 Europe can
only accelerate this trend. This also means that new smaller firms
based on the twin characteristics of flexibility and specialisation are able
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to survive alongside their much larger conglomerate counterparts.
But competing under market conditions may carry with it barriers to the
development of self — management. Effective implementation of self —
management requires the construction of supporting institutions and
cultural tendencies that are not predominant in capitalist society. These
include the equivalent of schools for teaching management skills,
cooperative institutional and legal structures, supportive lending
institutions and social values. Competition in the market place tends
to foreclose the avenue of development by the individual firm by
isolating firms in their own day — to — day fight for survival. Thus Gunn
(1988) notes that:
"... workers who begin with a quest for control of their
own workplace find themselves controlled by the market,
and market forces exert a steady pull to keep these newly
created organisations from contributing to further change."
(p. 12)
Little comparative work has been done on the performance of
cooperatives and traditional small firms, but one study by Jackall and
Crain (1984) did find that wages in cooperative enterprises were lower
than in comparative small firms. The issue for cooperatives revolves
around whether they can avoid reproducing the negative aspects of
small firms in general and build on positive ones which have been
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widely discussed elsewhere (See Estrin, 1985, Ireland and Law, 1982
and We!ford 1989a for example). Whilst some would claim that
cooperatives are significantly different to traditional small firms,
nevertheless the external economic pressures acting on them are alike.
7.3 On the Notion of 'Self — exploitation' 
Those who are most sceptic about the cooperative movement argue
that cooperatives are vehicles for self— exploitation and are illusory in
their promise of more self determined workplaces. These criticisms
have been expressed lucidly by Mandel (1975):
"It is ... to deceive workers to lead them to believe that
they can manage their affairs at the level of the factory.
In the present economic system, a whole series of
decisions are inevitably taken at higher levels than the
factory, and if these decisions are not consciously made
by the working class as a whole, then they will be made
by other forces in society behind the workers' backs." (p.
38)
Tomlinson (1982) concentrates more on the constraints imposed on the
cooperative firm by the need to survive in capitalism:
"Whilst cooperatives operating in a predominantly capitalist
economy are hemmed in by, for example, the need to get
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finance, or the need to sell their goods at prices which will
provide a positive cash flow, they are not so tightly
hemmed in as the common Marxist argument suggests.
They have to have a concern for financial survival but this
does not mean that to successfully achieve this there is
only one way, 'the capitalist way'." (p. 35)
Schutt and Whittington (1987) have distinguished between two types of
business located in the small firms' sector of the economy. As the
vast majority of cooperatives are small we can apply this analysis to
the cooperative sector. Small firms will either be 'dependent' or
'independent'. Dependent firms are defined as follows:
"These 'dependent' small firms complement and serve the
activities of larger firms, for instance, engaging in sub —
contracting. Their economic viability depends upon both
the level of activity of their large firm patrons and the
'make or buy' decisions of these large firms." (p.15)
Clearly this type of firm is tied in to its larger partner or partners and
without them would have particular difficulty surviving. The independent
firm does not necessarily enjoy a more secure position however:
"These 'independent' firms are of two types: manufacturing
and service firms that compete with large firms by intense
exploitation of labour and (often antiquated) machinery; and
manufacturing and service firms that do not compete with
larger firms, being confined to 'niches' of demand
consisting of small local or specialised markets." (p.15)
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According to Mellor et. al. (1988) history suggests that the alternative
cooperatives have largely occupied the territory of the small
specialised/localised markets ignored by the large firms.
Schutt and Whittington's model is a pessimistic one for small firms and
cooperatives interested in security and independence. It is argued that
where a firm does operate in a relatively secure market position this is
likely to be a temporary phenomenon or attributable to a high level of
self— exploitation. Dependent firms are by definition in a precarious
market position and are also likely, it is argued, to suffer high levels of
self — exploitation as they absorb their overheads.
Webb and Webb (1914) had rather a lot to say about self— exploitation,
indeed it was they who first raised this issue with respect to the
cooperative sector. In particular they were aware of the problems of
dependency:
II
... the most numerous class of individual producers are
those craftsmen who work 'for the trade' and who are
dependent both for buying their raw material and buying
or hiring their instruments of production, and also for
selling their manufactured products, on wholesale or retail
traders." (p. 13)
Thus their concern was with groups of workers who have nothing to
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sell but their labour and who choose to do this outside of the
established framework of traditional firms. These groups of people are
easily exploitable and, it is argued, exploit themselves because:
"... they cannot combine in Trade Unions, whilst the
smallness of their enterprise usually exempts them from
any effective legal protection in the form of the Factory
Acts. Oppressed by the wholesale and retail traders on
either side of them, they become in turn potent
instruments of oppression of those whom they employ ..."
(P . 3)
Fairclough (1986) points out that the impact of the competitive market
effects all aspects of a cooperative's self— determination. In particular,
its position within the external market will affect labour segmentation
within the cooperative itself. Even if the cooperative avoids
segmentation of its own internal structure, it will find itself in a
secondary labour market externally. This weak market position will thus
entail compromises on the part of cooperatives even if they have been
established in opposition to traditional capitalists' work practices.
With technology as well, it is argued by Mellor et al. (1988) that
cooperatives are not free to make unconstrained choices and imposed
choices may lead to further self — exploitation. Choice and control of
technology is expressed in two ways: firstly, what technology is
purchased and secondly, how technology is used. Where cooperatives
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grow out of conventional businesses technology will often be inherited.
Thus output is likely to be constrained by the capacity and nature of
technology in the previous work environment. This may be the very
reason why a previous firm was unsuccessful and 'rescued' by the
formation of a cooperative. Cooperatives may also be tied to major
customers or contractors and their technology therefore determined for
them. In circumstances where cooperatives are able to buy new
technology, they are likely to be constrained by money. This may
force the cooperative into buying second — hand machinery or
machinery which is less efficient than that which would be optimal.
Cooperatives in positions of market dependency, particularly where this
manifests itself in terms of dependency of a particular buyer or
competition with a larger firm, are likely to be conducive to self —
exploitation. Often survival will require the reduction of prices and
therefore costs. This is likely to mean reductions in the largest cost
of all, namely wages. Surpluses are likely to be cut significantly and
growth rates consequently slower. In a cooperative whose objectives
include the generation of more employment, their plans may be
considerably impeded.
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7.4 Empirical Evidence
The discussion above leads us to some clear hypotheses about
cooperative enterprises who are dominated either by larger competitors
or monopsonistic buyers.
In the case of a dominant competitor we might expect cooperative
prices to be forced down by significant competition, thus forcing down
wages and surpluses. In turn cooperatives' aspirations of future growth
rates of turnover and income are likely to be less and planned
employment levels in the future cut 2. Thus in comparing cooperatives
with dominant competitors, to those operating in sectors where there
are none, we may expect lower wages, lower surpluses and less
optimistic growth aspirations.
In the case of the dominant buyer we may also expect this firm to
insist on production 'at a price', forcing cooperative prices down in
order to reduce their own input costs. Again, as a result, we may
expect lower wages, lower surpluses and lower growth aspirations in
markets dominated by dominant buyers compared with relatively 'open'
markets.
2	 Work has been done on using growth aspirations as measures of
cooperative performance in chapter 5 but see also Welford (1989).
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In the sample of cooperatives used here, there are 36 out of 69 which
can clearly be seen as being in markets with large competitors and 21
out of 66 operating in markets with dominant buyers. Cross
tabulations between market dependency and various performance
measures should produce information about the scope and nature of
self — exploitation. However, strict statistical tests of significant difference
between the cross — tabulations are not possible because we have
discrete observations and no real estimate of variance. Moreover we
cannot necessarily assume an underlying normal distribution.
Nevertheless in the tables presented below we can refer to a clear
difference in some cases and elements of uncertainty in others.
7.4.1. Large competitors
Table 7.1 shows the distribution of wages between cooperatives
operating with dominant competitors and those operating without
dominant competitors. Respondents were asked whether they
considered their wage levels to be higher, lower or about the same as
capitalist counterparts. 	 Actual responses and percentages of the
relevant population segment are given.
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Wage levels
	 lower same higher total
Dominant competitor
	 11 11 11 33
33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100%
No dominant competitor
	 13 12 11 36
36.1% 33.3% 30.6% 100%
Table 7.1 
If self— exploitation were to exist we would expect a larger proportion
of cooperatives operating in the dominant competitor sector to be
experiencing lower wages. This is clearly not the case. Indeed there
appears to be no real difference between the two types of market with
respect to wages.
Turning now to surpluses, respondents were asked how big their
surplus was as a percentage of the total wage bill. Table 2 gives the
average reported surplus in each type of market:
Dominant competitor 	 15.9%
No dominant competitor
	 15.3%
Table 7.2
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Again there is no clear difference between the two types of market.
Turning to growth aspirations we can divide our sample into firms
expecting low growth (less than 10%) and others expecting high growth
over the following twelve months. For this analysis any longer period
seems less useful since market conditions are more likely to change in
the longer term. Table 7.3 examines expected growth rates in
turnover, employment and incentives respectively:
low growth high growth total
Turnover
Dominant competitor 6 27 33
18.2% 81.8% 100%
No dominant competitor 16 20 36
44.4% 55.6% 100%
Employment
Dominant competitor 20 13 33
60.6% 39.4% 100%
No dominant competitor 23 13 36
63.9% 36.1% 100%
Incomes
Dominant competitor 19 14 33
57.6% 42.4% 100%
No dominant competitor 21 15 36
58.3% 41.7% 100%
Table 7.3
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There is a clear difference between the two competitor sub — groups
with regard to turnover growth. However exactly the opposite is
happening to what we hypothesised. Cooperatives with dominant
competitors are expecting a significantly higher growth in turnover than
those without dominant competitors. Maybe this reflects the idea that
dominant firms are only interested in operating in markets which are
buoyant and are likely to grow, thus allowing them to make large
profits, and cooperative firms might therefore be benefitting symbiotically
from this.
There exists no clear difference between subsets with regard to
employment or income growth and we must reject our basic
hypotheses once again. Thus with respect to large competitors we
have no clear evidence that domination by large firms leads to self—
exploitative behaviour.
7.4.2	 Large buyers
In a similar fashion to table 7.1, table 7.4 shows wage levels compared
with capitalist counterparts in markets distinguished by the existence of
a dominant buyer:
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Wage levels lower same higher total
Dominant buyer 4 10 7 21
19.0% 47.6% 33.3% 100%
No dominant buyer 18 13 14 45
40.0% 28.9% 31.1% 100%
Table 7.4
There are clear differences here but once again in the opposite
direction to that hypothesised. The results indicate that lower than
market wages are less likely to be paid where a cooperative enterprise
is faced with a dominant buyer. One explanation of this may be
associated with the security that a large buyer provides. In securing
contracts with the buyer, a cooperative reduces its level of uncertainty,
can plan production targets and may feel more able to pay and sustain
higher wages. In earlier chapters we have discussed the niches which
small firms can exploit and franchise and subcontracting arrangements
which might be common here.
Turning now to surpluses, table 7.5 gives figures for average reported
surpluses:
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Dominant buyer
	 13.3%
No dominant buyer
	
13.8%
Table 7.5
Again no clear difference exists and we must reject our basic
hypothesis. It may be worth pointing out that these reported surpluses
are approximately 2% lower than those reported for cooperatives
operating in markets with dominant competitors, although this difference
is not statistically significant.
Finally turning to growth aspirations, table 7.6 gives growth aspirations
over a 12 month period for turnover, employment and incomes
respectively.
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low growth	 high growth total
Turnover
Dominant buyer 5 16 21
23.8% 76.2% 100%
No dominant buyer 17 28 45
37.8% 62.2% 100%
Employment
Dominant buyer 11 10 21
52.3% 47.7% 100%
No dominant buyer 31 14 45
68.9% 31.1% 100%
Incomes
Dominant buyer 12 9 21
57.1% 42.9% 100%
No dominant buyer 26 19 45
57.8% 42.2% 100%
Table 7.6
In the case of income growth there clearly exists no significant
difference but in terms of turnover and employment growth elements of
uncertainty are apparent. But again both tables indicate relationships
opposite to those hypothesised. In particular we are left with the
impression that in markets dominated by a large buyer cooperative
enterprises are more optimistic about turnover growth and employment
growth than cooperatives in markets without a dominant buyer. This
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adds further weight to the idea that the buyer reduces uncertainty and
provides a stable market, leading to a better environment for the
successful operation of the small enterprise.
7.4.3 Self — exploitation and individual choice
Despite the findings above there are many readers who can doubtless
cite example of cooperatives they know where wages and surpluses
are low, where working conditions are poor and where prospects for
the future uncertain at best. To others though, the ability to exploit
oneself given individual choice might seem a little contradictory.
A possible way forward however may be to see cooperative workers'
remuneration in more general terms, which will include not only wages
and a share of expected future surpluses, but also the possible utility
derived from working for oneself, being part of a cooperative
movement, working with friends, not having to deal with authoritarian
relationships, making a socially useful product, as well as a range of
other social and political motivations. In this way we may expect
cooperative workers to accept a discount on financial returns, namely
earnings, both at present and into the future. A women's cooperative
paying themselves low wages may be doing so, for example, in order
to provide each other with flexible shared childcare support. Were this
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arrangement not so, then they may not be able to work at all. Thus
those who see cooperatives as vehicles of self — exploitation may be
taking a rather narrow view of remuneration. They need to examine
the notion of self — exploitation rather more fully.
7.4.4 Links with Management Structure and Political Motivations
We need to explore the possibility that the external environment, in
terms of competitors and buyers and the decision as to whether to
employ management or to adopt political motivations are linked. Table
7.7 explores these cross — tabulations:
Management(42) No Man.(30) Political (39) Non - Pol.(39)
Dominant Competitor (33) 19 14 15 18
No Dominant Competitor (36) 23 13 19 17
Dominant Buyer (21) 11 10 13 8
No Dominant Buyer (45) 25 20 19 26
(total numbers of firms in parenthesis, (numbers do not always add up because of
missing data)
Table 7.7
In the case of management structure differences simply reflect the fact
that in the survey more firms adopted a managerial structure than did
not and we can find no real difference here. Although numbers are
small and we have to be careful in interpreting them we might suggest
that it is more likely that firms follow political motivations when there
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are dominant buyers. This is perhaps a surprising result and reflects
what we have already suggested about a need for conventional security
in order to pursue political objectives. We return to this theme again
in chapter 8.
7.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the survey of cooperatives has been examined in terms
of their market dependency. Two scenarios have been examined; one
where a dominant competitor exists and the other where a dominant
buyer exists. No hard evidence has been found to support the view
that dominance by a large capitalist counterpart is likely to lead to
self—exploitation within the cooperative. Indeed in the case of the
dominant buyer some evidence is found to suggest that this
arrangement gives the cooperative a degree of support and certainty
enabling it to operate more successfully in terms of wage payments,
surplus generation and growth aspirations, and that this in turn may
enable it to better pursue political or cooperative objectives. This tends
to support a 'flexible specialisation' type of view where small enterprises
can exists alongside larger ones by holding relative advantages in some
areas, satisfying particular subsets of demand and via subcontracting
and franchising arrangements. More discussion of this point is found
in chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 8
CASE STUDIES
8.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine some of the issues raised in this
thesis with reference to a small sample of six cooperatives. Whilst not
exhaustive in any means information about these cooperatives has been
gathered over a two year period during two or three visits to each
supplemented by a range of other information. However it was always
part of the agreement to visit that detailed financial material should not
be disclosed. Nevertheless this thus provides short case study type
material capable of illustrating facets of the modern cooperative
enterprise.
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The six cooperatives, whose names have been changed to ensure
anonymity, were not chosen at random but rather reflect a geographical
and size dispersion which seems to be as representative as such a
small sample is capable of being. A summary of their basic
characteristics is contained in table 8.1. Neither has every detail of
every cooperative been reported or investigated. The emphasis has
been on reporting what seems important to the cooperative itself allied
to the general subject matter of the preceding chapters. Thus the
material contained in this chapter should be seen as an illustration of
much of the preceding discussion.
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Characteristics of the Cooperatives Examined
Boy — Girl Fashions
Membership:
Location:
Product:
Established:
Back to Basics Health
Membership:
Location:
Product:
Established:
Underground Shoes
Membership:
Location:
Product:
Established:
Trillion
Membership:
Location:
Product:
Established:
3 (all women)
Hampshire
Clothing
1987 (from new)
Food
3 (all women)
Yorkshire
Health Food
1986 (from new)
13
Somerset
Shoes
1982 (from factory closure)
15 (10 full — time, 5 part— time)
Northamptonshire
Plastics
1966 (from new)
Rudolf Protective Clothing
Membership:	 43
Location:	 Scotland
Product:	 Protective Clothing and Overalls
Established:	 1981 (from factory closure)
Cruelty — Free Cosmetics
Membership:
Location:
Product:
Established:
Table 8.1 
6
Derbyshire
Cosmetics
1984 (from new)
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8.2 Boy — Girl Fashions
Boy — Girl Fashions is a relatively young cooperative, established at the
beginning of 1987 by three young women, recently having left college
where they had been fellow students studying fashion and design.
With the intention of designing and making clothes their decision to
establish a business of their own was largely a result of being unable
to find suitable and rewarding work elsewhere. The decision to form
a cooperative was a result of support from the local CDA which has
a 'shop — front' office (the women were passing and thought it would
be a good idea to go in) but they also said that equality in the
workplace was important to all of them. It had clearly become
important for them to work for themselves and a theme amongst them
had become "working for ourselves and each other". They pointed to
the importance of incentives indicating that they felt these were
increased by working for themselves.
Having no finance of their own to establish the business they were able
to take advantage of a £5000 grant from the Prince of Wales Trust for
young people and overdraft facilities to £3000 from the Cooperative
Bank. Again it was the local CDA which proved vital in establishing
these links and in helping to put together an extensive business plan
from which they were able to get support.
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During the early period of business the women earned £40 per week,
registered as part of the enterprise allowance scheme. Their intention
was to increase this by £10 every three months and pay themselves
bonuses for hard work if possible. But ultimately the aim was to work
less hours rather than earn substantially more money. In the shorter
term surpluses were needed to pay off the overdraft, invest in more
machinery and general expansion.
A year after establishment there were still three members and one of
the key objectives of the cooperative was still job security and job
creation. Wages had risen by £30 per week over the year (£40 was
planned). When possible it was intended that like—minded new
members should be introduced on a trial basis ever mindful of the
good working atmosphere which existed between them. Other
objectives included the maintenance of the self— employment ideal which
meant that they did not envisage any hierarchy being created. My own
observation was that amongst the three women there was not a
dominant personality particularly such that this seemed feasible.
Expansion of the business in general was stated as being important.
Whilst their planning horizon was not long (they never spoke of
anything beyond 18 months) they were anticipating substantial growth.
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Although, possibly working against this, there was a desire to be able
to be more selective about the type of work they took on. In other
words there was evidence of a trade — off between growth and the
production of a particular product. The cooperative began its life with
high aspirations not only linked to general success but also linked to
the type of work they envisaged doing. The creation of an
individualistic designer collection was the target in terms of the type of
work looked for. At first the women had spent very little time on
creating their own clothes, largely because it had proved very difficult
to find outlets for unique garments. A lot of time has been spent on
making clothes to order, including many dresses for special occasions,
wedding dresses and bridesmaids' paraphernalia.
A strong characteristic of the group was self— determination. They
were confident about being able to work together and jointly deciding
on who did what work. Monitoring each other was not even seen as
an issue since when there was work to be done they felt they could
trust each other to do it. To some degree there was a recognition
that they should specialise in what they were good at, this meant that
one member, for example, had taken on the responsibility for
administration.
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Two years after the establishment of the cooperative a unique designer
collection had been put together. It was achieving some limited
success with small independent retailers but had resulted in the women
having to turn down other work which might have been more lucrative.
Even so the women had managed to increase their wages to £100 per
week. But there is clearly evidence of the type of trade — off discussed
in chapter 5 where concentration on a particular product had restricted
growth which may have otherwise occurred. The women were aware
of this and recognised it but found much more satisfaction in designing
and making their collection, being prepared because of this to take a
discount on earnings.
With expanding orders and a need for the marketing of their product
one woman has taken over all the administration whilst the other two
are spending roughly equivalent times on marketing, essentially taking
samples around independent retailers. The administrator seemed to be
taking on allocative tasks as well and one is left wondering whether this
is the beginnings of a management role being developed with possible
consequences for degeneration.
The women were all equally involved in the production process but
recently this has involved working longer hours than had been planned
and there was much discussion on my last visit about the possibility
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of taking on a new member. The key issue here was about
maintaining a good atmosphere rather than a consideration about
whether the cooperative could cope financially with another member.
Thus the doubts about employment expansion were more related to the
maintenance of non — pecuniary utility than (Illyrian) income shares.
8.3 Back to Basics Health Food
Originally established in 1986 by two women, this health food
cooperative now has three women members. The business ran from
home for the first few months but the cooperative now rents kitchen
space in a local enterprise complex. Based in Bradford it produces a
range of vegetarian and vegan food for local health food shops,
restaurants, wine bars, the photographic museum and a few regular
individual customers.
	
It also does vegetarian catering for parties,
business lunches and weddings. 	 The cooperative was originally
financed by an interest free loan from the two women's families.
A characteristic of the cooperative is its flexible working arrangements.
Members usually work between 20 and 40 hours per week determined
by the number of orders, although at busy times, such as during the
Bradford Festival this rises substantially. At slack times the cooperative
members prepare pre — packed, microwave ready meals for the freezer.
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Turnover was slightly above £20,000 per annum in 1988 and almost
£26,000 in 1989 and although the mark up between ingredients and
finished food is quite substantial, (gross profit for 1988 was 76% of
turnover) the members can pay themselves only £2.50 per hour. There
is no surplus to be distributed amongst members because investment
in machinery is still incomplete. This immediately raises the question
of self — exploitation discussed in chapter 7. To some extent the
members agree that they are exploiting themselves; they all had
previous jobs where they were earning substantially more money. But
apart from enjoying "being our own boss" and "self — control" the
existence of the cooperative is largely due to the women having
responsibilities of childcare. Thus the flexible working arrangements are
largely based on recognition of each others domestic responsibilities.
The arrangement not only provides employment for the women but also
guarantees shared childcare support. Work is often organised around
picking each others children up from school and around school
holidays. The women's partners do help with childcare, particularly in
the holidays, and occasionally help out with jobs in the cooperative
when things are busy.
In 1988 the third member of the cooperative was a probationary
member for six months prior to being admitted on a full equal basis.
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To find the new member an advert was placed in the press and in
wholefood shops. From five applicants one was chosen by interview.
She was the one who showed most commitment to working
cooperatively and whom the two founders thought they would be able
to get on with best. The 'atmosphere at work' being protected, the
third person is now a full member but this does illustrate the caution
often taken in expanding the workforce which was discussed in some
detail in chapter 5.
Only a little help was provided by the local CDA, although the
cooperative did not seek very much. But one of the greatest sources
of help and advice has been their main supplier — Suma. Suma even
buys back some of the cooperative's range of microwave — ready frozen
meals which is a valuable source of support and extended credit.
Largely because of this support the members of the cooperative see
themselves as part of a cooperative movement and would be keen to
help other cooperatives being established. Although not strongly
involved in the political side of the movement they are involved in the
movement towards promoting healthier eating.
At the end of 1988 considerable expansion in terms of diversification
was planned in the cooperative. The women were examining the
possibility of establishing a health food café in the city at which time
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new members would be expected to join the cooperative. These would
not necessarily all be women. This café will open in September 1990,
helped by a grant from the local authority and with the inclusion of a
fourth member of the cooperative who has been through a four month
probationary period. This is another woman with a child, like the
others, interested in shared childcare. No men applied to join the
cooperative and the view taken was that none were interested in the
relatively low rates of pay. Thus a period of hard work and further
expansion is planned.
8.4 Underground Shoes Ltd.'
The Underground Shoe Cooperative, based in Somerset, was formed
in April 1982 following the closure of the Clarkes Shoes factory in the
town. The factory had employed 200 workers and was the major
employer in the area. Although the parent company had a wide range
of retail outlets, the combined effects of recession and the increasing
imports of cheaper shoes had forced the company into a rationalisation
process. The decision was made to close the factory which specialised
in women's fur — lined boots.
1	 Much of the discussion in this section has been supplemented with
information from Bate and Carter (1987).
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Within the community the factory closure was seen as a disaster, with
the local press reporting the story, with associated tales of gloom, very
widely. It was this 'community crisis' which galvanised support from
various groups aimed at keeping the shoe factory afloat. When the
idea of a cooperative was suggested it was not long before this was
being supported by the local District Council, the workers' trades union,
the local press and the area's Conservative Member of Parliament. An
action committee was formed in order to make plans for the
cooperative and seek appropriate financing. In the end it was the
parent company, keen to maintain a caring image, which came up with
a package of help. It offered a free lease on the existing premises
and machinery plus the payment of overhead costs for a sixth month
period. However there was a rider to this imposed by Clarkes which
was that the cooperative must not produce goods which in any way
competed with their own goods. The full implications of this were
probably not fully appreciated at the time the cooperative was
established. But in tandem with this support the local trade union
offered a retail outlet for the factory's products for a trial period of
three months. However, much of this support was offered but eventually
failed to fully materialise.
The initial plan was to provide employment for 80 out of the 200
workers but this was soon found to be unworkable. The number was
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first reduced to 30 and then to 18. Today this number has fallen to
13 plus two YTS trainees. In the end therefore the establishment of
the cooperative did not prevent the 'community crisis'.
In July 1982 the cooperative was established with four worker directors
elected to advise a production manager who was made responsible for
day — to — day managerial affairs. In other words, clear managerial roles
had been protected and to some extent and the existence of four
managers out of 18 might be seen as somewhat top — heavy. At
monthly meetings policy decisions were to be made on the basis of
majority voting. One of the first decisions of the meeting was that
wages should be equal for all members and that any surplus should
be distributed in accordance with the members' wishes. In the event
the first year profit of £5000 was ploughed back into the business.
Having abandoned piece work and strict production line methods from
the outset the atmosphere of the cooperative obviously became
important. Bate and Carter (1987) report the following comments from
members of the workforce at that time:
"I was pleased to get out of that rat— race."
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"Piece work was a bad thing; it affected people, they were
totally different on piece — work — strung up; it worried
them, made them bad tempered and bitchy."
"I never liked piece — work; all rush and no work quality."
But although there was much optimism and a feeling of self—
determinism in the cooperative in the early stages the production
condition imposed on the cooperative by Clarkes was soon seen as
very restrictive. The cooperative was pushed into producing a man's
down market shoe which had to compete with cheap, foreign imports.
This pushed profit margins down. After three months of operation the
retail outlet offered by the trade union had not materialised. In the
event it never did, with the union claiming that it had not actually made
any formal offer — only talked about a possibility. On approaching
banks for help with obtaining extra capital, members were met with
caution, suspicion and some hostility. As a result of all this the
cooperative was forced to operate for twelve months without any loans,
producing a product which required a significant scale and turnover to
be profitable and with workers working many extra hours for no extra
wages.
300
Production problems were not helped by difficulties experienced in
obtaining raw materials and the common requirement that the
cooperative should pay before delivery. Associated with this the
cooperative found it increasingly difficult to find customers leading to
severe cash flow problems. The cooperative was constrained
considerably therefore by its external environment, the banks, former
owners and suppliers.
The struggle for survival and the need to work long hours for little
money helped to generate a strong independent spirit among the
workforce. During the second year of operation the product itself was
promoted as a sign of independent identity and quality. Customers
were assured of a high level of service. Within the cooperative the
notions of equality and job satisfaction were a source of pride and
satisfaction.
Again, Bate and Carter (1987) record the following comments made by
members at that time:
"Our meetings are a really good idea. This is where
cooperation part comes into it. You can have a say in
how things are run. You can have the chance to give
your ideas."
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"People keep coming up to me and asking what I think
of this or that. I was just a shop floor worker. I feel I
have changed; no - one ever asked my opinion about work
before."
"You haven't got a gun at your head all the time."
"It's nice to feel part of what goes on. Before if you said
anything you usually got your head bitten off - whether
you were right or wrong. The white coats made the
decisions and that was that."
During this second year the cooperative also managed to attract
external funding of £35,000 from COSIRA and banks extended overdraft
facilities. When eventually the lease on the premises and machinery
came into the hands of the cooperative it appeared that the final links
between the members previous employers and the cooperative had
finally been severed. Although this led to a feeling of self- reliance
and independence, the need to find work soon meant the cooperative
was actually undertaking contract work for the old bosses and a
strong, dependent link was therefore established with a dominant buyer.
This buyer ensured survival of the cooperative even though margins
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were so tight that wages had to be cut for a short period and we
might suggest that the company went through a period of enforced
self— exploitation in order to survive (see chapter 7).
Thus full self sufficiency was difficult to achieve and for some members
this led to less optimism and certainly less idealism. Low profit—
margin contract work made it seemingly necessary to reintroduce a
division of labour and production line techniques. But this in turn led
to a poorer standard of work and at one time Clarkes cancelled the
contract.
As time passed and members left the cooperative they were generally
not replaced. There have recently been internal strains particularly
between the worker directors and the rest. This has in part been the
result of the management group taking on all of the administrative
tasks and the acceptance by some members that this group should be
allowed to take on more of the decision making. It is clear though
that other members are feeling that they are losing their democratic
control. Some full meetings of the workforce have recently been
cancelled with management stating that there are no decisions to be
made. It seems that full reporting back from management may not be
occurring. This is exactly the sort of degeneration scenario due to
management which was discussed in chapter 6 and future
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developments will be interesting to watch.
The recent establishment of a factory shop has meant that the
cooperative is less dependent on contract work, although work has
become seasonal with the summer tourists providing the shop with a
flow of customers. The cooperative probably now does have a viable
and sound base for continued employment of the present workforce
of thirteen people. It is clear though that the atmosphere is less
idealistic and there is a clearer demarcation in the workplace than there
seemed to be three or four years ago with a clear role for
management retained and possibly increased. The atmosphere in the
cooperative is still dominated by the struggle for survival with ideals
and to and extent incomes being the cost of this survival.
8.5 Trillion Ltd. 
Trillion supply a range of glassfibre materials, plastics and craft
materials to schools, youth organisations and artists as well as to other
firms. It formulates a range of resins for a range of fibre casting
applications as well as offering a D.I.Y. package for building canoes.
The range of materials and mouldings made by the firm are a major
part of the craft curriculum in many schools which is the firm's biggest
market. The firm has recently launched a new range of plastic based
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craft products for primary and middle schools which after extensive
market research it expects to be very successful.
Trillion has been operating as a cooperative since 1966 when a small
group of people particularly interested in the artistic uses of plastics
in their own right, rather than as substitutes for other materials, came
together in a disused warehouse. With their own finance and a loan
from another cooperative eight people rented space in the warehouse
and set about developing methods for making resin castings, moulds
and sculptures. They chose a cooperative, egalitarian form of
enterprise because of religious convictions.
In 1968 the group appointed a managing director with the task of
working with the existing group to create a viable trading company.
By 1972 a building was purchased and the major part of the £16,000
in start up loans had been repaid. In 1973 Trillion became a Common
Ownership Company along with a number of other firms who had
come together as members of the Industrial Common Ownership
Movement. At the end of 1976 the cooperative had fourteen members.
Trillion, based in Northamptonshire now has ten full time and five part
time members and no outstanding loans. It has a management
structure headed by the managing director assisted by the general
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manager. Trillion's rules include a statement that:
"The company's main aim is to create a community of
people with shared objectives rather than an economic
profit centre."
The company is therefore quite small and expectations are that it will
remain so. Another company document indicates the implicit trade off
between growth aspirations and other wider objectives discussed in
chapter 5:
"We see no merit in growing larger as Trillion's aim is to
create a community with an ongoing concern for mutual
security and quality of life at work."
There is no clocking on or off and overtime is done only when
necessary and is unpaid. The working week is organised flexibly and
everyone works nine and a half days in two weeks. There are salary
differentials in the ratio of less than 2:1 between the highest paid and
the lowest (excluding the two trainees) based on skills and
responsibilities. The cooperative thinks that these wages are generally
in line with market rates, with the possibility that management is being
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paid slightly less than they would elsewhere and the lowest paid,
slightly more.
On the subject of management structure another Trillion document
claims that:
"The Management style is informal, with maximum
involvement and participation. Whatever authority the
Manager has is freely given to him by his fellow members.
To use conventional words 'Directors' are in daily contact
with 'Shareholders' who in turn know far more about the
business than would usually be the case because they all
work together."
My own observations are that a considerable amount of informal
collective decision making is done by consultation even on a day to
day basis but that given the relatively large turnover of the company
and large number of customers the managers are privy to large
amounts of administrative information which they are able to use to
good effect when decisions are to be made. The view of the
Managing Director is that better decisions are made after consultation.
But nevertheless there is an extent to which he controls information
and is able to strongly influence the collective decision — making, even
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if this is almost subconscious as discussed in chapter 4.
Important decisions which can wait are discussed weekly at a general
meeting. These rarely last more than an hour. Decisions, agreed by
consensus, include staffing, capital expenditure, approval of annual
budgets, new products, sales reports and grants to social projects. A
Trillion document seems to recognise that democracy may result in
some productivity disadvantages as well as advantages when it states:
"Democracy is a slower process than an authoritarian
regime and the mechanisms required to achieve the high
level of participation demanded may seem over complex;
there is however, no lack of interest in discussions and
many of our methods are being increasingly adopted by
other firms."
Trillion has a subsidiary registered as a charity which manages social
projects. This is a strong characteristic of the cooperative. The local
community is the main target for its charitable donations, with local
schools being given over £300 in 1987/8. Other typical donations
include Christian Aid (£200), Dr. Barnardo's (£100), R.N.L.I. (£50), Save
the Children Fund (£100), Mencap (£100) and V.S.O. (£200). In total
£2363 was given to various appeals and charities in 1987/8 and £2700
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in 1988/9. Targets seem largely to reflect the cooperatives interest in
religious causes and in child based projects. Again, the Trillion
document states:
"Members have differing motives for joining Trillion. Some
will see job security in an increasingly insecure industrial
society as an important consideration, while others will be
attracted by the opportunities of real participation. It is
relevant that a majority of the founding members were
practising Christians whose commitment led them to
develop a new kind of industrial community. While a
number of the members today may not be committed
Christians, we still attempt to reflect the view that people
at work have social and spiritual needs as well as material
ones."
Despite the reduction in members since 1976 gross sales and profits
have increased in nominal terms and according to the managing
director in real terms as well. The only year the firm has ever made
a loss was in 1982. At the end of 1988 gross sales were £663,598
with a profit of £45,940 (7.0%). A bonus of £27,000 was distributed
amongst the members based on a formula positively associated with
wage rates and years of service.
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The key characteristic is the adoption of alternative principles and a
recognition that this will result in less growth and even some
inefficiency. Committed to their product and to social and community
concerns they (unlike Underground) are in a healthy position to
promote and pursue their other objectives. But they have managed to
follow these objectives by being primarily (conventionally) successful.
8.6 Rudolf Protective Clothing Ltd. 
This large cooperative of 43 members produces a range of overalls
and specialist protective clothing from its factory in Scotland. Like
Underground Shoes it too was born out of a potential factory closure.
Taking over the factory as a complete package from its large holding
company in 1981, the whole workforce, then numbering only 24, took
out loans (mostly secured on their homes) in order to supplement
grant and I.C.O.F. finance in order to purchase the factory lease and
a nominal goodwill payment. These secured loans amounted to about
50% of the capital required.
The firm was established as a cooperative largely because of the
significant help given during the difficult transitional negotiations by the
local CDA. It was they who managed to secure finance for the
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cooperative and who convinced the holding company that it was better
to reach a buy — out agreement than to have to pay large redundancy
sums.
In the early years the cooperative maintained a similar managerial
framework to that which had operated previously. A general manager
and three assistant managers being responsible to the whole workforce
rather than to more senior external managers as was previously the
case. But this relationship soon proved problematic with the workers
expecting more influence over decision — making processes than they
were in fact given in practice. Managers in turn seemed unwilling to
relinquish many of their decision — making powers. Over time managers
began to withhold information, made more and more policy decisions
and tried to determine wages and institute productivity bonuses and
differential payments. The internal wrangles were solved after about
two years when the general manager and four other members of the
cooperative left to establish another firm (not based along cooperative
lines). The three remaining managers kept their positions but were
supplemented by two other members who had been instrumental in
establishing the cooperative with the CDA early on. Together these five
members constitute a management team which is now based on strict
egalitarian principles and where duties, roles and responsibilities of
managers are clearly defined and managers having to give a regular
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report of their activities to the whole workforce for approval. Thus
although the management role has not been abandoned there seems
to have been a period of regeneration within the cooperative (this
concept was discussed in chapter 6) where managers relinquished
much of their power and time was set aside to discuss, establish and
develop more cooperative egalitarian principles. Full meetings of the
cooperative regularly take place on Saturday mornings once a month.
It is the responsibility of managers to present a full report of the firm's
activities over the previous month, justify any decisions they made on
their own and advise on longer term policy matters.
One of the tasks of management is to allocate work needing to be
done. Some members have particular skills such that work is often
divided up very much along skill lines. Nevertheless all workers, except
for those on a six month probation, are paid exactly the same basic
rates of pay which are roughly equivalent (before any bonus payments)
to that paid in similar traditional firms. The cooperative has taken
advantage of the government's recent profit — sharing tax incentives,
linking pay to profitability and therefore reducing the tax burden of
individual members. The firm suggests that the bonus, paid as a
profit — related element, raises gross wages to above that in comparable
traditional firms. The expectation is that wages will be able to rise
substantially above inflation rates over the next few years if expansion
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continues along its present trend.
At present the cooperative employs 43 members and the expectation
is that that number is set to increase by about four members a year
for the next three years at least. In the past when orders have been
low the cooperative has turned its attention to producing all — purpose
overalls to use spare capacity. But currently there is little such spare
capacity and paid overtime is commonplace. The company has
therefore seen substantial growth in terms of turnover, employment and
incomes paid to members. For the past three years a surplus has
been made and 25% of this has been paid as a bonus to members.
The remaining surplus has been reinvested in the business, largely in
new capital equipment. The cooperative currently has a contingency
reserve of about £125,000, part of which it has placed with I.C.O.F.
It has not in the past made direct grants to charity or other
cooperatives though.
There exists no great competition in this specialist market and products
are largely made to order. Capital equipment is flexible and members
pride themselves in having a wide range of skills and expertise. It is
the opinion of members in the cooperative that their products are of
much superior quality to their competitors'. Indeed this pride in the
product is a very important philosophy in the firm. A high quality of
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workmanship is also emphasised and these principles are stressed in
the firm's marketing. But products are made in the most part for a
few large customers. This has made Rudolf rather dependent on these
buyers for its survival. Nevertheless it is largely the patronage from
ten large buyers and a stable demand for their products in turn, which
has allowed the company to expand substantially in the last five years.
The success and survival of these large firms has led to the success
and survival of Rudolf. Thus as discussed previously (chapter 7) the
existence of stable dominant buyers of a product where there is not
great competition has been central.
Compared with Underground where the market is very competitive
(including significant import penetration) and dominant buyers have
been exploitative rather than supportative, Rudolf has operated in a far
more optimistic market. In addition Rudolf has benefitted from the
characteristics of flexible specialisation. It is producing largely for a
specialised market with flexible machinery and a highly trained flexible
workforce. Underground was forced into producing low value added,
basic products susceptible to fierce overseas competition using
traditional production line technology and practices. There are clear
lessons here for any small company beginning a new venture.
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8.7 Cruelty Free Cosmetics
From a small workshop site in Derbyshire, Cruelty Free Cosmetics,
made up of six members, manufactures cosmetics made from natural
products which have not been tested on animals. The cooperative was
established in 1984 by four members who wanted to promote a
product which was important to them as animal rights campaigners and
vegans. This they saw as their main aim in the establishment of the
cooperative and three out of the four members who were in full time
employment took a cut in pay from their previous jobs in order to do
so. It was important for the members of the cooperative to create
jobs in what they termed a "sound environment". Five years after the
cooperative's establishment the members still consider that they pay
themselves a lower wage than a comparable job in a non — cooperative
organisation. All members are paid the same rate and feel that the
friendly and flexible atmosphere in which they work largely makes up
for the relatively low wages. In other words rather than seeing a self—
exploitation problem here the extra utility gained from the positive
atmosphere seems to make up for this. We have discussed this
previously in chapter 7 when suggesting that notions of self—
exploitation and individual choice were really not compatible.
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The aims of the cooperative are clearly set out in their business plan.
These are:
1. To manufacture, retail and wholesale cruelty
free skin and hair care products.
2. To make the public aware of animal
exploitation by the cosmetic industry.
3. To market goods without unrealistic claims of
emotional and physical benefit of their use.
4. To support other groups with similar aims.
The cooperative realises that it is operating in a small but rapidly
growing market. Its main problem has been getting its product widely
known. Experience suggests that once established good customers
tend to be loyal because of the nature of the product. Growth is
anticipated over the next few years with the expectation that new
members will be introduced. In the past year the company has
benefitted from the widespread anti — cruelty publicity provided by such
companies as the Body Shop. In addition Cruelty— Free Cosmetics
has increased its own publicity mainly by placing advertisements and
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inserts in magazines aimed at environmentalists, those with a political
leaning to the left and trades union newsletters.
In 1988 the view was that growth could be substantially increased, and
members themselves could earn much more money, if they dropped
their cruelty—free principles. There is a huge market in cosmetics
made from "natural" products or synthetics which are claimed to be
natural, but many of these ingredients are not cruelty free. One great
problem is that it is often more expensive to buy shampoo based
constituents, for example, which have not been tested on animals. In
this instance there is a clear trade off between potential growth and
vegan principles. The view therefore was that there was a clear
trade — off between the production of a particular product and growth.
Some evidence of a more widespread relationship similar to this was
found in chapter 5.
Now the opposite view seems to prevail though and the feeling is that
production of this particular product, at least, has actually led to
success as a result of increased pubic awareness. In the past year
alone turnover has more than doubled and two additional members
have been taken on, mainly to deal with increased distribution and
marketing. An increasing number of products are sold through mail
order. Generally, the products are a higher price than equivalent
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non — cruelty free ones and on a par with Body Shop merchandise.
As a further tool of differentiation the firm also emphasises its
cooperative principles and small size. Most traditional, large retailers
are unwilling to take on the product because of its relatively high price
and even where they are interested the discount demanded by them
has been too large to make it worth the firm manufacturing them.
Cooperative retail outlets such as health food shops have proved to
be successful outlets though. The success of the firm is clearly
related to the existence of an "alternative" niche market.
In this cooperative there is no management structure, all jobs are done
by everybody and all surpluses are reinvested in the firm. Members
work as required which usually entails about 36 hours a week unless
there is an order to complete when overtime is worked without
payment. In principle administrative tasks are rotated in a three —
monthly cycle, although an increased amount of job specification seems
to be occurring as business increases. At the moment there is a
recognition that the egalitarian structure does slow down decision —
making since everybody has to be consulted. But there is a
widespread negative feeling towards anyone taking over a management
role. When the management issue is discussed the clear worry is that
he/she will come to dominate, that others will be told what to do
rather than work being largely jointly — determined and that the
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atmosphere would suffer. There are clearly fears of a degeneration
scenario.
8.8 Discussion Relating to Major Principles Identified in the Thesis
The main aim of these case studies is to illustrate the key issues
raised above. It therefore seems sensible to deal with the issues in
the order they are dealt with in the chapters above. The issues relate
to internal structures (chapter 3), objectives of the cooperative (chapter
4), growth (chapter 5), management and degeneration (chapter 6) and
the external environment and self— exploitation (chapter 7). In addition
we have highlighted the interlinked nature of many of these ideas and
in particular some trade — offs between various objectives and
behavioural patterns have to identified.
8.8.1 Organisational form
There is clearly no single form of structure within the cooperative
organisation. The smaller cooperatives in this chapter do not operate
on a hierarchical basis which is not surprising when dealing with three
or four members. One of the clear objectives of Boy — Girl Fashions
was that a hierarchy should not emerge. Although, ironically, one
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member had taken responsibility for administration and it is often along
this route that an informal hierarchy does seem to emerge. Where a
hierarchical relationship has existed this has often been a source of
internal conflict. In the case of Rudolf Protective Clothing the inability
of management to fully take account of the wishes of the workforce
and an attempt to follow some of their own objectives nearly split the
cooperative. In Trillion though, the hierarchy exists essentially for
administrative purposes and there is a great deal of discussion done
informally on a daily basis with all members of the cooperative.
Management is therefore adopted for essentially efficiency reasons.
Members of Trillion recognise that democratic decision — making is a
slow process but that better decisions are made at the end of that
process.
Assignment to tasks seems to be done effectively in practice in all the
cooperatives with members 'pulling together' in order to get jobs done
when necessary. In the larger cooperatives, not surprisingly, there is
more of a division of labour where particular skills are involved and in
the case of Trillion this is reflected in wage differentials as well. In the
Underground Shoe cooperative this division of labour actually increased
with time as the firm was forced to adopt more traditional production
line techniques in order to compete with large competitors. In this
case the external environment dictated internal change. But in the
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case of Rudolf the external environment tends to free up the internal
structure because of the security of orders which it creates. Both
firms are dominated by external buyers but we have suggested that
the particular product and production technique are vital elements of
success here.
We saw in the case of the Underground Shoes cooperative that their
struggle for survival and the need to work long hours often for no
extra money generated a strong independent spirit in the workforce.
This in turn engendered a strong cooperative atmosphere and a high
level of job satisfaction. According to the cooperative this helped in
the production of a high quality product. Members of the cooperative
talked of being out of the 'rat — race' and of their positive feelings
towards open, participatory meetings. Similarly in the Cruelty Free
Cosmetics cooperative members stressed the importance of working in
an atmosphere which was friendly and flexible. Indeed with most of
the cooperatives interviewed there was a recognition that internal
relationships and atmosphere were a positive source of utility. In some
cases this was something to be set against relatively low wages.
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8.8.2 Objectives and Maximands
The wide range of reasons for establishing a cooperative enterprise
displayed in the survey results are reflected in the case studies. Job
creation were important motivations for both Boy — Girl Fashions and
Cruelty Free Cosmetics although in the latter case this was strongly
linked to political motivations and the importance of a particular product
as well. In the case of Underground Shoes and Rudolf Protective
Clothing it was a factory closure which brought the cooperative into
existence. In the case of Underground Shoes this new enterprise was
much reduced in size. Trillion's motivations surrounding the production
of a particular product range is mirrored by many other cooperatives
including both Cruelty Free Cosmetics and Back to Basics.
A common characteristic amongst at least four of the six cooperatives
examined here was the importance of some sort of external support
structure in the establishment of the cooperative. In some instances
this involved the CDA in others it was fellow cooperatives or the local
community in general. But we saw from the case of the
Underground Shoe cooperative that traditional support from banks, for
example, was difficult although we could not suggest that this had
anything necessarily to do with them being a cooperative.
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Again the objectives of the firms discussed in this chapter reflect the
range of objectives in the whole data set. These range from a need
for equality as characterised by Boy — Girl Fashions, religious
convictions (Trillion) and the promotion of a wider political movement
(Cruelty Free Cosmetics). But other wider motivations are also
common. Back to Basics was keen to promote healthier eating,
Cruelty Free to campaign against animal cruelty and Trillion had a
strong sense of being part of a common ownership movement, of
being part of the local community and promoting the religious and
spiritual side of their work. These wider motivations rather than a pure
profit motive seem to be a very distinctive feature of cooperative
enterprises. To some extent ti is these wider motivations which led
firms to more fully consider alternatives to the traditional firm structure.
A very important observation from the case studies is that a degree of
conventional success is needed in order to pursue these objectives.
In its struggle for survival Underground was able to do little but to
maintain employment.
8.8.3 Growth
A characteristic of the cooperatives examined here is that in contrast
to traditional Illyrian theory most had quite high growth aspirations.
Although an interesting aspect is that these growth expectations did not
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always manifest themselves in terms of an increase in employment.
Trillion for example with an impressive growth record expected turnover
to continue to rise and were introducing a new product range for
schools, but expected no great expansion in employment.
Underground Shoes had recently experienced a reduction in
employment and although they were generally more optimistic about
prospects for the future, saw little possibility for employment growth.
Certainly we find a great deal of caution in expanding employment,
but this is more related to considerations of atmosphere rather than
any other motivation. Members clearly recognise that the introduction
of a new member involves more commitment and more risk than the
simple employment of staff.
It is interesting to compare Underground Shoes with Rudolf Protective
Clothing again. Both cooperatives were born out of a factory closure
but from the beginning, in the case of Underground Shoes,
employment was substantially reduced. Rudolf transferred its whole
workforce from the old enterprise to • the new and following a
problematic period of potential degeneration increased its workforce by
two — fold. Rudolf continue to expect further substantial increases in
employment supported by their buoyant market position and
advantages of flexible specialisation and a 'total quality management'
package. Underground, on the other hand, seem to be continually
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constrained by the type of market in which they are operating. Indeed
not only were they constrained in conventional terms (growth,
profitability etc.) but they also seemed to be constrained in the
development of their cooperative principles with a movement towards
more hierarchical modes and production line technology.
In some instances cooperatives choose not to grow as fast as they
possibly could, often because they see trade — offs between principles
and possibilities. Boy — Girl Fashions for example were keener to
create their own collection, which in the short term was a risky
strategy without great turnover potential, rather than continuing to do
jobs to order (usually the ubiquitous bridesmaids' dresses) which
guaranteed more than enough work for the three members. Cruelty
Free Cosmetics were not prepared to enter the wider and potentially
profitable market for naturally or synthetically based cosmetics because
it was of overriding importance for them to adhere to their cruelty—
free principles. Although we know that in this case and that of Back
to Basics it was probably their particular type of product which
differentiated them from their competitors and ensured survival in the
first instance.
The cooperative with the most impressive growth record must be
Rudolf. Here a management structure exists and we suggested in
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chapter 5 that this may increase the probability of a high growth
strategy. In this case managers certainly were looking for continued
expansion of about 50% in three years. But management also existed
for organisational and efficiency reasons in this relatively large
cooperative (this may be expected given the discussion in chapters 4
and 6).
The cooperatives in the case study had mixed views about whether
there were productivity advantages in having a cooperative structure.
Certainly, Trillion and Rudolf (the two largest cooperatives) thought that
collective decision making was a slow process although the view stated
in the Trillion document was that it led to better decisions being made.
Boy — Girl Fashions and Back to Basics clearly thought that there were
productivity advantages, but they also happened to be the smallest
cooperatives where collective decision making was much easier.
8.8.4 Degeneration and Managerialism
A characteristic discussed at some length in chapter 6 was that
periods of degeneration in the cooperative enterprise are not
uncommon but it was suggested that these are sometimes followed by
periods of regeneration. This seems to be illustrated well by the
experiences of both Underground Shoes and Rudolf Protective Clothing.
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In the case of Underground that process almost seems to have a
cyclical pattern which was often heightened by external factors. The
cooperative had a 'shaky' start but during the first upswing the
cooperative was characterised by high levels of job satisfaction. When
again external forces meant that the cooperative had to rely on low
profit — margin contract work from its previous owners the atmosphere
and quality of work once again suffered and the main objective of the
cooperative once again became survival. Now there is evidence that
management is becoming dominant again.
In the case of Rudolf there was a clear period of degeneration when
after about two years of operation management began to take more
and more decisions and exclude other members. This process ended
when the senior manager left, management was reestablished on more
egalitarian principles and the enterprise flourished. We have already
suggested that where management does exist this is for largely
efficiency and organisational reasons.
The theoretical literature on degeneration suggests two other sources
of degeneration. In the first case, involving hired labour and an
external labour market (Ben — Ner, 1984), we find very little evidence of
support because all firms in the case studies had only member
employees. In the second case, involving a lack of finance, we find
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some limited evidence of this in the case of Underground. But this
was a potentially failing company and banks were probably cautious
because of this rather than anything else. In the other five cases little
difficulty was reported in finding finance although this was often
achieved through secured or personal loans.
8.8.5 Self— exploitation and the External Environment
Low wages are certainly a common characteristic amongst the six
cooperatives discussed here. Back to Basics pay themselves
substantially less than the members had been getting in previous jobs
or could be getting in comparable traditional firms. Boy — Girl Fashions
pay themselves £100 a week but are producing a product which would
be impossible to produce in any other situation. Both in Cruelty Free
Cosmetics and in the Underground Shoe cooperative members worked
overtime from time to time without payment. But in the cases of Back
to Basics and Cruelty Free Cosmetics there are clear compensating
motivations for continuing with the arrangements. For example a clear
motivation amongst the members of Back to Basics is shared childcare
support and amongst the members of Cruelty Free, the clear political
motivations. In the case of Trillion, average wages are on a par with
market rates although differentials, even though they exist, have been
squeezed closer together.
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it is interesting once again to compare Underground Shoes and Rudolf
Protective Clothing in terms of their external environments.
Underground Shoes have always been under pressure from the
competitive environment in which they operate. Cheaper imports of
shoes have meant periods of unpaid overtime and a need to return to
traditional line methods of production. The cooperative has had to rely
on contract work with low profit margins to survive. Thus the external
market has had a detrimental effect on the success and development
of the business. Compare this with Rudolf Protective Clothing where
impressive growth has occurred largely due to the patronage of
dominant buyers keen to buy a high quality product. Here the security
of the market has allowed Rudolf to expand and to continue to plan
for further growth and pay members incomes above the market rate.
8.9 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this chapter has been to provide some illustration of the
issues raised in preceding chapters rather than to reach any additional
observations or conclusions itself. A fuller, wider and more in depth
set of case studies would be ' required were that to be the case
(indeed this is now planned in a wider research project). No clear
conclusions are really possible except to point to the great diversity
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which exists in the cooperative sector. Nevertheless it is worth
highlighting a few characteristics which are common in the six
cooperatives studied.
Support structures, especially in the early stages of the cooperative
enterprise are clearly important. We have seen that significant and
seemingly effective support was provided by the CDA in the cases of
Boy — Girl Fashions, Back to Basics and Rudolf Protective Clothing.
Other cooperatives were instrumental in the establishment of Trillion and
Back to Basics. Where support was often offered but did not
materialise or where support was lacking, in the case of the
Underground Shoe cooperative for example, the development and
expansion of the business proved very difficult. On top of this wider
government support, in terms of grants, with the use of the enterprise
allowance scheme and by the adoption of profit — related pay legislation,
has been useful.
A common characteristic seems to be that cooperative enterprises are
often involved in decisions which require trade offs between objectives
and plans. For example Trillion saw itself as part of a community and
wanted to promote a caring, sharing ethic rather than operate as a
"profit — centre". It also recognised the trade off implicit in having
democratic decision making processes in terms of time. Back to
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Basics saw a clear trade — off between accepting low wages but having
childcare support built in to the work environment. Boy — Girl Fashions
were willing to sacrifice turnover in order to create their own unique
designer collection. Similarly Cruelty Free Cosmetics also sacrificed
potential turnover growth to maintain their political principles. In
general the wider motivations common within the cooperative movement
often come to dominate the arguably more traditional objectives of
profitability and expansion. Although we have seen that there is no
reason to necessarily expect cooperatives to grow at a slower rate
than capitalist counterparts, the decision not to grow as fast as might
be possible, is often a deliberate decision.
The decision about whether or not to adopt a management structure
is also central. The three largest cooperatives adopt one in the main
for organisational and efficiency reasons although in the case of
Underground there is some suggestion that degeneration is occurring.
But most of the cooperatives are well aware of possible degeneration
tendencies, which in turn can help them to be avoided.
The external environment in which the cooperatives exist is also
important. The story is rather more complicated than a simple issue
of whether the market is dominated by large capital. Certainly we
know that cooperatives can operate well in niche markets and often in
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the past these have been in "alternative" or artisan areas. But we also
know, particularly from the case of Rudolf, that large successful firms
can create an environment where a small supplier can also be
successful. In both of these situations we can also conclude that
flexibility and specialisation seem to add to conventional success as
well as an ability to follow cooperative principles,
What is clear from these illustrations though is that the issues, which
have been dealt with reasonably discretely, chapter by chapter in this
thesis, are actually very interrelated. Organisational form, objectives,
behaviour and the external environment all impinge on each other and
effect the structure of the organisation, the members within it, and the
performance and the aspirations of the cooperative firm. Indeed we
find that performance also has an effect on the ability to fully
implement the basic objectives of the firm as well as more tangible
outputs such as wage levels.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
9.1	 Introduction
At the outset this thesis set out to examine some of the theories and
issues associated with the organisation and behaviour of U.K. producer
cooperatives. In doing so it proposed adopting alternative modelling
approaches and sought to describe and explain more fully this diverse
sector using largely, but not exclusively, the tools of economics. I
hope that this has been achieved and whilst specific concluding
remarks are made at the end of each substantive chapter, this chapter
seeks to bring together some common results and findings, to expand
the debate surrounding the nature of common ownership and
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participation and to make suggestions and proposals for future
research.
9.2 Contributions to Economic Analysis
There are many ways in which the success of a cooperative enterprise
can be measured. In this thesis many different measures have been
used and all indicate that whilst cooperative firms, like any small
businesses, will face problems surviving in the market place, most seem
largely successful in pursuing their stated objectives. Estrin and
Shlomowitz (1988) in their study of employee ownership and worker
democracy note that:
"... producer coops have emerged... [and] appear capable
of surviving for very long periods. One reason is possibly
that the relatively higher degree of participation — in
profits, capital stakes and decision — making — implied by
the coop structure imparts some advantages in terms of
technical efficiency which, although typically fairly small,
may offset any other organisational disadvantages to that
institutional form." (p. 65)
This research tends to support that optimistic note. Many of the
'accepted' negative aspects of the cooperative form of organisation
such as perverse supply — side responses have been shown to be
based on restrictive assumptions about the labour — managed firm and
little empirical evidence is found to support this particular line of
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argument. Although we know that some cooperative firms do restrict
supply to pursue other objectives. Assertions about the existence and
survival of cooperatives based on ideas of degeneration and self—
exploitation have been shown to be questionable in most instances.
It is not difficult to find degeneration in some enterprises but it has
also been suggested that this does not always result in an
abandonment of other cooperative principles and is often followed by
a period of regeneration. On the key issue of self— exploitation we find
many instances of low wage payments but in many cases this is
balanced by members pursuing other utility — generating objectives.
Where individuals make a positive choice to be part of a cooperative
the whole notion of self — exploitation has been challenged.
The growth of the cooperative sector over the past fifteen years in
particular must reveal something of the perceived success of this form
of enterprise, otherwise why did these businesses not just establish
conventional forms? Moreover, growth aspirations of cooperatives
indicate optimism about the future. In particular cooperatives with an
accountable management structure, high capital stakes held fly its
members and a commitment towards self— employment have the
highest probability of following a high growth strategy.
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In an analysis of efficiency differences between labour— managed and
profit — maximising firms in chapter 3 it was suggested that there would
be a trade off between different efficiency measures as Estrin and
Shlomowitz imply. A general picture suggested that productivity may
be enhanced by worker participation and ownership, particularly when
they are combined and that the general cooperative workplace
environment could enhance efficiency. Here there are positive lessons
to be learned by those interested in more general issues of worker
participation in conventional firms. Nevertheless members of
cooperatives have often pointed to the costs as well as the benefits of
operating a structure where democracy and participation are important.
About a quarter of the respondents to the questionnaire clearly felt that
there was a trade — off between the political ideals of the cooperative
and efficiency, stemming from slow decision — making processes, a
lower expectation of work effort and an ability to raise money for
expansion. Other respondents were split over whether there were
productivity advantages associated with cooperative organisation. A
minority clearly felt there were productivity losses arising out of
cooperation. But we should remember that to a large extent the
production 'norm' by which cooperatives are measuring themselves is
set by the prevailing form of capitalism. When we begin to incorporate
wider considerations such as socially — useful production, non — pecuniary
utility and 'Green' issues the cooperative enterprise would seem to do
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rather well in any ranking of efficiency.
Cooperative enterprises are often involved in a range of other trade —
offs, in many cases revolving around objectives and aspirations. In
particular growth is sometimes sacrificed in order to adhere to the
production of a particular product range. But political principles
themselves often have to be traded against survival as we saw in the
case of Underground Shoes. It should be remembered that the
cooperative is merely an amalgam of a number of individuals each with
their own aims and objectives. In many cooperatives we have seen
that these individuals are motivated by the existence of self —
management, self— determination and equality. Other cooperatives grew
out of factory closures or were created in the first instance to create
jobs where none previously existed. This picture is indicative of the
diversity of the cooperative sector. Implicitly we must accept the need
for a degree of behavioural type modelling based on the behaviour and
motivations of members. Authors such as Cyert and March (1963) and
Vernon (1971) have long considered organisations not as homogeneous
entities but rather as complex sets of interactions between different
competing groups. In the cooperative there may be conflict between
those with private interests and those with others. Often dominant
coalitions in a cooperative will be able to attain their own ends. These
coalitions often pursue management roles with degeneration tendencies.
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Although perhaps alien to some 'purists' we have seen that,
nevertheless, management does play an important part in the
organisation and behaviour of many successful cooperatives. For
example, the existence of some sort of management structure seems
important in those firms with high growth aspirations. But more than
anything the existence of a management structure in a cooperative
seems to be as a response to organisational factors, Management is
commonly seen as a skill, in some cases largely associated with
administration, which needs to be performed in a similar fashion to any
other skill in the cooperative. Less evidence is found to support the
more pessimistic view that the existence of management in a
cooperative is indicative of some degeneration of the organisation
towards traditional capitalist motivations.
Nevertheless, cooperatives cannot but be affected by the existence of
competing capitalist firms especially where these take some sort of
dominant role. But no evidence is found in this research which
necessarily implies that that situation leads to cooperative firms having
to be self— exploitative. Indeed the reverse seems to be true in the
case of cooperatives operating in markets where there are dominant
buyers. They are often supported by their larger customers enabling
them to survive and operate successfully and indeed, once
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conventionally successful, to pursue their political objectives.
The work undertaken in this thesis has followed a general pattern of
looking at accepted theory and debate, examining extensions of that
theory and a degree of empirical testing and observation. A common
conclusion seems to be that those basic theories of the cooperative
enterprise are often not confirmed by empirical observation. That does
not necessarily mean that those theories are useless and invalid; as
Vanek (1970) notes, a labour — managed enterprise does not have to
adopt income — sharing in reality for its behaviour to be in line with
what one might expect if it were adopting such a policy. But many of
the theories tested here have had negative connotations (e.g. perverse
supply responses, degeneration etc.) and one is left wondering about
the extent to which these theories have given the cooperative sector a
"bad press", at least amongst academics. One contribution of this
thesis is to have placed some doubt upon these negative aspects.
For those who aid the development of the cooperative sector, such
as CDA's and local authorities some tentative policy recommendations
might be offered. A good atmosphere is the work place is worth
working at; it seems utility generating in itself and there is some
evidence to suggest that it enhances productivity. As a cooperative
grows in size or if it begins life relatively large a role for a specialist
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manger should be carefully considered. In this thesis we have pointed
to a number of advantages associated with accountable managers. On
the other hand the existence of management if often the first step
towards a degenerative process. Often cooperatives will be choosing
that form of organisation in order to pursue other non — financial
objectives. It should be pointed out though that those cooperatives
best able to do this in the long run are the ones with a degree of
conventional success and cooperatives for ever on the brink of survival
rarely meet their other objectives. Finally the product being the
produced and the environment in which it is produced are vital.
Cooperatives established from failing capitalist firms have been
successful but are less likely to be so if they are producing a product
open to significant competition. There is clearly a role for cooperative
production in the tradition 'artisan' areas though, where being a
cooperative itself may add to a product's attractiveness. But it has
also been suggested that cooperatives who can identify niche markets
can derive benefits from flexible specialisation. A quality product with
a stable outlet in terms of a few large buyers will not necessarily result
in profit margins being squeezed.	 This stability often helps
cooperatives pursue their other objectives from a sound base.
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9.3 Contributions to the Debate Surrounding Participation.
Whilst the cooperative sector in the U.K. continues to grow, it is
nevertheless still small in comparison to its European counterparts and
in comparison with traditional business in this country. Nevertheless,
what is moving on at least as fast as the debate about common
ownership and self— management, is debate surrounding other forms of
participation. The term 'participation' is used to embrace both financial
participation (profit — sharing and employee share ownership) and
participation in control (worker involvement in the firm's decision —
making process). Cable (1987) notes that the two forms of
participation are often regarded as having similar underlying economic
functions, but goes on to show that they have rather different roles
and effects. What we have shown, nevertheless, particularly in chapter
3 is that atmosphere at work is important to the extent that some
workers are willing to take financial discounts to achieve this.
Moreover, where participation can improve atmosphere we might expect
productivity advantages.
Much of the debate and discussion in this thesis, not least in chapter
8 where individual cooperatives are examined in some detail, suggests
that worker involvement does bring about better motivation, improved
atmosphere and less rigid work practices leading to greater efficiency.
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In effect, participation can lead to augmentation of the neo — classical
production function along the methodological lines suggested by Jensen
and Meckling (1979)1.
With recent developments in Eastern and Central Europe, a
participatory private sector, despite the problems encountered with the
Yugoslav self— managed system, may be a productive way forward.
The experience of codetermination schemes in West Germany may aid
this development but we have also seen that growing evidence from a
number of European countries shows that there are potential benefits
associated with a cooperative structure.
9.4	 Lines of Future Investigation
Three clear lines of future research come to mind when one takes an
overview of this thesis. The first arises from a common observation in
the thesis that support structures are very important in the cooperative
sector. Moreover, given that they are relatively well developed in this
sector, those interested in promoting small firms in general may be
able to learn much. The second arises from the experience of carrying
1 Jensen and Meckling's argument though Is that there will be a negative
impact on productivity if participation is introduced but their model uses ideas of
augmented production functions. The idea that participation in decision— making will
have positive impacts on productivity has been put forward by many authors, one of
the earliest being Blumberg (1968).
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out more in — depth studies in chapter 8 and the third reflects the
microeconomic modelling of the cooperative enterprise undertaken in
chapters 5, 6 and 7.
9.4.1 An Analysis of Support Structures
Very little work has been done in the past which examines the
environment in which enterprise development best takes place. By
examining this environment with particular reference to the cooperative
sector in Europe a picture of best practice can be developed. In the
U.K. the support of the CDA, ICOM and government sponsored bodies
has clearly been important to some cooperatives (they have said so).
But this type of support is not necessarily indicative of that in the rest
of Europe where the cooperative sector is larger. In Germany there
is considerable experience of credit networks. In Italy a network of
second level cooperatives provide considerable support for marketing,
research and other developmental projects. But France with its large
cooperative sector has few government sponsored support networks.
As yet there exists no synthetic work on an evaluation of the various
forms of support and their effectiveness in terms of the performance of
individual firms and the cooperative sector as a whole.
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The main questions for research seem to hinge around two clear but
interrelated areas.	 Firstly, appropriate financing of cooperatives is
v
important both at the set — up stage and during any period of
expansion. But it is unclear which financing arrangements are most
conducive to success, for example whether direct government support,
agency support or second — level cooperative support has superior
outcomes. The aim of any research would be to compare these
alternatives along with the type of finance provided in various European
countries and assess their relationship with various performance
indicators such as survival, employment and profitability.
Secondly, technical aid in establishing the cooperative enterprise is
something commonly cited amongst U.K. cooperatives (see Welford,
1989, for example). Again, what sort of help and over what time
period this should last needs investigating. The avoidance of
degeneration or financial collapse is another area where support
structures and networks seem important. In particular there is now a
great opportunity to establish these networks across Europe in
preparation for 1992.
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9.4.2 Further In — depth Studies
We have seen particularly from chapter 8 that a more detailed insight
into cooperatives can prove useful. The data on which this thesis has
largely been based has been restrictive at times and as ideas have
been developed one is often left with additional questions. Therefore
to collect more detailed data from a sample of say, 100 cooperatives
using interview techniques over a longer period of time would seem
extremely interesting. Indeed work by Wilson (1982) and this thesis are
to form the basis of such a research project supported by the ESRC,
based at the University of Bradford under the direction of Wilson.
9.4.3 Microeconomic Modelling of Small Businesses
It has been suggested that in some cases a cooperative enterprise
may not be distinguishable in practice from a traditional small business.
But the reverse, namely that some traditional small businesses are run
along democratic, cooperative lines, is also likely to be the case. In
any event the firms examined in this thesis have been subjected to
some microeconomic modelling, the general principles of which should
be easily transferable to any business. It therefore seems useful to
consider modelling traditional small businesses and comparing findings.
This may in turn add to the debate about participation — augmented
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production functions as well as to the literature on small businesses in
general. A fuller understanding of some of the behavioural aspects of
small business may also contribute to the provision of appropriate
support for new firm development.
9.5 Final Remarks
If this thesis has made a contribution to contemporary debate (I think
it has and I hope others agree) then it must be in providing a fuller
and richer understanding of the cooperative enterprise in the U.K. I
am left with an optimistic and positive feeling about the future of the
cooperative sector in this country and about the individual firms from
which it is constituted. But more than anything, traditional businesses
in general will do well to consider the wider implications of adopting
some form of participation into the workplace. Moreover, the average
worker spends rather a long time in his or her workplace and the
quality of that workplace must have an influence on quality of life in
general. A participative society must include participation in the
workplace. A democratic society must include democracy in the
workplace.
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APPENDIX A
Name Of Cooperative
Address
Telephone
What is the product or service provided by the cooperative ?
Number of members of the cooperative
When was the cooperative established ?
Would you like to recive a co py of the final report ? Y/N
1. How important was each of the followin g factors in the
establishment of your cooperative (please tick the relevant
box):
Very	 Not
important Important important
religious reasons
Political reasons
a redundancy situation / factory
closure
a job creation programme
the provision of a particular
product or service
availability	 of	 grants	 for
cooperative ventures
the	 desire	 for	 a	 Pleasant
atmosphere at work
wanting to work for yourself
support of the local Cooperative
Development Agency
a	 desire for equality with
fellow workers
others:
	 (please state)
your
Which one of the above do you consider to be most important ?
If	 you	 consider
	
it useful please
above.
expand on any	of	 the items
2. BefOre embarking On this venture how man y , if any , of the
members had ex perience or the type of business you are
operating ?
3. Can you briefly state the aims of your cooperative ?
To what extent do you expect your cooperative to grow in
terms of turnover in the next 12 months and 3 years ?
Remain	 Grow by
	 Grow by
Decline the same less than more than
10%	 10%
a. 12 months
b. 3 years
5.	 To what	 extent do you expect employment in the cooperative
to expand in the next 12 months and 3 years ?
Remain
	
Grow by
	 Grow by
Decline the same less than more than
10%	 10%
a. 12 months
b. 3 Years
6.	 To what extent do you expect incomes of the members of the
cooperative to increase in the next 12 months and 3 years ?
Remain	 Grow by	Grow by
Decline the same less than more than
10%	 10%
a. 12 months
b. 3 years
7.	 Are members paid regular wages of a fixed amount ? 	 Y/N
Do wages vary with the surplus/profit of the coop ? Y/N
8.	 Compared with similar non-cooperative organisations are the
wages paid:
Lower
About the same
Higher
Don't know
9.	 Are members paid:
H According to the cam. rat. of payA rate reflecting differences in skills ?
If there is a difference in wage rates pl•as* state the
hi ghest and lowest rate.
10. To what extent do members have a financial stake in the
comp any ? (Please tick):
100% of the capital was provided by the members
Between 50% and 99% was provided by the members
Under VA of the capital was provided by the members
None of the capital was provided by the members
11. Where did capital not provided b y members come from ?
-
Grants
Unsecured loans
Secured loans
Other cooperatives
Industrial Common Ownership Fund
Other (please state):
12. Given a surplus from trading please describe the percentage
of that surplus which would typically go to each of the
following:
a. the members
b. re-investment/ploughback
C. charity
d. other cooperatives
e. others (please state):
13. If you have made a surp lus recently how bi g would You
estimate this to be as a proportion of total wa ges ?
la. Do you expect to be able to take advantage of the latest
government legislation which allows tax relief on profi t -
sharin g schemes ?
25. Which of the following describes how work is allOcated
amongst the members Of the cooperative (please tick all that
are relevant).
1n11,
Work is divided On specific skill lines
Certain jobs have always been done by the same people
Work is rotated
There is no s pecific division of labour
Allocation is done by • manager or management team
Other (Please specify):
16. Which of the following statements most closely reflects the
way the cooperative i.e managed ?
a. On a day to day basin
a single manager makes the decisions
a management team makes the decisions
all members decide democratically on decisions
other (please specify):
b. When deciding on longer term policy
a single manager makes the decisions
a management team makes the decisions
all members decide democraticall y on decisions
other (please specify):
If	 applicable,	 is	 the manager or	 management	 team
democratically elected ? 	 Y/N
17. Do you consider that there are productivity advantages to be
gained from cooperative organisations which do not exit in
conventional firms ? Please state the reason for your
answer.
18. Are you operating in a market sector which is generally
dominated by
a. large competitors ?
	 Y/N
b. large buyers of your product ? Y/N
If a. or b. or both is true please state what influence they
have on you.
APPENDIX B
Name of Cooperative
Address
Has the product or service offered by the cooperative changed
over the last 12 months? (If so please give details).
Would you like a copy of the second report ? y/n
1. I am interested in knowing whether you perceive there to be
advantages or disadvantages associated with the cooperative
organisation in a number of areas.
Below is listed a series of attributes, please tick whether
you consider these attributes to be superior, identical of
inferior in a cooperative firm when compared with a
traditional firm.
ATTRIBUTE SUPERIOR
(i.e.more
or better)
IDENTICAL INFERIOR
(i.e.	 less
or worse)
Work Intensity
Care in use of equipment
Coping with machine
breakdown or worker
illness
Improvements to
processes made by
workers
Responsiveness to
new innovations
Assignment of workers
to appropriate tasks
• Leadership
Contracting
2. Age profile of cooperative members
a) for small cooperatives please list the ages (onl y ) of the
members of the cooperative
b) for larger cooperatives please give:
1) the ages of the oldest and youngest members
ii) the approximate mean average age of members
111) the age band within which most members fall
3.	 To what extent has the cooperative grown in terms of
turnover over the last 12 months ?
Remained Grown by	Grown by
Declined	 the same	 less than more than
10%	 10/4
1
4.	 To what extent has emplo yment in the cooperative grown in
terms of employment over the last 12 months ?
Remained Grown by	 Grown by
Declined	 the same	 less than more than
10%	 10%
1
5.	 To what extent have the incomes of members increased over
the last 12 months ?
Remained Grown by	 Grown by
Declined	 the same	 less than more than
10%	 10%
6. Have you been able to, or do you intend to, take advantage
of the legislation on profit related pay allowing you tax
relief on profit-sharing schemes ?
APPENDIX C
ON THE EXISTENCE OF SURVEY BIAS 
Following Plosser et.al .(1982) a robust test of survey bias can be
constructed by the addition of an independent set of observations.
Thus the following questionnaire sent to non-respondents in the first
round can be used to detect any significant differences between the
initial sample and a second independent sample. This in turn can give
an indication of the type of characteristics apparent in the rest of
a population. If for example characteristic 'a' is apparent in the
second sample and not in the first then we may infer that subsequent
non-respondents are likely to have that characteristic.
Using a test of the differences in two population proportions it can
be shown, by the use of t-tests on the actual and expected values of
the second survey, that there is no evidence (statistically) that
the two samples come from a different population, and therefore
there is no evidence of survey bias. Tables Al to A7 are included
to show that there is no bias. Figures in parenthesis are expected
response rates for the second sample given the response in the first.
However, straightforward comparison of expected and actual values from
the second survey do suggest some differences in one area, namely
managerialism. Whilst there is not statistical foundation for this
characteristic we must be aware that with such a small sample size in
the second sample the t-statistics may be underestimating their true
value. The implication is that a number of the missing firms might
have rather larger degrees of managerialism than that suggested in
the survey.
Reference:
Plosser, C I, Schwert, G W and White, H (1982). Differencing as a test
of specification. International Economic Review, 23, 535-552.
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Table Al: Aims of the Co-operative 
Common areas of response
General aim reported
	
Number of co-operatives
reporting this aim
Original Survey Follow-up t-value
The provision of employment/security
of employment 23 3	 (4.1) 0.17
The production and promotion of
socially worthwhile goods 22 2	 (4) 0.29
Working with and responsibility
towards the community 8 0 (1.4) 0.37
Profitability and good rates of pay 9 3	 (1.6) -0.28
Viability of the co-operative/
production to 'make a living' 9 1	 (1.6) 0.14
Promoting the co-operative sector 12 1	 (2.1) 0.24
Equal status for women and minority
groups 9 0	 (1.6) 0.39
Growth 5 3	 (0.9) -0.53
High quality of workmanship/creativity 6 2	 (1.1) -0.22
Training and skills development 12 0	 (2.1) 0.45
Provision of good working conditions 6 1	 (1.1) 0.02
Non-exploitation 5 1	 (0.9) -0.02
No response 15 5	 (2.7) -0.36
- 3 -
Table A2: Distribution of Surplus (where applicable)
Destination of surplus
Number of co-operatives
distributing at least
some of the surplus to
this area
Original Survey Follow-up t-value
Members 44 10 (8) -0.19
Re-investment 53 12 (9.6) -0.21
Charity 18 2	 (3.2) 0.20
Other co-operatives 6 1	 (1.1) 0.02
Non-respondents = 6
_ 4 _
Table A3: Wage Payments 
Original Survey Follow-up t-value
Co-operatives paying members
regular wages 52 10	 (9.5) -0.05
Co-operatives not paying regular
wages 10 2	 (1.8) -0.04
Non-respondents 4 o (0.7) -0.26
Wages paid in the co-operative
compared with the non-co-operative
sector
Lower 25 2	 (4.5) 0.35
About the same 20 5	 (3.6) -0.20
Higher 12 3 (2.2) -0.15
Don't know 7 2	 (2.1) -0.17
Non-respondents 2 0 (0.4) 0.19
Co-operatives paying members
according to the same rate of pay 44 9	 (8) -0.10
Co-operatives paying members
differing rates 19 3	 (3.4) 0.07
Non-respondents 3 0 (0.5) 0.23
Table A4: Responses to Question 17 
Do you consider there are productivity advantages to be gained from
co-operative organisations which do not exist in conventional firms?
Areas commonly cited by those believing
there to be productivity advantages
Number of co-operatives
citing this area
Original Survey Follow-up t-valuE
Motivation 5 1	 (0.9) -0.02
Flexibility 9 2	 (1.6) -0.08
Commitment 15 4	 (2.7) -0.21
No demarcation/No unionisation 5 0	 (0.9) 0.29
Self monitoring/No shirking 7 1	 (2.1) 0.07
Members receive the benefits of
their labour
4 1	 (0.7) -0.09
8 2	 (1.4) -0.12
Happy atmosphere
Areas commonly cited by those believing
there to be productivity advantages
Number of co-operatives
citing this area
Original survey Follow-up t-value
Slow decision making process 4 1	 (0.7) -0.08
Work effort is not expected to be
so intense 2 1	 (0.4)
-0.26
Inability to raise money for expansion 4 0	 (0.7) 0.26
Humanist aims are not compatible with
high productivity 3 0 (0.5) 0.23
Summary of responses: Yes No Don't Know Non-respondents
Original survey 32 11 2 21
Follow-up 5	 (5.8) 2	 (2) 1	 (0.4) 3	 (0.5)
t-value 0.10 0 -0.26 0.12
- 6 -
Table A5: Allocation of Work Amongst Members of the Co-operative 
Allocation device Number of co-operatives
citing this as a method
of job allocation
Original Survey Follow-up t-value
Work is divided on specific skill
lines 41 6	 (7.4) 0.15
Certain jobs have always been done
by the same people 12 3	 (2.1) -0.15
Work is rotated 9 0	 (1.6) 0.39
There is not specific division of
labour 17 4	 (3.1) -0.14
Allocation is done by a manager
or management team 6 4	 (1.3) -0.65
Other 0 0 (0) 0
Non-respondents 4 0	 (0.7) 0.26
- 7 -
Table A6: Decision Making in the Co-operaive Enterprise 
Co-operatives reported the following
strategies for decision making
Number of
co-operatives
On a day to day basis
Original Survey Follow-up t-vall
A single manager makes the decisions 20 2	 (3.6) 0.2
A management team makes the decisions 13 7	 (2.4) -0.7,
All members decide democratically on
decisions 26 3	 (4.7) 0.2:
Other (not specified) 1 1	 (0.2) -0.4]
Non-respondents 6 6	 (1.1) -1.0(
When deciding on longer term policy
A single manager makes the decisions 0 0 (0) 0
A management team makes the decisions 4 5	 (0.7) -1.0C
All members decide democratically on
decisions 54 7	 (9.8) 0.25
Other (not specified) 2 0 (0.4) 0.18
Non-respondents 6 0 (1.3) 0.32
,
Where applicable were managers democratically elected?
Yes No Not Clear/No Response
Original survey 20 5 8
Follow-up 7	 (3.6) 2	 (0.9) 0	 (1.4)
t -value -0.46 -0.29 0.37
8Table A7: Question 18 
Are you operating in a market sector which is generally dominated by:
Original Survey Follow-up t -value
(a) Large Competitors Y = 28 5 (5.1) 0.01
N = 29 7 (5.3) -0.21
no response = 9 0 (1.6) 0.40
(b) Large Buyers Y = 18 3 (3.3) 0.04
N = 36 9 (6.6) -0.26
no response = 12 0 (2.1) 0.45
Commonly stated influences on
the co-operative - as stated
by respondents:
No of co-operatives
stating this factor
(a)	 Large Competitors
Original Survey Follow-up t-value
6 0	 (1.1) 0.32little because we specialise
they make us more efficient
they focus our trade on
particular sectors
they enforce restrictions
and push down prices
3
3
4
0 (0.5)
1	 (0.5)
1	 (0.7)
0.23
-0.16
-0.09
(b)	 Large Buyers
3 1	 (0.5) -0.16
they dictate prices and
discounts
they make us more efficient
we would not exist without
them
4
3
0	 (0.7)
0 (0.5)
0.26
0.23
TESTS OF THE DIFFERENCE IN TWO POPULATION PROPORTIONS 
Suppose we have two populations, 1 and 2, with respective success
proportions pi and p 2 • Then sample proportions pi, for samples of
n, from population 1 are normally distributed. Likewise with sample
proportions p2.
The standard error of the proportion is
se (pi) =	 Plql
and similarly
se
	
]
(P2) =	 P2q2
n2
The standard error of the difference between the sample proportions
is given by
se (p i -13 2 )
	
Plql	 112(12
+
	
ni	 n2
Correcting for degrees of freedom the standard error becomes
1
se (p 1-p2) =	 ni Plq i 	 n2 P2q2
n1 -1	 n2-1
111	n2 - 2
and we can use a t-test with (n1-n2-2) degrees of freedom to detect
differences between an actual observation in the second sample and a
predicted value based on the first sample. The critical t-value at
a 57. significance level with 76 degrees of freedom being 1.67.
